August 2004
On The Fence, Gaza, NY Times Editorial, B'tselem Report, Civil Marriage in Israel, American Society, Reform Jewish Movement's Resolution on Israeli Unilateral Withdrawal, 9/11 Commission, American Society, Living Wills, Farewell Baltimore, New Book
Dear friends and colleagues,
The Fence
I wish to draw your attention to the following article:
Editorial
By Mortimer B. Zuckerman
Comparative advantages
US News and World Report
2 August 2004
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/issue/040802/opinion/2edit.htm
Compare scenes. In The Hague, 15 justices of the International Court of Justice solemnly order Israel to dismantle the security fence it is building to separate Israelis from Palestinians. In the Gaza Strip, meanwhile, the Palestinians, prevented from killing Israelis by a barrier that exists now, are busy murdering one another in factional warfare of gunfire, arson, and kidnappings. And in Ramallah on the West Bank, the Palestinian Authority is in turmoil yet again over the corrupt and incompetent leadership of the terrorist Yasser Arafat, one of whose chief critics emerged from a television interview to be shot twice in the leg.
Violence is the syntax of debate among Palestinians, as it has been the syntax of negotiation with Israel. It escalated in the first place not as the result of Israeli aggression but because of Israeli willingness four years ago at Camp David to yield control of 95 percent of the occupied lands as Israel had previously yielded all of the Sinai to Egypt. Even the United Nations Mideast envoy, Terje Roed-Larsen, a longtime supporter of Arafat, publicly attacked the PA recently for its failure to end violence, combat terrorism, and institute reforms that ordinary Palestinians have been demanding for years.
The flat-Earth assumption of the justices in The Hague, reinforced by a U.N. General Assembly vote on July 20--instigated in part by France--is that all Palestinians are ready to live in peace with the State of Israel and are thwarted only by Israel's intransigence. The General Assembly vote, under European pressure, did add a couple of ambiguous paragraphs about the duty of restraint on all sides, but in The Hague's judgment there was little mention of terrorism. It was a ruling taken in a practical and moral vacuum. The court washed its hands of the sure consequence: If Israel complied, scores more Israelis would be blown up by suicide bombings. Ultimately, the court placed the victims of terrorism on trial instead of the terrorists--a move emblematic of the hypocrisy of international diplomacy, remorseless in the face of the murder of Israelis yet highly agitated over a fence aimed at saving lives--just because it ostensibly impinges a little on land in the disputed West Bank.
In truth, the decision was preordained by politics--handed down, it should be noted, by a court composed in part of justices with only a nodding acquaintance with the rule of law and democracy. The head of the court, a Chinese justice, represents a country that invaded Tibet and has a questionable human-rights record. Some of the court's members come from foreign enemies of Israel, e.g., Egypt. The one dissenting American judge on the court nailed the key legal point: "To reach that conclusion with regard to the wall as a whole without . . . seeking to ascertain all relevant facts bearing directly on issues of Israel's legitimate right to self-defense, military necessity, and security needs, given the repeated deadly terrorist attacks in and upon Israel . . . cannot be justified as a matter of law."
Compare that blind justice with the careful ruling against the Israeli government on the routing of the fence by Israel's High Court of Justice, which the government has said it will accept. The court found the fence was not expressing a political border or any other border but was simply a barrier against the reality of Palestinian terrorism. But it still ordered the Army to alter a section to make it less oppressive to the Palestinians. This court had its eyes open--as The Hague's justices did not--both to the Palestinians most immediately affected and to the Israeli victims of the Palestinian campaign of terror, 900 dead and more than 6,000 wounded. It insisted that there must be a balancing of military necessity and humanitarian considerations: "Both international law and fundamental principles of Israeli administrative law recognize proportionality as a standard for balancing the authority of the military commander in the area with the needs of the local population."
Expertise over magic. In a memorable passage, the Israeli court affirms: " 'The security of the state' is not a 'magic word' which makes judicial review disappear. . . . The military commander is the expert on the military aspects of the fence's route. We are the experts on the humanitarian aspects of the route . . . whether the military commander's route inflicts disproportionate injury upon the local inhabitants. This is our expertise."
