March 24, 2005

Horror in Tel-Aviv, Mass Murder in Darfur, Incitement, Talia Sasson's Report on the Illegal Outposts in the West Bank, Racism, Center for Democratic Studies, Crisis in High Education, Maale Edumim, Separating State from Religion, Poll among Youth on Serving in the Territories, Israel Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 2 (April 2005), Lebanon, Hizballah and Amal, Terri Schiavo, Earth and Moon Viewer, Books


Dear friends and colleagues,


Horror in Tel-Aviv

On Friday, February 25, the horror returned to Tel Aviv. A suicide bomber wanted to enter a dancing club, the guards inspected him and when he realized he will not be able to enter he exploded at the entrance. Five people killed, and more than fifty injured. My wife and I were fifteen minutes away from the place as we returned from the theatre.

This was a sad reminder that some Palestinian organizations will continue to attack at the heart of Israel, that talks about "new paths" for peace failed to convince them, that there is still great necessity for guards in every public place in Israel (the industry was shrinking as some relaxed to think that with Abu Mazen the horror is behind us), and that the Palestinian Authority cannot avoid confronting the terror organizations, disarming them, and sending their leaders to spend the next years of the lives behind bars. The "politics of numbers" comes into play yet again. If the next explosion will be too painful for Israel to bear, we will enter the Palestinian cities with great force and then the result would be yet another major setback for tranquility.


Mass Murder in Darfur

The Sudanese Government, using Arab "Janjaweed" militias, its air force, and organized starvation, is deliberately and systematically killing the black Sudanese of Darfur. Over a million people, driven from their homes, now face death from starvation and disease as the Government and militias attempt to prevent humanitarian aid from reaching them. The same forces have destroyed the people of Darfur's villages and crops, and poisoned their water supplies, and they continue to murder, rape and terrorise.

The International Community has tough words for Sudan but threats to act are mild, with the strongest suggestions being economic sanctions on Sudan. But the Sudanese are accustomed to sanctions, and even the toughest sanctions take months to have any impact. The Khartoum government is skilled at using negotiations to delay. They know all they need is another few weeks and their terrible work will be done. Of all things we must not allow in Darfur, it is delay. Only one thing will stop the killing in Sudan: an immediate international intervention to protect the people of Darfur and deliver aid to them. I call upon governments and the United Nations to intervene immediately to protect civilians and guarantee the delivery of humanitarian aid in Darfur, Sudan. I call on the UN Security Council to mandate the International Criminal Court to investigate those responsible for the Darfur genocide. Sign a petition on http://www.darfurgenocide.org/action.htm


Incitement

The incitement continues. On February 27, 2005 head of SHABAC Avi Dichter presented the cabinet with a selection of letters sent to senior figures that included extremist statements. One of the letters read: "A din rodef has been placed on the prime minister and he must be murdered." To recall, din rodef was instrumental in the incitement campaign against Yitzhak Rabin leading to his assassination on November 4, 1995. "Din rodef" is an ancient rabbinical decree that allows Jews to kill other Jews who worked for an enemy.

The letters also read "Yigal Amir lives, Rabin is dead, Sharon will die" and "Sharon will meet Arafat in hell." Justice Minister Tzipi Livni told the cabinet that preparations for the disengagement include the creation of dedicated units whose sole job will be to combat incitement and those causing disorder. Minister Haim Ramon attacked the justice system saying it was unacceptable that blatantly inciteful statements can be made against Sharon and other senior figures without any response from the legal system. He rightly asked for practical law enforcement steps be taken.


Talia Sasson's Report on the Illegal Outposts in the West Bank

On March 8, 2005 attorney Talia Sasson submitted her report on West Bank outposts to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. There were no great revelations, just systematic data that confirmed what we already know. Some of the illegal settlement outposts in the West Bank were both planned and funded by the Housing Ministry, including a number of those built on private Palestinian land. The report essentially confirms longstanding complaints by Palestinians and activist groups like Peace Now that successive Israeli governments, including those in power after the signing of the Oslo Accords in the early 1990s, approved and financed for decades the establishment of outpost settlements on privately-owned Palestinian land.

In light of the harsh accusations, Sasson recommended that the Housing Ministry be stripped of authority over construction of settlements in the West Bank, and that this power be transferred to the cabinet. Housing Minister Isaac Herzog (Labour) said following the release of the report that every expense earmarked for the settlements will now need the approval of the ministry's director-general. Up until now, the heads of each department at the ministry have been able to sign off on expenses for various construction and infrastructure matters at the settlements.
Sasson reported that a number of government ministries had failed to hand over some of the information she requested. Therefore, the list of outposts that appears in the report is not a complete one. "I do not have a full picture of all the outposts," she said. The report names "only" 105 illegal outposts in the West Bank. Of them twenty four were established after March 2001, in blunt violation of the Israeli government's promise to the Bush administration. Of the twenty four, 15 were built on private Palestinian land.

Sasson also called on Attorney General Menachem Mazuz to look into the involvement of government employees in the establishment of illegal outposts, and prosecute the offenders.
Talia Sasson said the complacency over unauthorized settlement outpost construction was not limited to the Housing Ministry alone, accusing the IDF Civil Administration and the Defense Ministry of involvement. According to Sasson, the Defense Ministry must approve any trailers being placed in the West Bank - which in fact it did, in contradiction of the defense minister's instructions.

Sasson said she does not know whether the ministers themselves knew what their ministries were doing, and that it is possible other ministries were also involved in the outpost construction.

Following the report's publication, Yahad-Meretz Chairman Yossi Beilin called for a formal government investigation into the matter, with ministries legally compelled to provide all relevant information. Infrastructure Minister Benjamin Ben-Eliezer called on the government to take "clear and drastic" action against the outposts. Generally speaking, while the Labour ministers voiced alarm and wished to take immediate steps against the outsposts, the Likud ministers were far more moderate in their reaction. After all, the report is hardly news to them.
The U.S. administration warned Israel that its failure to keep its promise to remove all outposts established in the West Bank since March 2001 will harm relations between the countries, and could have an impact on American aid to Israel. At their last meeting, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told Dov Weisglass, the prime minister's adviser, that President Bush expects Jerusalem to take immediate action based on the conclusions and recommendations in Sasson's report on the outposts.

Talia Sasson had worked in the Attorney General's office. Inter alia, she headed the small unit that tracked down incitements and decided whether to press charges against inciters. Recently she retired and now works as an independent lawyer.

A few years ago I hosted her on one of my TV talk shows (Academic Channel), together with the former Attorney General Michael Ben-Yair. The tension between the two was noticeable. The "Incitement Unit" was established immediately after the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin, under the leadership of Ben-Yair. I was surprised to know that the Unit was established more or less without the blessing of Ben-Yair. I found this most interesting, especially given the special circumstances that brought about the decision.

I had talks with a few former attorney generals in Israel in which I raised the issues that Sasson reported now, with particular alarm that some of the legal outposts serve as hotbeds for political extremism, operating outside the confines of the law, using the weapons supplied by the IDF against Palestinians without too much interest of law enforcement authorities. There was, still is, a common saying among radical settlers: The law stops at the Tapuach Junction (Kfar Tapuach is settled by Kach followers, Meir Kahane's banned party). They never seemed too surprised, going into lengthy explanations how difficult it is to infiltrate those settlements and obtain the proof needed for prosecution, the reluctance of the security forces to challenge those settlers, their fear of the zealots, etc. This reminded me of South Africa: first you supply radicals with weapons; then surprisingly the weapon is used against whoever is described as an "enemy"; and it is too risky for the security forces to intervene, thus turning a blind eye to what is going on. When you plant seeds of hatred, you will reap blood.


Racism

A new poll, published by Yedioth Ahronoth ("Racist? Me?") on March 22, 2005, p. 8 (24 Hours section) among Jews in Israel testifies about the seriousness of racism in our society. Here are some of the findings:
23% would not marry religious people, nor would like their children to marry religious people;
15% would not marry people of Middle-Eastern origins, nor would like their children to marry people of Middle Eastern origins;
21% would not marry people of Russian origins, nor would like their children to marry people of Russian origins;
79% would not marry Arab people, nor would like their children to marry Arab people;
53% are not willing to live next to an Arab family;
22% are not willing to live next to an Ethiopian family;
38% would not buy a used car from an Arab;
22% believe that religious people get too many rights.

I reiterate the importance of education in primary and high schools. Grass root work is of immense importance. Alas it is not within the priorities of the present Minister of Education. The Center of Democratic Studies at the University of Haifa could do the job, if only we had the resources to tackle the problem.


Center for Democratic Studies

I still have not nominated Chairperson of the Governing Board of the Center as I did not find the right person to fill the position. I am looking for an affluent Israeli, with connections in business and/or high tech, access to financial resources who is committed to the ideas and principles of democracy, and would be willing to dedicate time and energy to mobilize the funds necessary for the multiple projects the Center would like to pursue. If you have any ideas and suggestions regarding the appropriate such person, please let me know. Your advice is highly appreciated.


Crisis in High Education

During the past few years the Ministry of Education had cut the budgets of all universities in Israel by some 40 (forty) percent! Each year a 10% cut was declared. All the fat in the universities evaporated in 2001. Then the meat was eaten. Now they are hurting the bones. The skeleton is fighting to remain alive against all odds. All universities went into a severe crisis. Working conditions have become difficult, very difficult. Photocopying papers became a luxury. The sad thing is that no one cared. The presidents of all universities wanted a meeting with Prime Minister Sharon. For two years they were begging to see him. However, Sharon's busy schedule did not allow such opportunity. Israeli government has other priorities. Money was tunneled to colleges, yeshivas, revising high school teaching. The government is not interested in providing quality education. It is interested in providing popular education: granting degrees without much efforts, to enable people to ask for an increase in their salaries. This way everyone is happy, and the voices of alarm raised by the academia were lonely cries in the wilderness. Scholarship, merit, excellence – all became obsolete. Instant education, this is what the people want, or, better still, like coffee without coffee, soap without soap, why not education without education? Degrees from tenth-rate institutions are bought with money. One MP obtained degrees without attending the college in which he was supposed to enroll, submitting papers of other students. He was caught with hard evidence. No one knows how many do the same and complete their degrees in such dishonest ways.

As said, no one cared until Tel Aviv University, arguably in the worse condition of all universities, all rely on public funding, decided to unify some departments and to close others. Last week Tel Aviv students raised their outcry, and suddenly people begin to notice the crisis. The universities are fighting for their lives. On March 28, 2005 a general strike is declared in all universities. I hope this will be the first step in a long battle against the "anti-elite" government to change its agenda and thinking. Maybe Labour ministers will take issue and join our struggle. We need to do something now in order to change the government's priorities, or else we will witness the day when the first Israeli university will be required to close its gates and declare bankruptcy.


Maale Edumim

On March 21, 2005 Israel publicly confirmed plans to build 3,500 new housing units in the largest Jewish settlement in the West Bank, Maale Adumim. At present some 30,000 people live in Maale Adumim. The government often describe Maale Adumim as part of "greater Jerusalem" that will be part of Israel in any future peace agreement. Palestinians angrily responded that such an action would violate the Middle East peace plan and would be a major obstacle to resolving bitter disputes over nearby Jerusalem.

In practical terms, the expansion of Maale Adumim creates two major problems. First, Palestinians living in East Jerusalem and nearby areas will be effectively boxed in, with no room to grow. "This project may be one of the biggest obstacles to reaching a two-state solution," said Yariv Oppenheimer of Peace Now, an Israeli group that monitors settlements. "This will cut off Jerusalem to the east with Jewish settlements."

Also, an expanded Maale Adumim would serve as a barrier between the northern and southern parts of the West Bank. Palestinians traveling between the two parts would face a lengthy detour, though Israeli officials have hinted that they may build a bypass road.

Critics also called the expansion a violation of Israel's pledge under the road map, which calls for a freeze of all settlement activity. Israel has interpreted that to mean that it can continue building in existing settlements. Israel also says the peace plan is not currently being carried out because the Palestinian leadership has yet to act against Palestinian factions responsible for attacks on Israelis, as the plan requires.

About 230,000 Jewish settlers live in the West Bank, and the number is increasing by at least 10,000 each year. In addition, more than 200,000 Israelis live in East Jerusalem, which Israel annexed after capturing it in the Arab-Israeli war of 1967.

The same day of the Maale Adumim decision, March 21, Israel handed over security control to the Palestinians in the West Bank town of Tulkarm, a hotbed of Palestinian militants. Last month Israel agreed to transfer security control of five Palestinian towns in the West Bank, and Tulkarm is the second one to be handed over, after Jericho last week.

Another recent positive development: Egypt sent a new ambassador to Tel Aviv after a few years of a vacant decision.


Separating State from Religion

Further testimony of the need to separate between state and religion is evident from reading the latest report of the Central Bureau of Statistics. 7.089 Israelis, 8.2% of the total number of citizens that married in 2002, chose to marry abroad. The report also shows that 74% of those marrying abroad are Israeli Jews.

The Israel Religious Action Center (IRAC) sent an urgent letter to the Prime Minister, demanding that the work of the government committee aimed at solving the plight of those "unable to marry" (minuei-chitun) be renewed. In this way, according to the Reform Movement, the continuing harm to the fundamental rights of hundreds of thousands of Israelis unable to marry in Israel according to their conscience or are unable to marry at all -- can come to an end.