The court's ruling is a remarkable demonstration of the role of an honorable judiciary in a democratic state under mortal challenge. "Our task is difficult. We are members of Israeli society. Although we are sometimes in an ivory tower, that tower is in the heart of Jerusalem, which is not infrequently struck by ruthless terror. . . . As any other Israelis, we, too, recognize the need to defend the country and its citizens against the wounds inflicted by terror. . . . But we are judges. When we sit in judgment, we are subject to judgment. We act according to our best conscience and understanding."
With that perspective, the court decided to make the fence, in certain areas, more responsive to the needs of the local population while recognizing that its decision did not make it easier for military security. In effect, the court acknowledged that the delay in its completion might well come at the cost of terrorist attacks. "This is the destiny of a democracy: She does not see all means as acceptable, and the ways of her enemies are not always open before her. A democracy must sometimes fight with one arm tied behind her back. Even so, a democracy has the upper hand. The rule of law and individual liberties constitute an important aspect of her security stance. At the end of the day, they strengthen her spirit and this strength allows her to overcome her difficulties."
Indeed, building a fence is one of the most civilized ways in which nations can defend themselves, in Shakespeare's words, "against the envy of less happy lands," when they share a border with armed attackers who lack an effective government to constrain them. The Roman Emperor Hadrian ordered a wall to be constructed across the width of England to keep barbarians out. The Chin emperor ordered several walls to be linked to the Great Wall of China to repel barbarians. Well, we don't have barbarians today, but we have their modern equivalent in terrorists--with the Palestinian Authority a known safe haven and favorite breeding ground for them, especially the suicide bomber.
The U.N. itself built a fence around its headquarters in New York for protection. Likewise, India, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Turkey have built barriers to contain their neighbors. India just completed a 460-mile barrier in contested Kashmir to contain terrorist infiltration from Pakistan and is building a security fence similar to that being built by Israel to protect itself from Muslim terrorists coming in from Bangladesh. Saudi Arabia built a 60-mile barrier along an undefined border zone with Yemen to stop the smuggling of weapons.
Success. The bottom line is that the fence has worked. Secretary of State Colin Powell emphasized this in saying the fence issue should not even have been brought to The Hague. The American people recognize this full well. In a poll this year, 68 percent say the Israelis have a right to a security fence "even if many other countries disagree." The House of Representatives voted 361 to 45 deploring the misuse of the International Court of Justice and its advisory opinion that Israel's security fence should be dismantled.
The facts are conclusive: Before the fence was erected, the average number of terrorist attacks was 26 per year. Since its partial construction, the number has dropped to three per year, while the death toll has dropped by over 70 percent from 103 to 28, and the number of injured has dropped by more than 80 percent, from an annual average of 628 to 83. Terrorist penetration into Israel from the northern West Bank, where the initial portion of the fence was completed, has dropped from 600 a year to zero--as Israel was able to foil every suicide bombing originating from the northern West Bank and specifically from the cities of Nablus and Jenin, areas that had previously been infamous for exporting suicide bombers.
Only 5 percent of the fence is a wall to prevent fire from adjacent Palestinian communities onto Israeli areas. The height of this portion has in some places been raised, for example, as in Jerusalem--from 2 yards to 8 yards--because the terrorists jumped over the shorter wall. But in any event, it is a temporary, nonviolent way to reduce terrorism that has already saved many lives.
The fence brings benefits to the Palestinians as well: It will reduce friction between Israelis and Palestinians through the withdrawal of Israel from many settlements. The fence will also facilitate the removal of Israeli checkpoints and thus encourage greater freedom of movement within Palestinian areas. It will create an incentive for the withdrawal of Israeli settlements from the Palestinian side of the barrier, making the removal not a question of if but when. Fewer successful terrorist attacks mean fewer Israeli retaliatory defensive operations; finally, the route of the fence under this Israeli court decision will be much closer to the territorial proposals agreed to by the left-wing Israeli government in the Camp David talks and to the territorial settlements previously imposed.
Under the new court ruling, about 75 percent of Israeli settlers would be incorporated into roughly 8 percent of the West Bank on the Israeli side of the barrier. Fewer than 1 percent (13,000) of West Bank Palestinians would be stranded in these Israeli areas, while over 99 percent (1,970,000) would be left in the approximately 92 percent of the West Bank on the other side of the fence, which would be a contiguous area.
The Palestinians cannot have it both ways. They cannot avoid their security responsibilities while denying the Israelis the right to defend themselves, and they must pay a territorial price for the four years of terror they unleashed, for terrorism cannot be seen to succeed.