"The fact that thousands of Israelis go abroad each year, and are ready to present themselves before a foreign authority as a result of no choice, testifies to the feeble policy of Israel", states (IRAC's) letter, quite rightly. The situation needs to be changed, sooner the better, or more and more Israelis will fell alienated from the state in which they live.


Poll among Youth on Serving in the Territories

A poll conducted in February 2005 by Bar Ilan University among 508 people, aged 16-18 (published by Maariv, March 9, 2005, pp. 12-13), about their willingness to serve in the army, and in what capacity, shows that 76% of the secular youth wishes to serve (83% among religious youth); 43% want to do combat service (62% among religious youth); 13% refuse to evacuate settlements (36% among the religious youth); 42% refuse to serve in the territories (29% of the religious youth). Slowly but surely the occupied territories are conceived as a liability by a growing number of people. Slowly but surely the settlements are loosing their legitimacy in the public eye. Common sense does prevail. Sometimes it hesitates, but at the end it will win its way. Israel is on the right track, after so many years of empowering the occupation and deligetimizing the Palestinians. More and more people believe that two-state solution is the only viable solution to end the bloodshed in our troubled region. Hallelujah.


Israel Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 2 (April 2005)

I am the editor of special issue of this journal that appears in London. This volume is quite special. Usually when academics edit books we invite fellow academics to write the chapters. However, decision makers are often critical of this practice, especially when academics reflect on their doing. They argue, quite rightly, that it is very simple to sit outside the tent and to piss inside, that the academics' outlook would have been quite different were they the bearers of responsibility. With responsibility comes a very different perspective that could not comfortably accommodate the moral outlook that academics advocate.

For these reasons, I decided that a volume on Israeli institutions should be written by people who served in power positions. Most of the articles were written by decision makers, and they are fascinating. When you read, note not only the content but also what they decided not to address. Of all my edited volumes, I am particularly proud of this one. Hereby the table of contents:

Introduction
Raphael Cohen-Almagor


General

The Crisis of Governance: Government Instability and the Civil Service
David Nachmias and Ori Arbel-Ganz

Citizenship Education in Israel – A Jewish-Democratic State
Orit Ichilov, Gavriel Salomon and Dan Inbar

The Military-Political Complex: The IDF’s Influence over Policy towards the Palestinians Since 1987
Yoram Peri

On the Need for A Constitution
Meir Shamgar


Institutions

Presidency in Israel: Formal Authority and Personal Experience
Yitzhak Navon

The Government
Gad Yaakobi

The Knesset
Naomi Chazan

The Attorney General in Israel – A Delicate Balance of Powers and Responsibilities in a Jewish and Democratic State
Elyakim Rubinstein

Particularistic Considerations and the Absence of Strategic Assessment in the Israeli Public Administration: The Role of the State Comptroller
Eliezer Goldberg

The Press Council
Raphael Cohen-Almagor


Final Word

Israeli Institutions at the Crossroads
Raphael Cohen-Almagor

I thank the Journal's chief editor, Prof. Efraim Karsh, for his thoughtful cooperation. This volume will also appear as a book by Routledge later this year. Notification will be announced in due course.


Lebanon, Hizballah and Amal

Infra excerpts of a recent article published by the GLORIA Center, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol.9, No.1 (March 2005). The author is Dr. Rodger Shanahan, a Visiting Fellow at the Research Institute for Asia and the Pacific, University of Sydney, who teaches in the university's Department of Arabic and Islamic Studies. The author shows the extent of Syria's involvement in Lebanon's internal politics, and emphasizes the rise of the Hizballah. Israel is investing lot of efforts in convincing Europe to include the Hizballah in its black list of terrorist organizations. For many European countries the Hizballah is considered as political organization that was involved in a just guerrilla warfare against the IDF in Lebanon. Not much attention was given to its launching of rockets on Israeli towns across the border, although I should say that since the American presence in Iraq those incidents became rare.
Hizballah Rising: The Political Battle for the Loyalty of the Shi'a of Lebanon

By Rodger Shanahan

While the future political direction taken by the Shi'a majority in Iraq is of immense interest to U.S. policy makers, a longer-running political contest is still being played out in another part of the Arab world for the political loyalty of the same community. Since the re-emergence of elections following the end of the civil war in Lebanon, where the Shi'a represent the largest of the communal groups,[1] both Amal and Hizballah have been forced to run on joint electoral tickets for the national elections. Running on joint lists thus allowed the two Shi'a political parties represented in parliament to avoid a direct electoral showdown. In the local government elections held in May and June 2004, however, candidates ran on separate electoral tickets, giving a better indication of each party's popularity. On the face of it, the results indicate that Hizballah has moved well ahead of Amal as the preferred political representative of the Shi'a community. However, as is the case with anything related to Lebanese politics, the results not only reflect the local political popularity of the two parties, but were also heavily influenced by the broader strategic desires of the dominant foreign force in Lebanon: Syria.

The contest between Hizballah and Amal for the position of pre-eminent representative of the Shi'a community has, at times, been a heated one. Although Amal had its genesis in the Movement of the Dispossessed (Harakat al-Mahrumin), founded by the charismatic scholar ('alim) Musa as-Sadr, it turned briefly to the secular leadership of Husayn Husayni in 1979, and since 1980, Nabih Berri. Hizballah, on the other hand, has retained the leadership of the party in the hands of the scholars, in line with its ideological linkage with, and jurisprudential loyalty to, the Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamene'i. Indeed, many of Hizballah's early founders came from the ranks of disaffected Amal members who were disillusioned with the party's embrace of the secular political system. Both Islamic Amal members and members of the Da'wa who had joined Amal were prominent in the establishment of Hizballah. Like all groups vying for the political loyalty of the same constituency, however, the two groups developed into fierce rivals, and conflict between the two groups has generally existed right below the surface. Between 1985 and 1988, at the height of the intra-communal dispute, Hizballah and Amal militia members fought a series of bloody engagements in the south of the country. More recently though, any violence between the two parties has been small scale and very localized, and is normally centered over local electoral disputes.

Because of the complex nature of Lebanese politics, and the use by Syria of the Lebanese political process in pursuit of its own foreign political objectives, it is difficult to draw clear conclusions from events such as elections. In the case of the 2004 municipal elections, however, it is clear that Hizballah emerged as a much stronger party than its rival Amal. In the south of the country, Hizballah emerged victorious in over 60 percent of municipalities (compared with 55 percent in 1998), while Amal captured only 30 percent of municipalities (down from 45 percent in 1998). Hizballah also did very well in southern Beirut and the Biqa', particularly in Ba'albak, where it had taken its support for granted in 1998 and been dealt a heavy blow, winning only a few of the municipalities. With the benefit of a well-organized campaign in the region, Hizballah gained control in 27 of the 30 municipalities that it contested in the Biqa'.[2]

Hizballah's relative success can be put down to a number of factors, some of which emanate from purely domestic politics, and others that are of longer-term strategic importance. As far as Syria was concerned, the dynamics of this municipal election were different from others, in that Damascus was happy for a more realistic reflection of local political attitudes towards Hizballah and Amal to be displayed. Whereas it has been Syria's wish for the two parties to maintain a balance during national elections in order to ensure that no one communal group becomes dominant enough to challenge Syrian primacy, in the case of the Shi'a parties there was a relatively low-key approach taken to these local elections. As a consequence, Hizballah was able to display its strength in the heartlands of the Lebanese Shi'a: the Biqa', the southern suburbs (dahiyya) of Beirut, and South Lebanon. That is not to say that there was no action on the part of the Syrians to influence the outcomes. In the Biqa' for example, Hizballah formed an electoral alliance with the pro-Syrian Ba'th party, which made it difficult for Amal to form an effective, politically popular counter-alliance.

Syria's decision to ultimately allow both parties to contest the elections without being forced into an electoral alliance with each other was motivated in part by external considerations. No doubt realizing the level of popular support that Hizballah possessed, Syria realized that the elections would provide the United States, in particular, with a public example of how genuinely popular the party was politically. Following the late 2001 proscription of Hizballah as a terrorist organization by the United States, the Syrian government wished to signal to Washington the reality of the situation on the ground in Lebanon. By association, Syria, as the hegemon within Lebanon, was also signaling to the United States its own continuing relevance within the region. This was particularly important following the passing of the Syria Accountability Act and the Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act in October 2003 by the U.S. House of Representatives. The Syria Accountability Act, for example, stated that "...the Government of Syria should immediately and unconditionally halt support for terrorism, permanently and openly declare its total renunciation of all forms of terrorism, and close all terrorist offices and facilities in Syria, including the offices of Hizballah."[3] By illustrating to the world the political popularity of Hizballah within Lebanon, Syria hoped to dilute the impact of the bill and show the United States that Hizballah was a legitimate political reality within Lebanon. Such was the intent of the statement by Syrian president Bashar Assad when he claimed that the elections "defined the true political sizes" in Lebanon.[4]

Of course, more than just Syrian political considerations account for Hizballah's success. The party is genuinely popular, both as a consequence of its resistance activities that prompted the 2000 withdrawal of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) from the country's south, as well as its ability to achieve the return of prisoners from Israeli jails in return for the remains of IDF soldiers. There were concerns in some quarters that Hizballah's popularity was rooted too deeply in support for its resistance against the Israelis occupying South Lebanon. For Hizballah, the withdrawal of the Israelis in 2000 provided a great fillip to the organization, and gave it the ability to announce both its Lebanese nationalist credentials, as well as its wider authority as the only Arab group to defeat Israel militarily. In the immediate aftermath of the perceived victory, it has also given the party's machinery the ability to cement its southern support. The party was instrumental in repairing village housing and some infrastructure damaged during years of resistance, while at the same time the creation of the dispute surrounding the ownership of the Sheba'a farms area allowed Hizballah to maintain its armed militias and to undertake military operations against Israel. The refusal of the Lebanese government to use its military to control the border region also allows Hizballah a free hand. Without the resistance, Hizballah fears becoming a sectarian form of the emasculated Amal. With its military wing however, the party has a regional relevance that its opposition is denied.

While its success against the IDF gained it great kudos, the military wing of Hizballah these days must be managed far more judiciously by Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah than in the pre-2000 period. While Israel remains an unpopular neighbor amongst the Lebanese (particularly amongst those from the south), the United Nations' rejection of Lebanon's (Syrian-inspired) claims to the Sheba'a Farms has presented the Islamic Resistance with a conundrum. With no unfulfilled UN Resolution behind its military operations, Hizballah's military actions in the south are carried out without the full support of the local population, especially given the Israeli reactions which follow. The more that Hizballah carries out military action in the Sheba'a farms for its own and others' strategic purposes, the more it risks alienating the Lebanese polity, the majority of whom lack any affinity with the Sheba'a farms issue.

Hizballah appears to understand the limitations of relying too heavily on its military component, however, and the party planned for the period following the withdrawal of Israel from Lebanon. It has always been active within the Lebanese Shi'a community as a significant provider of social services, and has been careful in maintaining a reputation for probity that eludes Amal. Of particular note is its ability to mobilize its supporters to achieve both its strategic and local political purposes. This is one aspect that will be of the utmost importance to the party in the long term as it continues to establish itself as a major player in the Lebanese political scene. In May 2004, the party was able to stage a mass rally of over 250,000 people in Beirut to protest at U.S. military incursions into the Iraqi holy sites at Karbala and Najaf, indicating its mass appeal.[6] Illustrative of the ability of the party to mobilize its support base at the local level was the fact that voter turnout was particularly good in the regions where Hizballah was strong. In Ba'albak, for example, over 70 percent of registered voters participated, while the figure for Nabatiyyah in the South was approximately 65 percent of voters. This compares with a figure of just over 20 percent for Beirut, and 30 percent for Sunni-dominated Tripoli.

While there is little doubt that Hizballah has become a well-organized, unified and multi-faceted organization, its rival for the loyalty of the Shi'a community has suffered in comparison. The municipal election results capped several bad years for Amal since their performance in the 1998 municipal elections. Amal's standing as a representative political party has fallen significantly since that time, particularly at the local level. Originally founded as a party designed to represent the interests of the economically and politically disenfranchised Shi'a population, its establishment heralded the emergence of a sectarian-led attempt to alter the political status quo that had for centuries deprived the community of a political voice. The early years of the party were full of promise, but more recently the very same party has lost much of its moral authority as its closeness with the government has led to charges of corruption against it. Amal is battling to stay level with Hizballah, whose members are meticulous about maintaining a public reputation for financial probity and an active opposition stance within government.

One of the consequences of this fall in popularity of the Amal movement is the emergence of internal disputes within the party. This was illustrated in March 2003, when Nabih Berri expelled six members from the party, including three members of parliament, two of whom were ministers.[7]

The future for Amal appears uncertain. The party is dominated by Nabih Berri, who has proven to be a staunch supporter of Syria. Although a dominant force, the recent expulsion from the party of several high-powered members attests to the fact that Berri, not for the first time, faces challenges to his authority from within the party. At the same time, the willingness of Amal's Central Council to unanimously confirm his decision to expel members attests to the fact that Berri is still very much in control of the party. While national parliamentary elections are due to be held in 2005, the nature of the Lebanese political system and Syria's place in it should guarantee parity between Amal and Hizballah. Syria has always been careful to maintain a degree of balance between the two parties, and while it was willing to send a message by allowing Hizballah to flex its muscles during the local government elections, its desire for balance will likely see it force the two parties into running joint electoral tickets again in 2005. Similarly, having seen Hizballah's political strength demonstrated, Syria is likely to continue backing Berri, both because he has been a loyal ally and because they fear tilting the Shi'a political balance towards Hizballah.

While Hizballah is also dependent on both Syria and Iran to varying degrees, the party has earned a reputation for integrity that eludes Amal. That having been said, neither party attracts many active supporters outside the Shi'a community, limiting either's claims to be truly national parties.

Hizballah has a long-term political strategy regarding its role within Lebanon. While it long ago acquiesced to the realities of multi-confessional Lebanon by rejecting its revolutionary strategy for the achievement of an Islamic state, it has never rejected the desire to see Lebanon ruled in accordance with Islamic precepts as its ultimate objective.[9] While this continues to mean that it is viewed with suspicion by many Lebanese, the party has saved its fiery rhetoric for external issues, such as United States intervention in Iraq and the continued Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory. Domestically, it has taken a strategic decision to act as the responsible political opposition, while pushing for electoral reforms that would ensure the Shi'a's numerical power is translated into political power. Both Amal and Hizballah have as one of their major aims to cease the sectarian basis of parliamentary representation that guarantees a political over-representation of the non-Shi'a population.[10] The parties have also sought to change the electoral law to lower the voting age from 21 to 18, which would similarly strengthen the hand of the Shi'a, given that this demographic is dominated by the Shi'a.

Hizballah understands that its political strategy within Lebanon must take into account three groups. First and foremost, it needs to gain the loyalty of a majority of the Shi'a community, as it is this group that will provide it with victory at the ballot box, and ensure its longevity as a political movement. Secondly, it needs to be accepted as a legitimate and responsible political party by the broader Lebanese polity. While the ultimate aims of Hizballah in terms of the Islamization of society mean that it will not be politically supported by many, if any, of the non-Shi'a Lebanese (particularly the Christian and Druze minorities), it aspires to be regarded as a responsible political player so that it can eventually achieve major leadership positions within the Lebanese political system that will allow it to achieve its goal. This is evident in Hizballah's successful attempts to position itself as the party representing the economically disadvantaged, regardless of communal identity. To that end it has an active involvement in the Lebanese trade union movement, while Hassan Nasrallah's held a meeting with then-Prime Minister Hariri in June 2004 to discuss the socio-economic impact of Lebanon's $34 billion debt (representing 185 per cent of Lebanon's GDP).[11] In addition to the balancing act it must undergo to navigate the difficult shoals of Lebanese domestic politics, it must also deal with Syria. As a party that portrays itself as a champion of Lebanese nationalism, exemplified by its militia's victory over the IDF, it must play a game of realpolitik with Syria. Support for Hizballah by Syria is dependent on Damascus's own interests. For that reason, Hizballah maintains good relations with Syria (a move at odds with its nationalist credentials) while building itself up politically for the day when Hizballah's resistance is of no use for the advancement of Syria's regional interests. While these three lines of strategy are difficult to achieve simultaneously, the 2004 local government success over Amal illustrates that the strategy is paying dividends within the community.


Terri Schiavo

On March 21, 2005 American Congress gave jurisdiction over Terri Schiavo to federal courts, an extraordinary legislative move that could empower a U.S. judge to order the reinsertion of a feeding tube that a state court allowed to be removed.

Voting 203 to 58, the House joined the Senate in approving the measure and rushing it to President Bush. He signed the bill into law, saying, "I will continue to stand on the side of those defending life for all Americans, including those with disabilities."

This statement, like many others, manifest the level of ignorance of people who speak about the case, and contribute to its being one of the loudest medical ethics dramas in history. Terri Schiavo is a peon in the hands of partisan people, with partisan agendas. However, I don't think anyone is capable of helping her.

When I embarked on my research on the right to die with dignity back in 1991, it was clear to me that I will not be able to study all the horrible diseases that exist on this planet. I decided to study one hopeless medical condition that I thought was the worse, and I thought that if I would be able to make intelligible conclusions about this condition then ipso facto the conclusions could relate to other medical conditions down the scale. At that time I thought the state of Post-Coma Unawareness, known in the medical circles as Persistent Vegetative State (a term I resent as I think it is unethical and does not serve the patient's best interests), is the worse medical condition. Since then I changed my mind and now I think locked-in syndrome is arguably worse, but I dedicated some years of my life to study PCU patients, reading every article I could reach, and visiting relevant departments in medical centers in Israel, Canada, the USA and the United Kingdom. In my research conclusions (The Right to Die with Dignity: An Argument in Ethics, Medicine, and Law, Piscataway, NJ.: Rutgers University Press, 2001) I urged hospitals as a policy not to cease treatment of post-traumatic PCU patients younger than 50 year-old within a period of less than two years. The two-year waiting period should be regarded as the minimum period of evaluation before forgoing hopes for patients’ rehabilitation and return to some form of cognition.

Terri Schiavo was born on December 3, 1963. She is younger than 50. However, the cause of condition was not traumatic. In February 1990 she suffered cardiac arrest; doctors believe a potassium imbalance caused her heart attack, which led to brain damage due to lack of oxygen, and she has been in this condition for more than fifteen years. There are a very few recorded patients in history who woke up after such a long period of time. All of them suffered irreparable brain damage and remained helpless and absolutely dependent on others until their very last day. I don't know what motives drive the Schindler family but I don't think their tireless efforts serve Terri Schiavo's best interests. One positive development that may result of this tragic controversy is that maybe more efforts and funding will be directed to study PCU, and the brain in general. Possibly PCU patients in the US will be better treated and maintained. Terri, I am afraid, is beyond all this.


Earth and Moon Viewer

See http://www.fourmilab.ch/earthview/vplanet.html
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We need to invest more in protecting our planet. It is beautiful.

Viewing the Earth

You can view either a map of the Earth showing the day and night regions at this moment, or view the Earth from the Sun, the Moon, the night side of the Earth, above any location on the planet specified by latitude, longitude and altitude, from a satellite in Earth orbit, or above various cities around the globe.
Images can be generated based on a full-colour image of the Earth by day and night, a topographical map of the Earth, up-to-date weather satellite imagery, or a composite image of cloud cover superimposed on a map of the Earth, a colour composite which shows clouds, land and sea temperatures, and ice, or the global distribution of water vapour. Expert mode allows you additional control over the generation of the image. You can compose a custom request with frequently-used parameters and save it as a hotlist or bookmark item in your browser. Please consult the Details for additional information and answers to frequently-asked questions.

Viewing the Moon

In addition to the Earth, you can also view the Moon from the Earth, Sun, night side, above named formations on the lunar surface. or as a map showing day and night. You can also make expert and custom images of the Moon. A related document compares the appearance of the Moon at perigee and apogee, including an interactive Perigee and Apogee Calculator.


Books

Idith Zertal and Akiva Eldar, Lords of the Land (Or Yehuda: Kinneret, Zmora-Bitan, Dvir, 2004) (Hebrew). The book provides a detailed review of the history of settlements since 1967. I expect an English translation soon.


With my very best wishes, as ever,

Rafi

My last communications are available on http://almagor.blogspot.comEarlier posts at my home page: http://lib-stu.haifa.ac.il/staff/rcohen-Almagor
Books archived at http://almagor.fetchauthor.info

February 2005


Comment on Prince Harry, Israel’s Punitive House Demolitions Since 2000, Human Rights in Israel, Peace Index, Syria, Dan Halutz, Excessive Media Ownership and Its Potential Threats to Democracy, Research and Lecture Tour to Holland and Belgium, Interview to Volkskrant, International Raoul Wallenberg Foundation's Campaign, Israel Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 1 (January 2005), Books, Photos


Dear friends and colleagues,


Comment on Prince Harry

SBK from Washington commented on Prince Harry:

No one has pointed out that, added to his evident ignorance and immaturity, the British press has implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, compared Israeli actions in the territories to that of the Nazis. Same among leftist politicians, and polls showed (at least before this incident) that a sizable portion of the British population (40% or so) do equate Israel with Nazi Germany. So why should he have any more reverance for Nazi symbolism that the British press, parliament and citizenry ?? Like any adolescent of average intelligence, Harry can presumably sense hypocrisy a mile away. Perhaps he's learned enough to know that the swastika is a symbolic toy and weapon, to be used for whatever purposes -- demonizing opponents, or amusing friends -- may be convenient.


Israel’s Punitive House Demolitions Since 2000

B’Tselem, the Israeli Human Rights organization, has issued its report on this issue. Its principle findings are:
· Since the beginning of the al-Aqsa intifada, the IDF has demolished 628 housing units, which were home to 3,983 persons.
· These homes were demolished because of the acts of 333 Palestinians. On average, 12 innocent people lost their home for every person suspected of participation in attacks against Israelis.
· Almost half of the homes demolished (295, or 47 percent) were never home to anyone suspected of involvement in attacks against Israelis. As a result of these demolitions, 1,286 persons lost their homes even though according to Israeli officials they should not have been punished.
· Contrary to its argument before the High Court of Justice that prior warning is given except in extraordinary cases, B’Tselem’s figures indicate that in only three percent of the cases were occupants given prior notification of the IDF’s intention to demolish their home.
· Extensive destruction of property in occupied territories, without military necessity, constitutes a war crime.


Three Different Kinds of House Demolitions

Over the last four years, Israel has demolished some 4,100 Palestinian homes in the Occupied Territories. About sixty percent of the demolitions were carried out in the framework of what Israel calls “clearing operations.” Some twenty-five percent were destroyed because Israel claims they were built without permit. The remaining fifteen percent were demolished as a means to punish the families and neighbors of Palestinians suspected of involvement in carrying out attacks against Israelis. These punitive demolitions are the focus of this report.


Punitive Demolitions Over the Years

Israel has demolished Palestinian houses as a punitive measure since the beginning of the occupation in 1967. The extent of such demolitions has varied over the years:
· From 1967 to the outbreak of the first intifada, in December 1987, Israel demolished or sealed at least 1,387 housing units, most in the first few years following occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
· Following the outbreak of the first intifada, Israel dramatically increased its use of house demolitions as a punishment. From 1988-1992, Israel completely demolished 431 housing units and partially demolished fifty-nine.
· From 1993 to 1997, Israel completely demolished eighteen housing units and partially demolished three units.
· From 1998 to October 2001, Israel did not demolish or seal any houses as punishment.
· In the course of the al-Aqsa intifada, Israel renewed with increased vigor its use of punitive house demolitions. As part of this policy, Israel demolished 628 homes from October 2001 to 20 September 2004. The official decision to renew the policy of punitive demolitions was made at a meeting of the Political-Security Cabinet on 31 July 2002, about nine months after the policy began in practice. This report analyzes Israel’s policy during this period.


Punishing the Innocent as Official Policy

The declared purpose of the punitive house demolitions is to deter potential attackers, by harming the relatives of Palestinians suspected of attacks against Israelis. Testimonies given to B’Tselem indicate that security forces occasionally use the threat of demolition to convince relatives of wanted persons to cooperate and turn over their relatives. Israel’s policy has left 3,983 Palestinians homeless since the beginning of the current intifada.

This measure does not directly harm the suspects themselves, who at the time of the demolition are not living in the house. According to B’Tselem’s statistics, thirty-two percent of the suspected offenders were in detention at the time of demolition, twenty-one percent were “wanted,” and forty-seven percent were dead. In addition, in many instances the IDF also destroyed houses adjacent to the house that was the target for demolition. These cases involved both apartments in the same building as the suspect’s apartment, and adjacent buildings. B’Tselem’s research indicates that in some cases the IDF explicitly intended to destroy the nearby houses. Yet, even if the IDF did not intend to damage nearby houses, the fact that there have been many such cases makes the lack of intention irrelevant. Since the beginning of the al-Aqsa intifada, the IDF demolished 295 such adjacent homes (about one-half of all homes demolished), in which 1,286 persons lived. However, statements made by the IDF Spokesperson’s Office following demolitions always mention one house, that in which the relevant individual lived, as the residence that was demolished.


Reason for Demolition: Not Just Suicide Bombings

The text of the decision made by the Political-Security Cabinet and reports in the media give the impression that Israel’s policy is directed only against Palestinians who were directly involved in attacks that caused many Israeli casualties. Yet in practice, Israel demolishes houses in response to involvement in any attempted violent act against Israelis, regardless of the results: from suicide bombings that leave many casualties to “failed” attacks against soldiers. Furthermore, the demolitions are aimed not only at the perpetrators, but also against the homes of individuals with any level of involvement in such attacks, either in the planning, the dispatching of the persons who carried out the attacks, or by providing assistance of some kind. According to B’Tselem’s figures, sixty-six percent of the demolitions were directed at the families of suspects who carried out attacks, while the remaining thirty-four percent were directed at those involved in other ways. In forty percent of the Palestinian attacks because of which the suspects’ homes were destroyed, no Israeli was killed.


No Prior Warning

Contrary to prior practice, since the policy was renewed in 2001, the IDF has generally not issued a demolition order, and has not given prior warning to the occupants before demolishing their home. The IDF gave prior warning in only seventeen cases, representing three percent of the total. Most of the demolitions take place at night, and the occupants are given only a few minutes to remove their possessions from the house.