It has been said that if Israel is 10 percent more moral, it will be a light unto the nations; if it is 25 percent more moral, it will bring the Messiah; if it is 50 percent more moral, it will be dead. The Israeli High Court of Justice's decision brings a light unto the nations of the world. The International Court of Justice's advisory opinion would produce nothing but more dead innocents.
Gaza
Israel did not withdraw from Gaza yet and the mess continues. Palestinian militants want to show they are alive and kicking, and what can happen after Israel's pulling out. Last month the IDF moved into Beit Hanun in response to the persistent Palestinian rocket attacks, many of them coming from militants hiding in orange and olive groves. The Palestinian rockets have a range of about five miles, contain a limited explosive charge and are extremely inaccurate, but an attack last month killed two Israelis.
The attacks have continued, and on August 4 Israeli forces shot and killed four Palestinians during clashes as the military expanded operations in the northern Gaza Strip to try to prevent rocket attacks being mounted from the area.
Israel's Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Moshe Yaalon, said that the military might continue pushing into northern Gaza if the rocket attacks did not stop. If the effort does not provide security for the Israeli village of Sederot, he said, "we will be forced to widen and deepen" the operation.
NY Times Editorial
August 4 was the 75th birthday of the Palestinian leader, Yassir Arafat, who has been confined to his damaged compound in the West Bank city of Ramallah for about two years. Arafat did not make any public appearances, and there were no reports of celebrations for him. It is not a time for celebrations. Maybe Arafat should start thinking of retirement and dedicate more time to himself and his family. After all, for long decades he worked diligently for his people at the expense of doing for himself, and he needs a lot of time to write his rich autobiography, and this is an important task that requires thinking and research. I sincerely wish him tranquil and productive retirement as a prolific author.
Indeed, on July 22 the NY Times called upon Arafat to resign and to go home, saying that he inflicted enough damage upon his people and completed his role in history. The Editorial says that Arafat has never transformed from revolutionary leader to statesman. He should clear the road to someone who is more suitable for this stage in Palestinian history.
Sometimes I wish newspapers have more power. If the Palestinians had someone of Nelson Mandela's stature, the conflict was resolved and sealed long time ago.
B'tselem Report
B'tselem is an Israeli organization that monitors human rights in the territories. In previous research I conducted on human rights violations, no. of Palestinians casualties, house demolitions, administrative detentions etc. I always tried to gather information from the IDF and to match the data with B'tselem's. Usually, the IDF numbers are lower in comparison to B'tselem's.
In a report published on August 9 B'tselem called the transportation policies imposed on Palestinians in the West Bank "the reign of forbidden roads." The report holds that Israel's policies on roads and highways are reminiscent of the apartheid regime in South Africa. The report's authors noted that, as opposed to South African policies, the Israel Defense Forces dared not document such practices in writing.
One of the differences between the Israel's policies in the territories and South Africa's former policies is that Israel cites security concerns while executing its policies. Israel's security services say that closing roads to Palestinian traffic prevents terror attacks on those roads and in Israel. B'tselem claims the policy is illegal and should be avoided.
In addition, say B'tselem officials, closing roads to all Palestinians is "a racist directive which constitutes a policy that indiscriminately harms all Palestinians, and therefore infringes on human rights and is a violation of international human rights and laws" (published in Haaretz, 9 August 2004).
Civil Marriage in Israel
A new survey determined that 70% of Israelis support recognition of civil marriage and 58% do not agree that civil marriage will cause a split in the Jewish People.
The survey, commissioned by the Forum for Freedom of Choice in Marriage, determined that 59% of the public support recognition of Reform and Conservative marriage ceremonies, in addition to Orthodox ceremonies.
On the contrary, 40% are convinced that only the Rabbinate should perform religious marriage ceremonies. The survey was conducted by Dahaf, headed by Mina Zemach. 500 individuals participated in the survey, constituting a representative sample of the Jewish population in Israel.
According to the survey, 75% of the secular population supports the proposal to allow civil marriage, versus 13% among the religious and ultra-orthodox public. 40% prefer to be married in a ceremony that is not an Orthodox one, yet 85% of these would incorporate Jewish characteristics in such a ceremony.
Only 6% of the Israelis responded that they would prefer to be married in a complete secular ceremony, without any Jewish characteristics. The survey also points out that the majority of Israelis today (77%) prefer an Orthodox marriage ceremony over a marriage abroad or signing a marriage agreement with an attorney.