Causing Severe Physical and Mental Harm

Testimonies given to B’Tselem indicate that the harm suffered by families affects almost all aspects of life: disruption of the family unit, as some families are forced to split up and live separately; sharp decline in the standard of living, as a result of the loss of property, even after the family finds substitute housing; and feelings of dependence and instability as a result of the loss of their home, which is more than just a place to provide shelter. Research on the psychological effects indicates that house demolitions have a substantial post-traumatic effect, primarily on children.


Violation of the Right to Housing

The right to adequate housing is well enshrined in international law. The right to housing is important because it is a prerequisite for the exercise of other rights, among them the right to an adequate standard of living, the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, and the right to family life. The right to housing is a vital component of the protection of the rights of children, who are entitled to special protection in international law. As the force in control in the Occupied Territories, Israel is required to respect the Palestinians’ right to housing.


Collective Punishment

Israel’s policy not only infringes the right to housing, it also breaches one of the most fundamental principles of justice: the prohibition on punishing a person for acts committed by another. The prohibition of collective punishment is especially stringent when the victims are children. The Fourth Geneva absolutely prohibits collective punishment without exception.

The Hague Regulations, on the other hand, recognize a narrow exception to this prohibition. The exception applies when occupants of the house intended for demolition knew or could foresee the act for which the army intends to demolish the house, and had the opportunity to prevent it. Despite this, state officials have often declared that prior knowledge or responsibility is not a precondition for the legality of the demolition. In the few cases in which the High Court addressed the question of indirect responsibility of family members for failing to prevent an attack, the justices relied on baseless assumptions to determine that the relatives knew about the attack during the planning stage. This approach is completely inconsistent with the High Court’s handling of the identical offense known in Israeli law as “failure to prevent a felony,” which calls for an extremely heavy burden of proof, in which the prosecution must prove that the defendant had positive, concrete, immediate, and significant information that a felony was about to occur.

Israel further argues that house demolitions are not punishment, but rather a means of deterrence. Therefore, the state contends, the act does not comprise collective punishment and thus does not violate international humanitarian law. The High Court accepted the state’s argument by making an analogy between house demolition and incarceration of the head of a family, which also harms the family. However, the comparison is flawed. The purpose of imprisonment is to deny certain rights to the offender. The suffering of his family is only a by-product which is not necessary to achieve the objective of the imprisonment.


Denying the Right to Due Process

Finally, demolition of houses is an administrative procedure based solely on suspicion, in which the occupants are denied the right to due process of law. Since the policy was renewed in 2001, Israeli has further denied due process by denying victims of the policy the fundamental right to plead their case to the authorities before the demolition is carried out. Israel justifies its failure to give prior warning on the grounds that the warning is “liable to endanger our forces, and cause the action to fail, because warning will enable the enemy to booby-trap the houses scheduled to be demolished, ambush our troops taking part in the action, and the like.” This justification is baseless. At least as far as the West Bank is concerned, the IDF has effective control throughout the area, and is constantly present in almost all the cities, villages, and refugee camps. Also, making demolitions an openly declared policy enables some families to anticipate the demolition of their home. Following recent suicide attacks, the Israeli media reported that the IDF intended to demolish the houses of the persons who carried out the attacks. Thus, the state can no longer justify denial of the right to be heard on the need to preserve the element of surprise.

In perfect timing, after the publication of this report the Ministry of Defence announced earlier this week that it no longer supports demolition of houses as a punitive measure, arguing that it does not really serve as deterrence and only increases hostility and hatred by Palestinian families who were affected by this draconic measure. Prudence does prevail. Sometimes it hesitates, sometimes it takes time, more than necessary.


Human Rights in Israel:
An Overview with Special Reference to Administrative Detention

Just published a short piece of mine: News and Journal 2004, The 21st Century Trust, London. I am thankful to the Trust (Paul and John) for permission to publish it in this forum.


Introduction

Israel is a young democracy under constant stress. It is situated within a hostile environment. Since its establishment in 1948 it experienced six wars (the 1948 Independence War; the 1956 Suez War; the 1967 Six Day War; the 1969-1970 War of Attrition; the 1973 Yom Kippur War; the 1982 Lebanon War), a Palestinian uprising (Intifada) that lasted six years (1987-1993), and since September 2000 it has been under constant terror attacks. Terrorism is not a new phenomenon. Israel has been facing terrorism since its inception but the last four years have been particularly harsh. In such a strenuous and abnormal reality respect for human and civic rights is held secondary to security considerations.
Israel is a land of immigrants. The Law of Return, passed on 5 July 1950, gives the Zionist doctrine its most forceful legal expression. It accords every Jew who decides to make aliya (immigrate) and to settle in Israel an automatic citizenship. Effectively, the Law of Return is a nationality law, granting only Jews nationality status in the state of Israel. There are still schisms between different immigrant groups as well as between these groups and people who were born in Israel. Generally speaking, three groups of people are being discerned in the Jewish population in Israel: Sephardim whose origins lie in Asia and Africa; Ashkenazim whose origins lie in Europe and America; and Sabras, native born Israelis. The large Sephardi sector holds justified grievances against the Ashkenazi elite, speaking of systematic discrimination and violation of basic civic rights during the formative years of the state and arguing that some residuals of this discriminatory attitude continued to linger for decades, some say until today.[1]
In this short piece I chose to reflect on the status of Arab-Palestinian citizens in Israel, on some of the problems that the Jewish character of the State present, especially to women, and then on the occupation, specifically on the administrative detention mechanism employed in the occupied territories and sporadically also in Israel.


Israeli-Palestinians

Twenty percent of Israel's population consists of Palestinian-Arabs who do not share the raison d'etre of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. They often claim, quite rightly, that they are being discriminated against and do not enjoy the same rights as Jews. The Orr Inquiry Report about the circumstances leading to the killing of 13 Arab citizens by the Israeli security forces in October 2000, issued in September 2003, sheds light on this continued discrimination in all spheres of life. Formally all Israeli citizens are equal before the law, regardless of national affiliation, religious beliefs, and political stands. I say 'formally' because in this connection an important distinction has to be made between formal citizenship and full citizenship. Israeli Jews can be said to enjoy full citizenship: they enjoy equal respect as individuals, and they are entitled to equal treatment by law and in its administration. The situation is different with regard to the Israeli-Palestinians, the Bedouin and the Druze. Although they are formally considered to enjoy liberties equally with the Jewish community, in practice they do not share and enjoy the same rights and burdens.[2] For example, Israeli-Palestinians pay more income tax than Jews since they do not enjoy discounts given to those who serve in the army. Arabs will find it more difficult than Jews to receive licences for extending their flats, or for building new ones. They also find it difficult to buy, or even to rent a flat in a Jewish neighbourhood. Furthermore, budgets of Arab municipalities stand in no comparison to those of Jewish municipalities. There are not enough classes in Arab towns and villages. Arabs who graduate find it difficult to get a job in government offices. In addition, being a Palestinian-Arab in many cases 'guarantees' that a worker's salary would be lower than that of a Jew who is doing the same work. The Oslo peace process, which started in September 1993, has reinforced the status of the Palestinians in Israel as a “double periphery”: being placed at one and the same time at the margins of Israeli society and at the margins of Palestinian National Movement.[3]


State and Religion

Further twenty percent of the population are orthodox and ultra-orthodox who will be happy to transform Israel into theocracy. They also complain about prolonged discrimination and denial of basic civic rights, although in recent years there are also complaints from the secular majority about reverse discrimination that bluntly favours the religious minority. In Israel there is no division between state and religion. The concept of a Jewish state has been imbued with religious values, and gender equality rights clash with religious norms. Jewish women are subject to male pre-dominance under Jewish Law, the halakha. Women in Jewish (and also Moslem and some Christian denominations) are subject to discrimination in property and inheritance laws. At present, some religious practices are offensive to the sensibilities of women, and involve coercion, which conflicts with the liberal elements of democracy that vouchsafes the rights of individuals. One of these is the right to follow one’s conscience and to practice one's beliefs as one sees fit, as long as this practice does not entail harm to others.
There is no civil marriage in Israel and persons must be married according to the law of their religious communities. Divorce is also regulated by such law and generally speaking constitutes the jurisdiction of the religious courts. Requiring all who wish to marry to do so by religious law is a serious incursion on the fundamental right to marry. Furthermore, there is a large population of people in Israel who cannot marry at all under Israeli law, either because they belong to different religious communities or to non-recognized religious communities, or because they are not allowed to marry under the law of their community. These incursions on the right to marry are compounded by the fact that both Jewish and Muslim law discriminate between men and women, in the laws of marriage and divorce themselves, as well as in the laws of evidence. Women cannot be judges in the courts in which they comprise half the parties to the disputes.[4]
The system of marriage and divorce is not the only sphere in which religion has an effect on individual rights. Sabbath observance laws, which may potentially impose unacceptable limitations on such rights, have in practice been relaxed in recent years. Their existence and level of enforcement now vary from town to town. Thus, in many towns cinemas and other places of entertainment are open on the Sabbath and some shopping centers operate too. However, in most towns, and in interurban routes, public transport does not operate on the sabbath, a restriction that obviously has an inordinate impact on the poorer sections of the population who do not have their own cars, and curtails exercise of their right to freedom of movement.[5]
Democracy is supposed to allow each and every individual the opportunity to follow her or his conception of the good without coercion. Israel today gives precedence to Judaism over liberalism. I submit that on issues such as this one, the reverse should be the case.[6]


Occupation

In addition, there are noticeable tensions between left and right: while people associated with the left concede of the necessity to make grave territorial concessions and end the occupation, the people who associate themselves with the right wish to retain the settlements and maintain control over "Greater Israel", i.e., Israel including the territories that were occupied during the Six Day War. Certainly occupation qua occupation is inconsistent with a human rights regime. Ending the occupation and the establishment of a viable Palestinian state alongside Israel is the key for promoting basic human rights in Israel.
In this short survey it will be impossible to cover all aspects of negation of human rights in the occupied territories. They are numerous. The reader is advised to consult the reports of B'tselem and other human rights organizations that monitor human rights in the occupied territories.[7] The remainder of the article addresses one concern: administrative detention, a procedure that is frequent in the territories and infrequent inside the Green Line. This procedure enables the State to detain a person without trial for six months and, if needed, to prolong the denial of freedom further because of "state security considerations". Since the outbreak of the 1987 Palestinian Intifada in December 1987 until today Israel has detained thousands of people. In 2003, 1007 Palestinians were detained. As of 1 August 2004, the Israel Defence Force (IDF) has detained 731 Palestinians.[8] Some detainees remained in jail for years.[9]


Administrative detention

Administrative detention is widely used in many countries. According to the International Commission of Jurists, at least 85 countries have legislation permitting this practice.[10] Israel made use of administrative detention from its first days as an independent state. This measure has been used both in the occupied territories and in Israel within its Green Line borders. While the military govern and adjudicate the detention procedures in the territories, the civilian executive and judicial authorities govern these procedures inside the Green Line and in East Jerusalem, which was officially annexed to Israel.
The power to implement administrative detention was created at the time of the British Mandate by the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945.[11] When Israel declared its independence in 1948, a state of emergency was announced and the Defence Regulations became part of Israeli law. After the Six Day War, military orders were issued that enabled the use of Defence Regulations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. From the first year of occupation, Israel resorted to administrative detention as a security measure against the Palestinian population and, on occasion, against Jews involved in espionage and similar activities believed to endanger state security. In 1979 and 1980, it was decided to change the existing procedures relating to administrative detention in the Green Line borders and subsequently in the occupied territories. First, the Defence Regulations were replaced with an Israeli law through the enactment of The Emergency Powers (Detention) Law, 5739-1979.[12] Section 2 of this law provides: ‘Where the Minister of Defence has reasonable cause to believe that reasons of state security or public security require that a particular person be detained, he may, by order under his hand, direct that such person be detained for a period, not exceeding six months, stated in the order’.[13] Israeli courts rely heavily on the statements of the Defence Minister who is not obliged to produce substantial evidence, as is required in an ordinary court of law, to justify the detention.
The issue of administrative detention should be viewed, especially in the occupied territories, within the general framework of security considerations that justify the demolition of houses, deportations, controversial instructions for the opening of fire, methods of interrogation that some may regard as torture, closure of newspapers, and the like.[14] Israel does not hesitate to endorse illiberal methods when it comes to defending its security. Those illiberal patterns of ‘militant Zionism’ are being advocated, legalised, implemented, and justified by the legislature, the government, and the court of justice.[15]
Administrative detention is one of the most anti-democratic procedures that exist in Israel. It has severe consequences for the persons concerned, and it contravenes some of the most important documents in international law. Article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights postulates: ‘No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile’. And Article 9(1) of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights reiterates that ‘Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention’. The right to due process of law grossly infringed by resorting to administrative detentions is protected in Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.[16]
The reader should not infer from this discussion that democracies should stand idle in the face of grave threats to their security and/or their very existence. Democracies have every right to defend themselves against such threats. I object only to the implementation of what I conceive as an unjust procedure that denies basic rights and liberties and infringes on due process of law at times other than those of real emergency. Obviously, security considerations necessitate taking some restrictive measures such as questioning, detention for 48 hours, house arrest, and the initiation of criminal proceedings, but they do not justify brute denial of rights in the form of administrative detention. This act should not be considered as just another preventive measure to be selected from the arsenal of preventive measures. During normal times, it should not be contemplated at all. It should not be a substitute for criminal proceedings. The courts hold that administrative detention is justified as a last resort, but I have serious doubts as to whether this is, indeed, the case.[17]
Administrative detention is manifestly unjust. It is contrary to the democratic spirit and to liberal reason that proscribes arbitrary arrests. This procedure is the kind of instrument despots use to suppress opposition. In contrast, democracies require that all legal procedures be exhausted before putting individuals behind bars. In a court of law, the prosecution must prove that criminal offences have been committed that justify penalties. Defendants have the right to be represented by lawyers, to summon witnesses and to cross-examine them. The administrative detention procedure omits these rights and, therefore, is contrary to the notion of justice. My contention is simple: if the detainees have committed criminal offences (sedition, incitement, violent or terrorist acts, etc.), they should stand trial, and it is for the prosecution to show why they should be kept out of society. Let the prosecution prosecute, the defendants defend themselves, and the court of justice mete out justice in accordance with material evidence. And if there is not sufficient evidence to prosecute, or if the prosecution is unable to produce relevant material, the defendants should retain their freedom. No procedure should exist to override the administration of justice.[18]


Conclusion

Israel is saturated with schisms. Those schisms challenge the foundations of liberal democracy (liberty, equality, tolerance, justice) and the ability to maintain human rights.
After the Holocaust, the goal was to found a safe haven for Jews all over the world so as to avoid the possibility of another horrific experience of that nature. Indeed, the United Nations acknowledged the need of establishing a Jewish state. This creation, however, based on a Jewish conception of the good, discriminates against the Israeli Arabs. Israel acknowledges the problems involved in the introduction of this perfectionist element in its framework of ruling. To assure an equal status for the Arab minority, the Declaration of Independence holds that Israel will foster the development of the country for the benefit of all its inhabitants; that it will be based on the foundations of liberty, justice and peace; that it will uphold complete equality of social and political rights to all of its citizens irrespective of religion, race or sex, and that it will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, language, education and culture. It is time to translate these words into deeds and to strive to achieve real equality between Arabs and Jews, and to secure civic and human rights for all.
Israel, being the only Jewish state in the world, should endeavor to retain its Jewish character. The symbols should remain Jewish with some accommodations in order to make the state a home for its Palestinian citizens as well. Shabbat should remain the official day of rest. Palestinian villages and towns may make Friday their day of rest. Hopefully, one day, when security considerations would become less dominant and pressing, and the Israeli economy could afford two days of rest, as is the case in many parts of the world, then Friday and Shabbat will become the two official days of rest.
The preservation of the Jewish character of the state should not entail coercion of the predominant secular circles of Israel. The guiding principle should be Live and Let Live. We need to differentiate between the symbolic aspects and the modus operandi aspects. As far as the latter are concerned, separation between state and religion should be achieved. People are born free and wish to continue their lives as free citizens in their homeland. Coercion is foreign to our natural sentiments and desires to lead our lives free as possible from alien restraints and impediments. Hence, while Shabbat should be observed, malls and shopping places outside the cities should be available for the many people who work during the week and do their shopping during weekends.
Public transportation should be made available for all people who cannot afford having a car and for those who do not drive. The state should cater for the needs of as many citizens as possible. Kosher shops and restaurants should be available and with them non-Kosher shops and restaurants for the secular, agnostic population.
Most importantly, the significant events in one's life: birth, wedding, divorce and death should be handled in accordance of the people's own choices. If they so desire, people may involve rabbinate and other religious institutions in their private lives. But this option should be left to them. If people wish to have secular ceremonies then they should have the ability to conduct them and not to be forced to undergo practices which mean very little to them, if anything. The state should have as little as possible say in family, intimate affairs.[19]
Israel should end the occupation, the sooner the better. The state of occupation harms primarily the Palestinians but it also damages the civic foundations of democracy. Decision makers thought that it is possible to maintain the duality of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde: being an occupier outside the Green Line, and a citizen inside the Green Line. However, norms of the occupation infiltrate inside Israel and damage the democratic foundations of the State. The Gaza First Plan is a possible route to follow as -- indeed -- the first step in a calculated process designed to evacuate the territories and shifting responsibility to the Palestinian Authority.[20]
As for administrative detention, this measure should be regarded anti-humanitarian and be objected to in the same way we protest against torture, collective punishment, harming children, deportation, and forced transfer of the population. While recognising that security considerations are of paramount importance, and that without security a democratic state would not exist, there is still a limit to what we can do in the name of democracy. As Justice Aharon Barak contended in the Schnitzer case, our strength lies in our moral power and in our adherence to the principles of democracy, especially when we are encompassed by such dangers.[21]
Security is not an end in itself, but a means. We must secure a democratic system, an administration of the people, for the people, by the people, that guarantees individual freedoms and fundamental human rights.


Peace Index

Prof. Ephraim Yaar and Prof. Tamar Hermann published the Peace Index of January 2005. In recent months they found cautious optimism among the Israeli Jewish public about the chances of calming the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, and at present it has grown. Along with overwhelming support for conducting political negotiations with the Palestinian side, along with greater belief that such negotiations could lead to peace in the coming years, the majority also thinks new Palestinian leader Abu Mazen is making sincere efforts to end the terror and has the ability to end or at least reduce it substantially.

In the domestic sphere, despite enhanced fears that the resistance to the disengagement plan could lead to a civil war, and the widespread view that the plan’s opponents have been “marketing” their message more successfully than its supporters and also are prepared to invest more effort in promoting the policy they favor, support for the plan among most of the Jewish public remains stable, with a clear majority also believing the government will eventually be able to implement it. The majority favors taking various measures to make the domestic process easier, including increasing the financial compensation to the evacuated settlers, preventing the transfer to the Palestinians of their homes and infrastructures without suitable compensation, allowing soldiers who oppose the evacuation not to take part in it, and closing the zones of the evacuation to the media. In addition, the Jewish public supports—by a rate of two to one—holding a referendum on the plan and stepped-up civic activity by its supporters.

Seventy-seven percent of the Jewish public currently support or strongly support holding peace negotiations with the Palestinian Authority, and 51% believe strongly or moderately that this will lead to Israeli-Palestinian peace in the coming years (in the Arab sector the optimism is high indeed: 94.5% favor negotiations and 78% believe in their chances of bearing fruit in the coming years).

The broad support for the disengagement plan—59%—remains unchanged, and a segmentation of the rates of support and opposition by voting for the large parties also indicates great stability. However, the Jewish public is split regarding the danger that implementing the plan will ignite a civil war—49% see the danger as very high or high (in September this rate was 40%), 46% as low or very low (interestingly, an overwhelming majority—67%—of the Arab public sees little such danger). Some 56.5% think the disengagement opponents are currently “marketing” their message to the Israeli public more effectively than the supporters, and just about the same total say the opponents—more than the supporters—are prepared to invest effort in advancing the policy they favor. It is not surprising, then, that about 60% of the public—similar to the rate of supporters—see it is desirable that the disengagement supporters express their position more effectively via petitions, demonstrations, and the like. However, despite the assessment of the marketing success and determination of the disengagement opponents, a very large majority—74%—expect the government will ultimately succeed in implementing the plan and evacuating the settlements. This is higher than the public’s evaluation of the plan’s chances of success in December (63%). A cross-section of expectations on this issue with positions on disengagement shows, as expected, that among the plan’s supporters there is unanimity (91%) that the government will be able to carry it out. Interestingly, though, among the opponents as well a majority, albeit not large (52%-41%), holds this view.

Seventy percent support increased compensations to the settlers, 68% favor ensuring that their homes and infrastructures are not transferred to the Palestinians without suitable compensation, 53% believe soldiers who oppose the evacuation should be allowed not to take part in it, and the same rate supports closing the zones of the evacuation to the media. Furthermore, despite the prime minister’s opposition to a referendum on the disengagement plan, most of the Jewish public, at a similar rate to support for the plan (61%), favors a referendum. Indeed, a segmentation of support rates for a referendum by position on the disengagement plan shows that even among the supporters a majority, albeit small (52%-45%), wants one to be held. As expected, the rate of those favoring this is higher among opponents of the plan (79%).


Syria

President Bush declared on January 17 that Syria was "out of step" with democratic trends in the Middle East and that the Syrian government needed to cut off support for Iraqi insurgents and stop interfering in Lebanon to avoid becoming further isolated internationally.

The Bush administration announced the recall of the ambassador, Margaret Scobey, to express American displeasure after the assassination on Monday of Rafik Hariri, a former Lebanese prime minister who was a close ally of the United States and France and also a critic of Syria's involvement in Lebanon.

Frankly, I would not be surprised if Syria was not behind the assassination and if the investigation will reveal that one of the factions who wish the Syrians out of the country committed the murder, knowing that Syria will be the prime suspect. Syria has an interest to calm down the situation at time when the American lion lies at its gate. They would have committed the assassination only if felt that Hariri became too successful in his anti-Syrian activities. I do not have sufficient knowledge about his range of activities and the extent of his success in the Lebanese internal politics. I presume the clouds will clear soon.


Dan Halutz

Maj. Gen. Dan Halutz was named on February 22 by Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz as the next chief of staff, the first ever air force general to reach this position. Halutz, 57, will be the 18th chief of staff. Ariel Sharon was a full partner in the decision to appoint Halutz, who is known to be one of the prime minister's favorite officers.

Halutz is the controversial officer who authorized the "targeted assassination" of Hamas leader Salah Shehadeh by a one-tone bomb dropped by an Air Force bomber on Shehadeh's Gaza home. As a result, 15 civilians, including 11 children, were killed. Quite a collateral way to conduct targeted assassination. Asked how he felt about the death, Halutz said that he "sleeps very well at night." He added that the only thing he felt was "a slight jolt to the airplane - it was gone within a second." Now that this great humanitarian is heading the military pyramid I will not sleep well at night.


Excessive Media Ownership and Its Potential Threats to Democracy

As some of you may know, for the past few years I have conducted research on this issue. The study, which analyses the situation in Canada, Israel and Germany, was just published. The reference is "Excessive Media Ownership and Its Potential Threats to Democracy: A Comparative Analysis", by Raphael Cohen-Almagor with Stefan Seiterle, Annual Rev. of Law and Ethics, Vol. 12 (2004), pp. 437-463. Abstract infra. Those interested are welcome to ask for a copy.

Abstract
The aim of this essay is to examine the issue of media ownership in Canada and Israel, and to reflect on the situation in Germany. In Canada and Israel there is the dual problem of excessive ownership of the media by a small number of people who control the print press and the electronic press. I shall first review the press industry in each country and then reflect on the broadcasting industry. It is argued that the situation of both the Canadian and Israeli markets is alarming because in both societies single individuals have accumulated far too much power. Excessive media ownership threatens diversity of opinions and free journalism and it provides avenues for partisan, partial interests. Germany should learn from the experiences of both countries. Democratic governments should invest efforts to diffuse the power among players with different interests and worldviews.


Research and Lecture Tour to Holland and Belgium

During the first historic meeting between Abu Mazan and Ariel Sharon after the former was elected to succeed Arafat, a meeting that certainly provides fresh and positive wind to our troubled region, I was in Holland and Belgium. I conducted research on euthanasia in the only two countries in the world that legalized euthanasia, research that updates my last book, Euthanasia in the Nethelrands. As ever, a fascinating experience that provides a lot to think and learn about. I need to find the time to sit and analyze the vast material that I have gathered.

I also gave a few lectures on the relationships between media and terror, global terrorism, political extremsism and incitement, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; was interviewed to the written press (one piece infra), and gave a brieifing at the Belgian parliament to some MPs about the heated atmosphere in Israel nowadays. I emphasized that Europe, and also the USA, may have a positive role to play in seeing that the property Israel intends to leave behind will not be demolished and will be transferred to the Palestinan Authority untouched. Both Europe and the USA have the ability to compensate Israel for the lost property. Secondly, I reiterated that Israel will not be able to tolerate the launching of Kassam missiles, and that the onus is on Abu Mazan to halt his extremists. Furthermore, Israel cannot live with the threat of Iranian WMDs and reserves the right to self-defence, including preemtive attacks on such sites in Iran. I expect Bush to increase his involvement in the ME in general, and in Israel-Palestine in particular but said I will be surprised if he will take upon himself to convene a Camp David summit, as Carter and Clinton did. Somehow, Bush does not strike me as a person with an eye on small details, and he lacks the commitment that the two humanitarian presidents had. But, who knows, maybe Bush will surprise me.

I wish to thank my kind hosts that made my visit memorable: Martine Bouman, Eldad Hayet, Sigrid Sterckx, Cas Mudde, Laurent Reichman, Pierre-François Laterre, and Simon Petermann.


Interview to Volkskrant

Mohammed B. is lang geen Osama bin Laden
The Volkskrant
10 February 2005

Interview
Raphael Cohen-Almagor maakt onderscheid tussen lokale terroristen en internationale terreurnetwerken
‘Een aanslag plegen
in Amsterdam zou
een vergissing zijn'
Hoe ver kan een democratie gaan in de strijd tegen het terrorisme zonder op te houden een democratie te zijn? Een Israëlische politicoloog is op zoek naar het antwoord.