The survey reveals surprising statistics concerning the “brit zugi’ut” (couples registration) that would enable registration in the Ministry of Justice: apparently 70% of the secular population do not support “brit zugi’ut” assuming it did not grant all the rights of a married couple. 53% of the secular population sees “brit zugi’ut as a good or reasonable answer for civil marriage. 45% of the secular population thinks “brit zugi’ut” is not a good solution or that it does not supply an answer at all.
Reform Jewish Movement's Resolution on Israeli Unilateral Withdrawal
On August 3, 2004 Rabbi David Saperstein, Director of the Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism, sent a letter to Secretary of State Colin Powell informing him of a new resolution passed by the Union for Reform Judaism's Board of Trustees, entitled "Unilateral Withdrawals, Security Barriers, and Home Demolitions: Striving for Security and Peace in Israel and the Middle East." The resolution was included with the letter along with a copy of the new issue of Reform Judaism, which features several articles on the security barrier, including one by Rabbi Saperstein.
The Union's new resolution addresses Palestinian terrorism, Israeli security, unilateral withdrawal, the security barrier, and administrative home demolitions. The letter to Secretary Powell explains these new positions, expresses support and concern for recent Congressional actions regarding Israel, and urges the Secretary to support increased U.S. involvement in the peace process. The letter concludes, "For peace to emerge, unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and parts of the West Bank must be matched by the United States' vigorous pursuit of a return to the peace process."
The Union resolution on Israel is available at www.rac.org/isres.pdf, and Reform Judaism's articles on the security barrier, including Rabbi Saperstein's article "High-Stakes Gamble," can be found at www.urj.org/rjmag.
On the 9/11 Commission
I wish to bring to your attention the following article, published by the Washington Post.
Stansfield Turner
Sunday, August 1, 2004; Page B01
The 9/11 commission's recommendations won't create a new intelligence structure. Mostly, they repackage what we have now. For instance, the recommended position of national intelligence director (NDI) already exists. It is the director of Central Intelligence (DCI) created by the National Security Act of 1947, with responsibility for coordinating the nation's 15 intelligence agencies. The DCI today has a staff just for this coordinating function. We don't need a new layer of bureaucracy. What we do need is a review of what authority a coordinator of intelligence should have, whether we call him or her an NID or a DCI.
The commission recommendation of separating the NID/DCI from the job of heading the CIA is a fine idea. The two jobs are more than one person should try to handle. And there is a conflict of interest in running one of the agencies that's being coordinated.
A serious problem today, which the commission addresses nicely, is that the 1947 law did not give the DCI sufficient authority to ensure adequate exchange of data among the agencies. It would take only an executive order from the president to give the DCI, or a new NID, the authority to set the standards for classifying secret intelligence materials. Today, each of the heads of the 15 agencies can create classification categories so as to exclude other agencies from their data. Some intelligence does deserve special treatment. But that should be decided by the NID/DCI, who has the national interest in view, not someone with an agency's perspective.
The same presidential executive order could give the NID the authority to set the budgets for all 15 agencies, to reallocate funds and people among them, and to set priorities for both collecting and analyzing intelligence, thus implementing the intent of the 1947 law. President Jimmy Carter gave me, as his DCI, that authority. This enabled a far greater degree of coordination than we have today.
Should a new NID be given a fixed term -- not to coincide with the president's -- to help insulate him or her from political pressures to twist the intelligence? Absolutely not. Why? First, because one responsibility of the chief of intelligence is to be intelligence adviser to the president. A harmonious working relationship between the two is essential. In the past, a number of DCIs have resigned and a number of others have been fired just because of a lack of rapport with the president. Second, because the NID/DCI's authority derives in good measure from the support he or she receives from the president, especially vis-à-vis the more powerful secretaries of defense and state. A close relationship with the president is a NID/DCI's lifeblood.
Finally and most importantly, a fixed term is a bad idea because we shouldn't overreact to the accusation of the day -- that is, the assertion that the Bush administration may have pressured DCI George Tenet and his people to slant the intelligence on Iraq. The idea behind a fixed term is to make the NID more independent, rather than serving at the pleasure of the current president. Thirty years ago, we reacted in exactly the opposite direction, establishing congressional and executive controls to rein in powerful DCIs and prevent them from overstepping legal and ethical bounds, as they were accused of doing in the 1950s and 1960s.
Let's not now re-invite this problem of the past in dealing with a problem of today. All that is needed is to select as NIDs people who will stand up to improper pressures. We also have two congressional committees on intelligence whose job it should be to blow whistles at the slightest sign that the intelligence process is being politicized.
Stansfield Turner, director of central intelligence from 1977 to 1981, is on the faculty of the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland.
On the American Society
A few months ago I had an exchange with a friend who wishes to remain anonymous about the American society. Here it is.
Hi Rafi,
It is amazing to see the escalation in the divisive nature of American politics since 2000, and just as bad has been the increase in disparity between rich and poor. There has been a rape of the poor and middle class by the rich, and the amazing thing is that so many people seem to be unaware of what is happening. The accompanying loss of civil rights must be something that will cause a severe back-lash very soon.
M.
Hi M.,
I disagree with your last statement. It is a great nation. The more I know it, the more I appreciate it. I am talking about grassroots. The people have a very good sense of democracy, of civil rights and liberties, of the values that underpin their nation. That there is corruption is not new. Corruption is everywhere. Wherever there is power, there is corruption.
Hence, I do not see the downfall of the American empire in the near future. Such processes take centuries. The US suffers from severe problems: crime, drugs, political extremism, homelessness, poverty, terrorism, and corruption. Their health system is the worse in the western world. Public education is bad in many places. Public transportation is appalling. Many things in the infrastructure of society are not working properly. Still, it is an amazing place, with many good things to offer: cultural diversity, belief in freedom, belief that if you work hard you will find your place, belief that you are living in the best country in the world, strong pride and patriotism. People are proud to live here. They feel they are part of THE world empire. For me, it is the best place in the world to conduct research. If you are rich, you have the best that life can offer (this is true for every society, more so here). Unfortunately, the leaders did not find the way to decrease the gap between rich and poor. I agree that the gap, so it seems, is growing.
The US is a vast country with much to see and absorb. Life here is far more relaxed and comfortable than in other countries I know. One has less worries and stress, and has the ability to enjoy life far more, and this is true in a comparative level for all classes. The American empire will not last forever, but I do not think it will fall during this century. Eventually, internal problems mentioned supra will bring it down, as was the case with all empires in history.
The very best,
Rafi
Hi Rafi,
I agree with most of what you say. However, I will stick with my prediction that there will be a back-lash, not just on civil rights, but possibly on many other grounds as well. If the current administration is re-elected, and even if it is not, there will be a severe economic adjustment, if not melt down, after the election. At present interest rates are being held artificially low, and it is a fundamental contradiction that at times of record and increasing public sector deficits interest rates can be low. Even if a Democrat is elected to the White House he will not be able to do much to ameliorate the economic fall-out from the present misguided policies.
And in fields like civil rights, there are many people in the US who are already deeply concerned over legislation such as the Patriot Act. There was a time when if such legislation was enacted elsewhere the US Administration would have condemned it as an affront to democracy and individual rights and freedoms. Now we see even the courts are becoming less able or willing to stand up for individual freedoms and democratic protections. The electoral gerrymandering you mentioned in Texas is a case in point. Anywhere else in the democratic world the courts would have ruled that as an unconstitutional abuse of power. And now we are told that even after the debacle of the 2000 presidential election there is a high probability that systems will not be able to guarantee the accuracy of the vote count in 2004!
It is obviously true that many Americans still hold to the dream and believe in the visions you mention of freedom, the virtues of hard work, etc. But believing something does not necessarily make it so and the sense of disillusionment that comes from seeing the corporate greed and corruption and the deliberate results of policies aimed at transferring wealth from the lower to the higher socio economic groups, will ultimately have an adverse effect on the society.
I did not predict that the downfall of the American empire would happen in the near future. But it might happen much sooner than you think. I remember that the collapse of the Soviet Union happened much faster than most pundits thought. We cannot compare the empires of the past with what happens in modern times. These days events move much quicker, it is the nature of modern society.
The very weakened and distorted infrastructure that you mention will soon reach a critical mass point on the downward spiral. Until then things might look OK on the surface, especially from your vantage point, but once the slide develops into an avalanche it will cause almost instantaneous collapse of the society.
I don't predict a specific time for this but I reckon it will certainly be before the end of this century. You and I can compare notes from another place!
Cheers Rafi.
M.