Van onze verslaggever
Henk Müller
AMSTERDAM

Europa is vergeven van de terreurnetwerken. Gestaag werken die aan hun groei en hun infrastructuur. Terrorisme staat of valt met de beschikbare infrastructuur en die is volop aanwezig, constateert prof. Raphael Cohen-Almagor.
De Midden-Oosten- en terrorisme-expert van de Universiteit van Haifa in Israël is ervan overtuigd dat Al Qa'ida hard werkt aan een nieuwe grootschalige aanval. Bijvoorbeeld op Londen. ‘Amsterdam aanvallen zou een vergissing zijn in de ogen van Bin Laden. Nederland heeft de infrastructuur voor een grote aanval en is misschien een gemakkelijk doelwit, maar dat zoekt hij niet. Bin Laden wil een belangrijk, symbolisch doelwit. Al Qa'ida kent de geopolitieke verhoudingen.'
Cohen-Almagor heeft in Nederland niet alleen enkele lezingen over terrorisme gegeven, maar ook onderzoek gedaan naar euthanasie. ‘Ik concentreer me in mijn werk op ethiek en ethische grenzen', legt hij uit. ‘Grenzen als die tussen liberalisme en multiculturaliteit, tussen terrorisme en hoe een democratie daarmee omgaat, en de vragen van leven en dood: de holocaust en euthanasie.'
In Israël en de Verenigde Staten doceert Cohen-Almagor de recente geschiedenis van het Midden-Oosten, die deze week een nieuwe fase lijkt te zijn ingegaan met het sluiten van een wapenstilstand.
‘Voetje voor voetje lopen premier Sharon en de Palestijnse leider Abbas door troebel water. Sharon, een zeer voorzichtig man, wil als eerste stap de Israëlische troepen terugtrekken uit Gaza, zien hoe dat uitpakt en wat de Palestijnen gaan doen. Abbas, die nog maar net aan de macht is, probeert de Palestijnse ‘‘legers'' van Hamas en de Islamitische Jihad op één lijn te krijgen om in Gaza zijn gezag te kunnen opbouwen. Hamas en de Jihad willen eerst wel eens zien wat voor vlees ze met Abbas in de kuip hebben. Daarom houden ze zich rustig.'
Cohen-Almagor maakt onderscheid tussen ‘terrorisme op lokaal niveau' in Israël en Europa en wereldwijde netwerken als Al Qa'ida. De moord op Van Gogh is volgens hem gepleegd door lokale terroristen, die niet bij Al Qa'ida horen. ‘Maar je moet oppassen dat je die lokale terreurgroepen geen extra munitie verschaft, en zorgvuldig afwegen waar en wanneer de staat moet ingrijpen. Dat hoeft niet bij alles wat onliberaal is, maar wel als er sprake is van geweld. Wederzijds respect en een ander niet schaden, dat is de basisregel.'
Om te zien waar de grenzen liggen, bestudeerde hij vrouwenbesnijdenis en de rechten van moslimvrouwen. ‘Wat zijn de consequenties van ingrijpen? Stel dat moslimvrouwen binnenshuis moeten blijven. Moet de staat ze dan dwingen de deur uit te gaan? Nee. Als een moslim een vrouw geen hand wil geven, wat dan nog? Maar de staat moet wel ingrijpen als er sprake is van geweld.
‘Of eerwraak terrorisme is? Nee, terrorisme is angst zaaien door willekeur. Eerwraak is geen willekeur. Vrouwenbesnijdenis van Somalische vrouwen bijvoorbeeld is systematisch geweld, daarom moet de staat ingrijpen. Maar vrouwenbesnijdenis onder de bedoeïenen in Israël bleek vooral symbolisch. Niet ingrijpen dus.'
Het gevaar komt niet van lokale terroristen, onderstreept Cohen-Almagor, die Al Qa'ida en Bin Laden ziet ‘als een soort land' dat het verdient harder te worden aangevallen dan Irak. ‘In mijn ogen is dat de belangrijkste prioriteit. De kop van de cobra moet eraf.'
Irak is volgens hem sinds de val van Saddam Hussein geen kweekvijver voor terroristen, zoals Afghanistan destijds. ‘Er is terrorisme, maar de aanwezigheid van de Amerikaanse leeuw voor de poorten van Damascus en Teheran heeft al met al tot minder terrorisme geleid.'
Toen Bush aankondigde het terrorisme wereldwijd te willen aanpakken, vroeg de Israëlische expert zich af of de Amerikaanse president wel wist wat hij zei. ‘Bush is geen Carter of Clinton, die zich intensief met het Midden-Oostenconflict hebben bemoeid. Het zou me verbazen als hij bijvoorbeeld een Camp David-top bijeenroept. Bush is er niet zo persoonlijk bij betrokken. Maar wel bij de bestrijding van terrorisme. Hij wil de geschiedenis ingaan als de man die een einde heeft gemaakt aan het terrorisme.'

Cohen-Almagor is ervan overtuigd dat het Bush menens is als deze zegt het Midden-Oosten te willen democratiseren. ‘Irak was vanaf 11/9 kandidaat nummer één. Het klinkt cynisch, maar het aantal Amerikaanse body bags is niet zo groot dat de regering van mening verandert. Washington moet doorgaan met zijn pogingen van Irak een democratie te maken. Of dat lukt? Ik probeer optimistisch te zijn. Voor hetzelfde geld valt Irak uit elkaar'.

Maar tussen wens en werkelijkheid zit nog wel wat ruimte. Democratisering van de rest van het Midden-Oosten blijft vooralsnog beperkt tot veel geld voor instituten die rapporten schrijven over democratisering in het Midden-Oosten, constateert de Israëlische professor.

‘De regeringen in Egypte, Saudi-Arabië en de Golfstaten blijven zitten, het zijn bondgenoten, ze staan aan de Amerikaanse kant. Kadhafi heeft zijn lesje geleerd, Al-Assad van Syrië weet dat hij de VS nodig heeft om te overleven en Jemen houdt zich koest. Dan houd je alleen Iran over'.

Cohen-Almagor denkt niet dat de VS Iran zullen aanvallen. ‘Dat kunnen zelfs de VS niet aan, twee landen tegelijk aanvallen. Irak is kinderspel vergeleken met Iran. Maar naar Israëlische inschatting kan Teheran over een jaar een atoomwapen hebben. Dat zal Jeruzalem nooit toestaan en als Iran niet alsnog voldoet aan de eisen van het Internationaal Atoomagentschap zal Israël ingrijpen. Al dan niet met expliciete toestemming van Washington. Dat is een van de weinige zekerheden die ik heb inzake het Midden-Oosten'.



International Raoul Wallenberg Foundation's 100,000 Names for 100,000 Lives Campaign

I was asked to post the following. I signed and would appreciate your consideration.

January 17th 2005 marks the 60th anniversary of the disappearance of Raoul Wallenberg, who saved 100,000 lives in Nazi-occupied Hungary during WWII. On January 1945 Wallenberg was captured by the Soviet Army. Since then, his fate remains unknown.

Join the International Raoul Wallenberg Foundation's 100,000 Names for 100,000 Lives Campaign to clear up the final destiny of the Swedish diplomat. It is a great opportunity to repair 60 years of silence, unanswered questions and injustice with the steadfast support of us all.

So please, sign your name and spread the word, invite your family and friends to do the same. Help us reach the goal of at least 100,000 names for the 100,000 lives saved by this "Hero without a Grave". If you prefer so, you can also forward this email to your contacts.

All the collected signatures will be presented to the Secretary General of the United Nations to urge the solution of one of the most controversial cases in history of humankind.

Congressman Tom Lantos and his wife Annette, who were saved by Wallenberg were the first to sign.

Sign your name!
http://www.raoulwallenberg.net/?en/news/2018.htm

The International Raoul Wallenberg Foundation www.raoulwallenberg.net irwf@irwf.org


Israel Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 1 (January 2005)

I am the editor of special issue of this journal that appears in London. For each topic I chose the best person in Israel. Hereby the table of contents:

Introduction
Raphael Cohen-Almagor


General

From Socialism to Free Market – The Israeli Economy: 1948 – 2003
Ben-Zion Zilberfarb

Between Enlightened Authoritarianism and Social Responsibility – On Media and Politics
Dan Caspi


Rights and Schisms

Human Rights
David Kretzmer

Health Rights
Carmel Shalev

Women Rights: Legal Aspects
Frances Raday

Israel as a Multicultural Democracy: Challenges and Obstacles
Yossi Yonah

The Absorbtion of Immigrants from the Former Soviet Union
Tamar Horowitz

Is A Halachic State Possible? The Paradox of Jewish Theocracy
Aviezer Ravitzky

“A Jewish and Democratic State”: Present Navigation in the Map of Interpretations
Asa Kasher

Whither the Green Line? Trends in the Orientation of the Palestinians in Israel and the Territories
Majid Al-Haj

Israel and Its Arab Citizens
Hillel Frisch

Israel Facing Terrorism
Ariel Merari


Final Words

Revisiting the Zionist Dream
Claude Klein

Israeli Democracy at the Crossroads
Raphael Cohen-Almagor

Notes on Contributors

Index


I thank the Journal's chief editor, Prof. Efraim Karsh, for his thoughtful cooperation. This volume will also appear as a book by Routledge later this year. Notification will be announced in due course.


Books

A few years ago I saw the film Captain Corelli's Mandolin with Cruz and Cage. Now had the opportunity to read the book by Louis de Bernieres and enjoyed it tremendously. A very gratifying read indeed and -- as in most cases -- the book excels the film. I highly recommend.

Justine Burley (ed.), Dworkin and His Critics (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005).

Paul Schotsmans & Tom Meulenbergs (eds.), Euthanasia and Palliative Care in the Low Countries (Leuven-Paris-Sterling: Peeters Publishers, 2005), ISBN 90-429-1556-0.

Raphael Cohen-Almagor, Speech, Media, and Ethics: The Limits of Free Expression (Houndmills and New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2005), 2nd edition, paperback.

Please consider ordering the books to your libraries.


Photos

Enjoy!!


With my very best wishes, as ever,
RafiMy last communications are available on http://almagor.blogspot.comEarlier posts at my home page: http://lib-stu.haifa.ac.il/staff/rcohen-Almagor
Books archived at http://almagor.fetchauthor.info



[1] Raphael Cohen-Almagor, “Cultural Pluralism and the Israeli Nation-Building Ideology”, International J. of Middle East Studies, Vol. 27 (1995): 461-484.
[2] Ian Lustick, Arabs in the Jewish State: Israel's Control of a National Minority (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980); David Kretzmer, The Legal Status of the Arabs in Israel (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987); Hillel Frisch, "Israel and Its Arab Citizens", in R. Cohen-Almagor (ed.), Israeli Democracy at the Crossroads (London: Routledge, forthcoming).
[3]. Majid Al-Haj, "The Impact of the Intifada on the Arabs in Israel: The Case of a Double Periphery", in Akiba A. Cohen and Gadi Wolfsfeld (eds.), Framing the Intifada. People and Media (Norwood: Ablex Publishing Corporation, 1993): 64-75; Majid Al-Haj, "Whither the Green Line? Trends in the Orientation of the Palestinians in Israel and the Territories", in R. Cohen-Almagor (ed.), Israeli Democracy at the Crossroads. See also The Association for Civil Rights in Israel, Report 2002-2003 (Jerusalem): 17-23 (Hebrew).
[4] David Kretzmer, "Human Rights", in R. Cohen-Almagor (ed.), Israeli Democracy at the Crossroads.
[5] Ibid. See also Frances Raday, " Women Rights: Legal Aspects", in R. Cohen-Almagor (ed.), Israeli Democracy at the Crossroads.
[6] . For further discussion, R. Cohen-Almagor, “Israeli Democracy, Religion and the Practice of Halizah in Jewish Law”, UCLA Women's Law Journal, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Fall/Winter 2000): 45-65; Aviezer Ravitzky, "Is A Halachic State Possible? The Paradox of Jewish Theocracy" and Asa Kasher, “A Jewish and Democratic State”: Present Navigation in the Map of Interpretations", both in R. Cohen-Almagor (ed.), Israeli Democracy at the Crossroads.
[7] www.btselem.org; The Association for Civil Rights in Israel, Report 2002-2003 (Jerusalem): 30-33 (Hebrew).
· [8] http://btselem.org/
· [9] See, for instance, A.A.D. 10/94 Anonymous v. Minister of Defence, decision granted on 13 November 1997, involving Lebanese citizens who were kidnapped by Israel to serve as "negotiation cards" in the attempts to bring about the release of Israeli POWs.
· [10] Newsletter, International Commission of Jurists, No. 24 (Jan/March 1985), p. 53. For further discussion see Steven Greer, "Preventive Detention and Public Security: Law and Practice in Comparative Perspective", International J. of the Sociology of Law, Vol. 23 (1995): 45-58.
· [11] Cf. Palestine Gazette, No. 1442 (1945) (Supp. 2), at 1055.
· [12] 5739-1979, Laws of the State of Israel, Vol. 33 (1979), at 89.
· [13] Compare with the British Detention of Terrorists (Northern Ireland) Order 1972. Article 4 (1) of the Order empowers detaining any person ‘suspected of having been concerned in the commission or attempted commission of any act of terrorism or in the direction, organisation, or training of persons for the purpose of terrorism’ for a period of 28 days. At the end of that period the detainee should be released or could be further detained if the Chief Constable had referred his/her case to a judicially qualified commissioner appointed by the Secretary of State. For further discussion, see Antonio Vercher, Terrorism in Europe (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), esp. pp. 18-28.
· [14] For a critical account of the use of some of these measures, see Geoffrey Bindman and Bill Bowring, Human Rights in a Period of Transition (London: The Law Society and the Bar of England and Wales, 1994).
· [15] Pnina Lahav speaks of a variant of Zionism, which she terms ‘catastrophe Zionism’, whose major goal is defence. Those who adhere to catastrophe Zionism adopt a worldview that is permeated by anxiety. See Lahav, "Foundations of Rights Jurisprudence in Israel: Chief Justice Agranat’s Legacy", Israel L. Rev., Vol. 24, No. 2 (1990): 211-269, esp. pp. 216-223.
· [16] The concept of due process of law is derived from English common law probably during the reigns of Henry I (1100-1135) and Henry II (1154-1189). Chapter 29 (Chapter 39 in a later version) of the Magna Carta of 1215 declares: ‘No free man shall be taken, outlawed, banished, or in any way destroyed, nor will we proceed against or prosecute him, except by the lawful judgement of his peers and by the law of the land’. For further discussion, see Henry J. Abraham, Freedom and the Court (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, Fourth Edition): 92-151; and Theodor Meron, Human Rights in International Strife: Their International Protection (Cambridge: Grotius, 1987), esp. pp. 18-22.
· [17] See detailed analysis in R. Cohen-Almagor, "Reflections on Administrative Detention in Israel: A Critique", in R. Cohen-Almagor (ed.), Challenges to Democracy: Essays in Honour and Memory of Isaiah Berlin (London: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2000): 203-241, and “Administrative Detention in Israel and its Employment as a Means of Combating Political Extremism”, New York International L. Rev., Vol. 9, No. 2 (1996): 1-25.
[18] For further discussion, see Prisoners of Peace, Report No. 16 (Jerusalem: B'tselem, June 1997); Dafna Golan, Detained without Trial (Jerusalem: B'tselem, October 1992) (both in Hebrew).
[19] R. Cohen-Almagor, "Final Word", in R. Cohen-Almagor (ed.), Israeli Democracy at the Crossroads.
· [20] R. Cohen-Almagor, "The best first plan", The Baltimore Sun (December 18, 2003); http://almagor.blogspot.com
· [21] Cf. H.C. 680/88. Schnitzer v. Chief Military Censor, P.D. 42 (iv), 617, p. 645.