On Living Wills
For all those interested in the subject I recommend the insightful article of Angela Fagerlin and Carl E. Schneider, "Enough: The Failure of the Living Will", Hastings Center Report Vol. 34, No. 2 (March-April 2004): 30-42.
The authors lucidly indicate the problems involved in writing, and abiding by living wills. Those who have, or think of having living wills, are advised to read it.
Farewell Baltimore
As the year at Hopkins comes to a close, I wish to thank people here who opened their hearts, bestowed their kindness and made the time in Baltimore memorable: Mary Jo and Steve, Louise and Boris, Hadassah and Levi, Carole and John, Marina and Bill, Efrat and Guy, Frances and Tim, Mati, Yardena and Ori, Ayelet and Dan, Aviva, Max, Mark, Agnes, Amy and Christian. It has been a privilege to know you all. I hope we will keep in touch.
New Book
It is always nice to see that one of your former students is publishing. Daphna was my student at the Hebrew University Law School and she now spends time in Oxford. Although I did not read her book yet, I am sure it is intriguing and interesting: Daphna Baram, Disenchantment: The Guardian and Israel (Guardian Books, 2004).
I hope to see you in Israel.
With my very best wishes, as ever,
RafiMy last communications are available on http://almagor.blogspot.comEarlier posts at my home page: http://lib-stu.haifa.ac.il/staff/rcohen-Almagor
Friday, July 23, 2004
July 2004
On the Fence, Sharon's Coalition, Palestinian Poll, Consolidating PA Military Organizations, Incitement, My Newest Book Euthanasia in the Netherlands, The European Football Championship, Film Recommendation, Beautiful Photos
Dear friends and colleagues,
The Fence
On June 30 the Israel's Supreme Court ordered the army to remove a small portion of the barrier it is building along the West Bank and to reroute other sections to reduce the harm imposed on Palestinians cut off from lands they need. I trust this is only the start. More accommodations need to be done.
The unanimous decision by the three-judge panel (Justices Aharon Barak, Eliahu Matza and Mishael Cheshin) asserted that Israel has a genuine security reason for building the barrier and can expropriate land in the West Bank for it. But it said the army has a legal duty to balance properly between security and humanitarian considerations: "this reduction in security must be endured for the sake of humanitarian considerations."
The barrier's planned path along a 20.5-mile section, the court ruled, could not be justified because of the suffering it would cause: "The fence's current path would separate landowners from tens of thousands of dunams [quarter-acres] of land, and the planned regime of authorizations to access that land would not substantially reduce the harm. The fence's current path would generally burden the entire way of life in petitioners' villages."
The decision affects eight Palestinian villages with 35,000 residents northwest of Jerusalem. It is related to a section of the Fence running near Jerusalem's Ramot neighborhood, Mevasseret Zion, and the settlements of Givat Ze'ev and Har Adar. It should be noted that the residents of Mevasseret Zion had joined the Palestinians in arguing that a barrier between them would increase animosity and thus lessen safety. Just last week, children from the two towns joined together to fly kites as a sign of the friendly relationship that could be damaged.
The ruling sets an important precedent for how Israel can complete the Fence. Though the ruling applies only to one particular stretch, it obviously has implications for the rest of the Fence, as well. Indeed, on July 1, the Court issued a temporary restraining order barring completion of construction work on the West Bank separation fence in a section near Har Homa, south of Jerusalem. In the past, Har Homa was the site of protests over construction of new Jewish housing on lands which Palestinians claimed were theirs.
To remind, when complete, the barrier is to run from the northern West Bank, wrap around some settlements deep in the West Bank, and stretch to the area's southern rim. The barrier consists mostly of an electronic fence with coils of razor wire, adjoining trenches and guard towers, but about 5 percent consists of concrete walls rising 20 feet. In all, the complex of fences, concrete walls, trenches and razor wire is to run 680 kilometers (437 miles). It is currently one-fourth complete (about 125 miles).
The court rejected an argument put forward by the Council for Peace and Security, which joined the petitions, that the army's security considerations were flawed. On security matters, it said, the court will always prefer the judgment of the army, which bears bottom-line responsibility for Israel's security. It also rejected claims by Palestinians and by residents of Mevasseret that the Fence was being built not for security reasons, but rather to annex land to Israel. While it agreed that the army would have no right to build a fence for political reasons, such as annexing territory, it found that the actual stretch of fence at issue appeared to be a security barrier rather than a political one. This finding, however, applies only to that particular stretch of fence, and thus does not prevent petitioners from charging that other stretches of the fence are political.
The ruling did not address whether the Fence can extend deep into Palestinian territory. I expect the court would closely scrutinize any challenged sections to make sure they conform to principles set today.
The Ministry of Defense said it would abide by the ruling and reroute 18.6 miles of the 25-mile contested section of the Fence. It will also destroy or move 1.9 miles already built. The ministry had contended that it drew the route to leave enough distance and take in the right topographical features to stop potential gunfire from Beit Sourik or to detect the approach of a suicide murderer. It is likely that in a new route for the Fence, some farmland will still be taken, but the petitioners say it will be a lot less than planned.
In recent years, the Supreme Court forbade harsh physical measures during interrogations and barred many deportations of relatives of suicide bombers from the West Bank to Gaza. The recent decision, written by Chief Justice Barak, ended with an eloquent assertion of the quandary faced by the judges. It said that while they recognize they are making the army's task harder, they believe that in the end, conscience and law must prevail because "there is no security without law... Only a separation fence built on a base of law will grant security to the state and its citizens." This decision gives Israeli citizens one more reason to be proud of their Supreme Court under the leadership of Barak.
Senior government sources expressed satisfaction with the ruling, noting that the court accepted the state's position in principle: that the Fence was a security barrier rather than a political one, and that, therefore, the government has a right to build it in the West Bank, rather than being obligated, as the petitioners had argued, to build it along the Green Line.
Senior army officials said they'd need two or three months to submit an alternate route for Cabinet approval, and would have to carry out new geological surveys and issue new land appropriation orders. In many parts of the relevant stretch, the Fence has already been built. At this point it is estimated that Israel will spend $11.1 million to alter portions of its West Bank barrier, building new roads, underpasses and tunnels to try to ease Palestinian conditions. I hasten to think this will not be the ultimate figure.
Defence Ministry officials said Israel has no plans to remove existing portions of the Fence. We shall see. I trust they don't have such plans at this point. They might have in the future. Quite likely, I would say.
As expected, on July 9, the International Court of Justice ruled that the West Bank separation fence contravenes international law, that it must be dismantled, and that compensation must be paid to the Palestinian owners of property confiscated for its construction. Fourteen justices supported the decision and the sole opponent was the American judge, Thomas Buerghenthal. For full text, see http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imwp/imwpframe.htm
In building the Wall, the court rules, Israel violated international humanitarian law, by infringing on Palestinians' freedom of movement, freedom to seek employment, education and health. It also states that Israel violated international treaties it had signed which deal with these topics: "The construction of such a wall accordingly constitutes breaches by Israel of its various obligations under the applicable international humanitarian law and human rights instruments."
The court also rules that Israel must halt construction of the wall and pull down those sections built inside the West Bank. "Israel is under an obligation to... cease forthwith the works of construction of the wall being built in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, to dismantle forthwith the structure therein situated..." the ruling says.The judges also rightly question the route of the wall determined by Israel, saying they are "not convinced that the specific course Israel has chosen for the wall was necessary to attain its security objectives."
The ruling says: "The wall, along the route chosen, and its associated regime, gravely infringe a number of rights of Palestinians residing in the territory occupied by Israel, and the infringements resulting from that route cannot be justified by military exigencies or by the requirements of national security or public order."
On the issue of compensating Palestinians harmed by construction of the wall, the court rules that, "Israel is under an obligation to make reparation for all damage caused by the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem."
The ruling maintains that, "Israel is bound to comply with its obligation to respect the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and its obligations under international humanitarian law and international human rights law. Furthermore, it must ensure freedom of access to the Holy Places that came under its control."
The Hague decision mentions the threat of terrorism four times, all of which quoting Israel's stance. There is no mentioning that some 900 Israelis have been killed and thousands injured in more than 20,000 attacks since September 2000. No mentioning of the fact that there is a 90 percent drop in terrorist attacks in areas where the Fence was completed. There is very little sympathy in the Court to Israel's intricate security situation. I wonder whether they would have taken a similar position were one of their countries attacked day in, day out by terrorists. Israel's position in the world at large and in Europe in particular continues to erode and little has been done to change the course of events. Having said that, the Court is right in its view that Israel should alter the Fence in way that will show more respect for the rights of our neighbours, honouring the Palestinian right to self-determination in their own land, beyond the Green Line.