January 2005

Comment on Paris, on PA Elections, Kassam Missiles, Civil Disobedience, Center for Democratic Studies, Using the T-Word, Syrian Wins Martin Ennals Award for Human Rights Defenders, Peace One Day, Prince Harry in Nazi Uniform, British Theatre, Photos from Israel


Dear friends and colleagues,


Comment on Paris,

Agnes Lefranc from Paris commented on what I had written on Paris and Parisians:

Dear Rafi,

I have to say, even if it hurts, that I agree with what you write about people living in Paris in your last newsletter: a large proportion of them can be totally awful with everyone they consider as a "foreigner" (their definition of a foreigner sometimes including "someone living on the other side of the city's limits"). As another example of that, there is now a lot of buzz around the application of Paris for the 2012 Olympic Games, and Paris authorities try to give the best "image" of the city... Anyway, some Parisians are already complaining about the "invasion" (visitors, tourists) that is going to happen during summer 2012 if the Olympic Games take place in Paris. It was the same for the 1998 soccer world cup, and finally, people were totally ecstatic during the event (the fact that France won the world cup certainly had something to do with it !!). I think that for most of the people living in Paris, the ungracious, grumbling appearance is more an attitude than their real "nature". And I really can understand that this is not an excuse and that this attitude can be totally offending for people visiting Paris.

Anyway, I hope that this will not prevent you from visiting Paris in the future, and I would be very glad to see you then (and perhaps have you meet some "nice" Parisians, if I can find them !!).

Agnes


PA Elections

The first post-Arafat elections took place on January 9, 2005. As was expected, Mahmoud Abbas won 62.3 percent of the vote for Palestinian Authority chairman. This margin of victory would give Abbas a clear mandate to renew peace talks with Israel, rein in militants and reform the corruption-riddled Palestinian Authority. Abbas' main challenger, independent candidate Mustafa Barghouti, won about 20 percent, and five other chairmanship candidates - ranging from a Marxist ex-guerrilla to an academic under U.S. house arrest on suspicion of funneling funds to Hamas militants - scored in low single digits. Hamas, the largest Palestinian militant opposition group, announced it will work with Abbas. Don't be too impressed with verbal declarations. Abu Mazen's test will be his ability to fight down terrorism and to put a stop to the launching of Kassam missiles. At least, unlike Arafat it seems that Abu Mazen does not lack the will to stop violence. He declared openly that violence did not serve the interest of the Palestinian people, and that there are other, more fruitful ways, to achieve independence and freedom. Israel will evaluate the new leader according to his actions, not necessarily according to his success. We first want to see a genuine attempt to stop violence and terror. I hope the Hamas and Islamic Jihad will also revise their policies and strategy. If not we may expect to see bitter internal clashes, with the IDF doing its share to assassinate militants. Those targeted killings proved useful from Israel's view but at the same time did not relax the atmosphere. Quite the opposite. Targeted killings served as a unified mechanism. Palestinian rivals forget all differences when facing Israel's military retaliation.

Senior Palestinian security official and West Bank strongman Jibril al-Rajoub resigned on January 11, saying he wanted to encourage President-elect Mahmoud Abbas to enact reforms. The resignation of Rajoub, a leading security official and West Bank strongman rival to Gaza's Mohamed Dahlan, suggests that Abbas is at least moving quickly to restructure the PA's notoriously corrupt and fractious security forces. Their reform is essential if Abbas is to have any hope of curbing the likes of Hamas and Fatah's own Al-Aqsa Brigades both of which have dismissed his calls to halt the terrorism of their "armed struggle". Rajoub, one of several security advisers, had been at odds with late Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat over calls to slim down the range of separate competing Palestinian security forces. Rajoub has called for the merging of some dozen competing security forces to help end chaos that gripped Palestinian streets in the months before Arafat died in a Paris hospital on Nov 11. "I recommend speeding up the combining of the security forces into three, and making radical, immediate changes in the organisational structure and leaderships," Rajoub said. Abbas is expected to carry out such changes, also wanted by Israel and Western countries.

Indeed, security reform is a key issue for Abbas, who may also need more effective forces to bring militant groups under control. Stirring Israeli concerns, Abbas has said he would rather co-opt militants than use force to rein them in. Don't be too amazed if Abbas would reappoint Rajoub in the near future. He needs him and co-optation is a proved mechanism to bring potential rivals to back your own camp.


Kassam Missiles

Ella Abuksis, age 17, was walking in the street in Sderot together with her little brother Tamir when she heard the frightening noise. She embraced her brother and fell with him on the ground. The missile fell five meters behind her. Tamir came out with small injuries. Ella, on the other hand, is now declared brain-dead.

Every country has the right to defend its sovereignty. It is impossible to continue this way. The people of Sderot cannot continue living in this way. The town is becoming a ghost city. Just imagine missiles on York, Ann Arbor and Windsor. Would the UK, the USA and Canada allow this to continue? There are only two possibilities: either the PA will put a stop to it, and this is certainly the preferable option; or Israel will enter the Gaza Strip yet again. To remind, the last time the IDF went the Gaza the result was dozens of casualties on both sides, especially the Palestinian. There is no third option, i.e. letting the missiles continue falling.

On January 18, Abu Mazen declared that he intends to locate one thousand policemen hoping that their presence will serve as deterrence. He says he needs "time and patience", precious commodities in our region. The people of Sderot have lost their patience and now exert pressure on Sharon to retaliate. Retaliation is not the issue. It is simply not enough. The missiles have to stop.


Civil Disobedience

The past few weeks I had several public appearances in which I was invited to express my views on different topics:

Incitement in Israel, calling upon the Attorney General to be alert and to fight down concrete calls for murder: Incitement is not protected under the Free Speech Principle.

Euthanasia and mercy killings: I was invited to present my new book in various forms, and to speak on the legislation process that is now taking place to settle the issue of medical treatment at the end-of-life. I was a member of a public committee, known as the Steinberg Committee, assigned by the Ministry of Health, to draft a law. After a long process this law is now considered by the Knesset Constitutional, Law and Justice Committee for final shape-up before moving on to legislation.

Payment for interviews: Concerning the case of Azam Azam, recently released from Egyptian jail after eight years of prison. Interesting story this one because Egyptian officials, from Mubarak down claimed that he was an Israeli spy, in service of the MOSSAD, while Israeli officials, from Sharon down, claimed that he was an innocent business man. Someone is not telling the truth. Anyway, Azam decided to take advantage of his release and do for his home, demanding a fee for his exclusive first interview. After a short and extensive race TV Channel 10 won the race by paying him some dozens of thousands of dollars. I was asked to comment on this issue.

Civil disobedience and conscientious objection: tricky and complicated question that has been occupying my mind for many years. Israel is a fascinating country in many respects, including demography. In the 1970s, we were about 3.5 million people. In a period of thirty years we doubled our size. Don't know if any other country in the world has such a record. Anyway, in the 1970s and 1980s I used to think that conscientious objection is a luxury we cannot afford. Morally speaking I felt that we should recognize refusal on such grounds, but practically I felt that as a state we are unable to afford it. Things have changed. The army grew beyond its needs. There are less external threats to wage war on us by one of our neighbours. There is peace (cold, but still peace) with the strongest potential rival, Egypt. The army does not recruit all eligible citizens, young men and women, age 18, for various reasons: religion, marriage (for girls), criminal record, poor health (physical or mental). And Israel had a problematic presence in Lebanon, and still has such presence in the occupied territories.

Thus, in the 1990s I expressed my views that it is a democratic right to declare conscientious objection; that Israel should recognize this right, and as people have the right not to serve due to religious reasons, so people should have the right not to serve on conscientious grounds. I backed the "Four Mothers" Movement which called Israel to pull out from Lebanon. The movement grew and made an impact on our society, more so when Yossi Beilin and others became vocal supporters of this motion, and even more so when Prime Minister Ehud Barak became a supporter and in 2000 had the foresight and courage to take our troops out of Lebanon.

It should be noted that in 1995, in order to determine who is a genuine CO and who is just trying to avoid the military service for reasons of personal comfort, the Minister of Defence set up, within the Israeli Armed Forces (IDF), a Conscientious Objection Committee. This move was considered necessary after the State of Israel adhered to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1991.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights do not explicitly mention the right to conscientious objection to military service. However, in 1993, the Human Rights Committee, the body of experts monitoring the implementation of the Covenant, adopted General Comment N. 22 on the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and affirmed that the right to conscientious objection to military service can be derived from article 18. Paragraph 11 states that :

"Many individuals have claimed the right to refuse to perform
military service (conscientious objection) on the basis that
such right derives from their freedoms under article 18. In
response to such claims, a growing number of States have in
their laws exempted from compulsory military service citizens
who genuinely hold religious or other beliefs that forbid the
performance of military service and replaced it with
alternative national service. The Covenant does not explicitly
refer to a right to conscientious objection, but the Committee
believes that such a right can be derived from article 18,
inasmuch as the obligation to use lethal force may seriously
conflict with the freedom of conscience and the right to
manifest one's religion or belief. When this right is recognized
by law or practice, there shall be no differentiation among
conscientious objectors on the basis of the nature of their
particular beliefs; likewise, there shall be no discrimination
against conscientious objectors because they have failed to
perform military service. The Committee invites States parties
to report on the conditions under which persons can be
exempted from military service on the basis of their rights
under article 18 and on the nature and length of alternative
national service."

As you well know, I oppose occupation and think Israel is mistaken by lasting our presence in Judea, Samaria and Gaza Strip. There should be a two-state solution, and I hope this will materialize in my life time. I said time and again that I hope many soldiers declare conscientious objection and go to jail rather than serve in the occupied territories. In my last Newsletter I praised the four parents of soldiers who sign parents to oppose sending their children to serve in the occupied territories. A few days have passed and I was invited to express my views on TV. There the issue was civil disobedience and conscientious objection in general, including the right of soldiers to refuse evacuating settlers, and the right of settlers to refuse their evacuation. I said that I see conscientious objection as a democratic right; that I hope soldiers will have the decency to tell their commanders, before going on assignment, that they are not willing to abide the order of evacuation, and not to sabotage the activity on the spot; that I respect conscientious objection as long as people are willing to pay the price for their acts, meaning to serve in jail. Regarding the settlers I support their right to object to what they conceive as illegal and immoral order, to leave their homes, but said that the border line is violence: they should not resort to violence. There is a difference between passive resistance, not cooperating with the army and leave the soldiers with no option but grabbing them by their hands and legs out of their homes to the vehicles, and fighting the soldiers with force, feasts and guns. While I condone passive resistance, I condemn any form of force that might lead to bloodshed and civil war.

Within four days I became the darling of YESHA, the Judea, Samaria and Gaza Council. Suddenly, in the first time in my life, I had something in common with the settlers' camp. Strange feeling, I must admit. I don't wish to play into their hands, but at the same time I need to be loyal to my conscience. I believe conscientious objection is not one-sided, serving the interests of one camp only. When it is from the left, it is fine; when it comes from the right it is condemnable. My conscience is not that flexible. The YESHA Council invited me to debate the issue and after consultation with the Dean of our Law Faculty I agreed upon the condition that the debate will reflect all (or most) streams of thoughts in Israel, that it will be balanced and not one sided, and that it will be of academic nature.

In a previous Newsletter I already mentioned a pertinent Supre Court case. On December 20, 2002, the Court passed an important judgment on the Zonschein case reaffirming the possibility of granting exemptions from military service for reasons of conscientious objection. It noted that "all agree that exemptions for conscientious reasons are included in those 'other reasons', which allow exemption from regular or reserve service." It refers to total conscientious objection only. In fact, it ruled out the possibility of selective objection (that is the exemption from service deriving from an objection to a specific war or military operation) for reasons of national security. The Court held that "the phenomenon of selective conscientious objection would be broader than 'full' objection, and would evoke an intense feeling of discrimination 'between blood and blood'. Moreover, it affects security considerations themselves, since a group of selective objectors would tend to increase in size. Additionally, in a pluralistic society such as ours, recognising selective conscientious objection may loosen the ties, which hold us together as a nation. Yesterday, the objection was against serving in South Lebanon. Today, the objection is against serving in Judea and Samaria. Tomorrow, the objection will be against vacating this or that settlement. The army of the nation may turn into an army of different groups comprised of various units, to each of which it would be conscientiously acceptable to act in certain areas, whereas it would be conscientiously unacceptable to act in others. In a polarised society such as ours, this consideration weighs heavily. Furthermore, it becomes difficult to distinguish between one who claims conscientious objection in good faith and one who, in actuality, objects to the policy of the government or the Knesset, as it is a fine distinction - occasionally an exceedingly fine distinction – between objecting to a state policy and between conscientious objection to carry out that policy."


Center for Democratic Studies

The Center is taking its formative shape. First on the agenda was to establish a reputable Governing Board that will involve capable people whose activities showed their commitment to the values and ideas that underlie the Center. The Board includes at this stage the following dignitaries:

Former Justice of the Supreme Court Dalia Dorner, a leading liberal voice in Israel whose imprint on our legal history is noticeable and admirable

Recipient of Israel Prize in Philosophy, Professor Asa Kasher of Tel Aviv University, a leading expert on ethics, with a sharp mind and careful eye

Rabbi Uri Regev, one of the leaders of the Reform Movement in Israel and in the world. He exemplifies humane Judaism in its best

Former Deputy Speaker of the Knesset (Meretz – the Civil Rights Party), Professor Naomi Chazan of the Hebrew University Dept. of Political Science, a most capable scholar who is spending her sabbatical now at MIT

Professor Eppie Yaar of Tel Aviv University, a leading sociologist who is known also for the Peace Index that he monitors for some years

Former Cabinet Minister (Labour) and Ambassador to the UN Gad Yaakobi, one of the brightest politicians I've ever known, a true intellectual with a passion for poetry

Professor Ben-Zion Zilberfarb of Bar Ilan University Department of Economics. He was the head of the Economic Planning Authority of the Israeli government (1982 –1985) and the Director General of the Ministry of Finance (1988 – 1999).

Head of the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute Dr. Shimshon Zelniker. Van Leer is a leading research center in Israel that has been working for many years to promote peace and understanding within Israel and with its neighbours

Professor Bernard Susser of Department of Political Science, Bar Ilan University. Barney is a leading political theorist in Israel. He supervised my MA thesis on Marx, Engels and Lenin some years ago (who counts…)

Professor Aharon Kellerman, former Vice President of my university, a man of many qualities and capabilities with lots of administrative experience

Professor Yedidya Stern of Bar Ilan University Faculty of Law, a leading activist in promoting understanding between secular and religious Jews, on constitutional issues, and a Senior Fellow at the Israel Democracy Institute

Mr. Gil Weiser, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the University of Haifa. He comes from the high-tech, a successful businessman who cares deeply about the future of Israeli democracy and who knows the inside out of my university

Professor Moshe Zeidner, Dean of Research whose responsibilities include overseeing the work of all centers within the university

I have also invited Professor Majid Al-Haj to be affiliated to my Center and he agreed. Majid heads the Center for Multiculturalism at my university and for this reason cannot be an official member of the Governing Board. He is a respected sociologist who works on the relationships between Arabs and Jews in Israel, and the absorption of the Russian immigrants in Israeli society.

The list is not conclusive as other members who have passion to better the future of Israeli democracy might join. I would like to have on board more business people, with contacts and access to people who care about Israel, and have the resources to invest in various projects and activities. I am also contemplating the establishment of an International Steering Committee. The Governing Board is scheduled to convene in early March and upon their approval I would like to invite people from four corners of the world to officially join the Center. Some already expressed interest, including Nobel Prize laureate Elie Wiesel.

Some of you took the initiative and sent checks in support of the Center. You touched my heart. I am most thankful for your care and concern.

There are some 400 people on this listserve, and more than 1500 people have visited the blog since its inception. If each will donate $100 the Center could kick-off to a good start. People who wish to donate money are welcome to send a check to:

Ms. Michal Zach
(for the Center for Democratic Studies)
The Research Authority
University of Haifa
Mount Carmel
Haifa 31905
Israel.

Those of you who wish to donate larger sums of money and want to receive charitable donation tax receipts are welcome to contact:

Ms. Estie Becker
Resource Development Department
University of Haifa
Mount Carmel
Haifa 31905
Israel.
besty@univ.haifa.ac.il


Using the T-Word

Together with a former student, Amit Rahat, I am conducting research on ombudsmen in the United Kingdom, Canada and Isssrael. For this purpose I recently visited the UK and met with some people in the BBC. I will not elaborate on my findings in this forum but would like to mention only one issue: The BBC cautious refrain from using the word "terrorism". Even those involved in the horrific seizure of a school in the town of Beslan on September 3, 2004 were not described as terrorists. I asked why. Senior people at the BBC explained that the BBC broadcasts worldwide to people with different point of views, and it does not wish to alienate anyone. They continued the explanation by the well-known cliché that one's terrorist is another's freedom fighter and therefore opt to the simple solution of not using the T-Word in principle. Then one of them maintained that a certain horrific act may be described as terrorist, but "we don't call the people who conduct the act as terrorist". Do you understand this?

Bear in mind that when the UK was subjected to IRA attacks the BBC had no problem calling the people involved "terrorist". After the Good Friday agreement terrorism no more exists. September 11 was tricky, though. Interesting.

Journalists are morally required to be conscious of the terminology they employ in their reports. An ephemeral terrorist organisation is not "an army." People who kidnap and murder randomly are not "students" or "saints" or "soldiers" or "freedom fighters." The killing of innocent civilians traveling on a bus or a train should not be described in terms of a "military operation." A difference exists between covering news and providing terrorists an equal platform to declare their agenda. To remain objective in the sense of moral neutrality with regard to terrorism is to betray ethics and morality. Terrorists deserve no prize for their brutality. Here I take issue with the BBC and also with the CBC Ombudsman, David Bazay, who in comments about the use of the word "terrorist" wrote that "There is nothing in the CBC's journalism policy that prevents the public broadcaster's journalists from calling a spade a spade or a terror attack a terror attack." But, at the same time, he instructed the CBC to be careful with the use of language. While quoting his colleague Jeffrey Dvorkin, Ombudsman for the American National Public Radio, Bazay explained that while the use of "the 't' word" may be accurate it also has a political and "extra-journalistic role of de-legitimizing one side and enthroning the views of the other." In his view, this is not the role of responsible journalism, "which is and should be to describe with accuracy and fairness events that listeners may choose to endorse or deplore." Indeed, this is the role of responsible journalism and therefore journalists should resort to the term "terrorism" when such acts are conducted. Bazay took pain to explain that sides to a given conflict use and abuse the word "terrorist" to frame the issues to advance their political agenda, but it does not matter how one side or another characterizes the acts of violence it carries. What does matter is whether the acts fall within the definition of terrorism. However, because the description of a given event as terrorist might be difficult and controversial, both the BBC and the CBC are opting, in general, for the simple solution of refraining from using the term.

I am most grateful to Wilfrid Knapp, Prinky and Adam Roberts, Eric Barendt, Jack Pole and Alan Budd for their kind hospitality.


Syrian Wins Martin Ennals Award for Human Rights Defenders

Aksam Noaisse, the Chairman of the Committees for the Defense of Democratic Liberties and Human Rights in Syria has won the prestigious Martin Ennals Award. Noaisse was one of the founding members of the Committees, created in 1989, and of the publication "Sawt al-Dimokratiyyah" (voice of democracy). Naisse has courageously spoken out in national, regional and international forums. He has been arrested six times, held incommunicado and tortured. He is currently not allowed to travel abroad. A trial against him will resume on 16 January 2005 and he risks 15 years prison.

The Martin Ennals Award for Human Rights Defenders (MEA) is a unique collaboration among eleven of the world's leading non-governmental human rights organizations to give protection to human rights defenders worldwide. The jury comprises Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Human Rights First, International Federation for Human Rights, the International Commission of Jurists, World Organization Against Torture, German Diakonie, International Service for Human Rights, International Alert, Huridocs and DCI.


Peace One Day

The British Council organized an evening to show the documentary film "Peace One Day" and have a Q&A session with the film maker Jeremy Gilley. The film documents the truly amazing journey of a visionary man, who is also a doer, who wanted to better this world by declaring one day of universal peace. To reach 365 days of global peace is somewhat more difficult, but let us start with one day during which all rivals will put down their guns, allow food and medicine to pass securely to people who need them. On this day there will be no firing, no bombings, no launching of missiles, no terrorism, no guerrilla warfare, no assassinations, no military operations. A global armistice and break of violence.

Just imagine a planning meeting of the heads of the Hamas in which the intelligence officer points out that tomorrow there is a golden opportunity to launch a massive suicide attack in the heart of Tel Aviv, but then a Hamas leader rise and say: We cannot. Tomorrow is the International Day of Peace.

Or that the heads of the security forces in Israel convene and the intelligence officer says that tomorrow there will be a golden opportunity to "eliminate" the head of operations of the Islamic Jihad, but then Sharon will respond: Not tomorrow. Tomorrow is the International Day of Peace.

To achieve this end, Gilley started by contacting Nobel Peace Laureates, received the support of some leading figures and then of Costa Rica and the United Kingdom, and in September 2001 the United Nations had passed GA Resolution 55/282 that accepted the idea and initiative. The motion was passed unanimously. 21 September has become the International Day of Peace.

Gilley is continuing his efforts to spread the news about peace-one-day and is now filming his second film in which he documents his efforts. Indeed, we all yearn for peace one day. 21 September can be a good start. Please mark the day in your calendars. (Inter alia, I suggested Gilley to contact all manufactures of diaries to note the day in their products).

If you can, arrange that your respective universities buy the DVD.

For further information, see http://www.peaceoneday.org/


Prince Harry in Nazi Uniform

The photo of the young Prince dressed up as a Nazi was, in one word, revolting. I presume this is the result of sheer ignorance. The guy does not know what he is doing, and not for the first time. Young people are prone to make mistakes more than older guys, but this one shows he lacks good education. God knows what he did at Eton. Apparently not much. Or maybe Eton does not teach WWII, the Blitz, and the horrors of the Nazi regime? I wonder. Young Harry thought that that custom would be most appropriate for the party he attended, that it will be "fun", "cool", and attract attention. Well, it certainly attracted attention, probably more than he wished in the first place. I hope he will now learn something about the people he wished to represent in his fun party.

Here in Israel young people in general don't use the swastika and other Nazi motifs. They understand it is beyond the acceptable. Only political opponents resort to Nazi symbols, dressing the leaders they oppose in Nazi uniform. You may recall the notorious photo of Prime Minister Rabin dressed in Himler's uniform. I read that soldiers in the occupied territories pride themselves with the symbol of the skull with two crossed bones. I assume they don't know much of their predecessors who used this symbol of death. What they want to say, mostly to their comrades as they paint this symbol on their own private closets and put up posters with the symbol in their own private rooms: Be Aware!! I am here to inflict death and mayhem. I am cool. I am not afraid. I am here to gun down Palestinians and to show them who is the boss. In a sense, the skull symbol serves the same purpose of the Nazi symbol in other parts of the world. But, of course, not in Harry's case.

Harry just wanted to be cool per se. Nothing beyond that. What troubles me is that this shallow man serves as an idol for many young people around the world. If he is wearing this so-called ghastly swastika, why won't we? The old generation is too rigid, they might say. It is actually cool to rebel against them and wear Nazi uniform. Who were the Nazis anyway? Germans. We have nothing against Germany. A beautiful country, actually, and a prospering one too. Germany has a long history, with one terribly dark chapter of which Harry and others know very little. Oswiecim is a mere foreign word of no significance and meaning.


British Theatre

Festen – a solid drama that shows British theatre at its best. Patriarch Helge Klingelfeldt is celebrating his 60th birthday at a magnificent old house in the Danish countryside. Surrounded by his loyal wife Else, his daughter Helene, sons Christian and Michael and a host of family and friends this promises to be a very special occasion. And then Christian proposed a toast that transforms the celebration into a painful journey to the dark side of the family. Paul Nicholls, who plays Christian, gives an electrifying memorable performance and holds the play together. You are in for a thrill.

Any idea what festen means? Ideas are welcomed.


Photos from Israel

I wanted to share with you some photos from Israel. Enjoy. These are just few gems to appreciate.


With my very best wishes, as ever,

Rafi

My last communications are available on http://almagor.blogspot.comEarlier posts at my home page: http://lib-stu.haifa.ac.il/staff/rcohen-Almagor
Books archived at http://almagor.fetchauthor.info