The Hague decision is not binding. As expected, Israel immediately reacted by saying that it will not honour the decision. Justice Minister, Yosef Lapid, said Israel would honor only its own court rulings, such as the June 30 High Court of Justice ruling ordering the defense establishment to reroute a 30-kilometer stretch of the separation fence northwest of Jerusalem.
On July 20, the General Assembly of the UN overwhelmingly adopted a resolution demanding that Israel comply with the world court decision. The vote was 150 in favour, six opposed (including the USA and Australia), and 10 abstentions (including Canada). We are popular.
Like the Hague Court, this decision is also not legally binding. But it speaks volumes about Israel's position in the world. My government's determination to continue the erection of the Fence according the original plan reminds me of King Pharaoh in Egypt: The more condemnation we receive, the more the government hardens its heart. I strongly recommend the heads of my government to speak to the former leaders of South Africa during the apartheid. They could explain them in some detail how bad the future can be.
In Israel many people say about the Arabs: "They" understand only the language of force. This statement is no less true about Israel. The Fence should have been built along the 1967 Green Line, with some accommodations necessary to include large settlement in the Jerusalem area and Ariel inside the Fence, and compensating the Palestinians in other areas. The idea of using the Fence to create geographic facts that in effect make greater Israel and smaller Palestine was unfair, discriminatory, unwise and unjust. The Fence should be moved, and it will. The questions revolve only about time, money and blood involved.
In the Bible, there is one word for both money and blood: "Damim". Israeli politics eloquently and forcefully explains why.
Sharon's Coalition
Meanwhile, Sharon has to foster and bolster his shaky coalition and began talks with Shimon Peres who always found it intolerable to sit in the opposition. You know my views about unified coalitions: only in severe state of emergency. So I am very much against. Peres said that he does not mind being blamed by his critique for advancing the cause of peace. I always admired his eloquent tongue. No wonder he's still in politics. His critique don't blame him for advancing peace but for rushing into Sharon's shaking boat and not fulfilling the role of critical opposition that is necessary for democratic life and for fighting against corruption. This is the essence of the checks-and-balances mechanism that is part and parcel of other democracies, of any democracy, necessary to keep functioning. My praising goes to MKs Tamir, Avital and Cabel who stood against their leader and who try to fight against this wrong decision. They fully understand that Labour could never retain its leadership position by playing a second violin. People will prefer the first fiddler. Party that rushes in testifies about its lack of authority and capacity to win election on its own right. It’s a phony leader. In election time, people are prone to prefer the original. But patience in Peres's age is too much to ask.
Palestinian Poll
A poll conducted in December 2003 among the Palestinian population shows that 63.1 percent support suicide murderers, a slight increase compared to October 2003 (61.8%). Hatred does not die easily.
Source: http://jmcc.org/publicpoll/pop/03/dec/pop13.pdf
Consolidating PA Military Organizations
Amidst of all the bad news that we constantly hear about the governance of the Palestinian Authority, on July 21 it was reported that Chairman Yasser Arafat issued a decree to condense at least a dozen security branches into three agencies. The decree unifies the manifold Palestinian security forces into three agencies - national security, general or domestic security, and intelligence. This is a long-awaited move. Arafat, who enjoys dividing-and-ruling, created all those military agencies to assure that no one will gather enough power to contest him. He has the mentality of a terrorist who does not trust anybody and keeps his back clear by sitting against the wall, unleashing and provoking one organization against the other. Arafat was forced to take this initiative by his close allies who understood that the divide-and-rule tacticts creates anarchy and disrespect for law and order.
On Incitement
A poll conducted by Ami Pedhazur, a colleague and friend from Haifa, among Israeli Jewish population revealed that 11 percent of people who identified themselves with the right agreed with the statement: "When national disaster is on the threshold and all protest measures exhausted, inflicting physical harm on politicians might be forgiven." Prime Minister Ariel Sharon called upon the Justice Ministry to act vigorously to uproot dangerous incitement from the far right-wing. "It saddens me that one who has spent his whole life defending Jews in Israel's wars now needs to be protected from Jews out of fear that they will harm him," Sharon said (Haaretz, July 5, 2004). Minister of Internal Security, Tzachi Hanegbi, said: "I have no doubt that there are people who have already decided that they will 'save the people of Israel' and will assassinate a minister, the prime minister, an army officer or a police officer" - in imitation of Rabin assassin Yigal Amir (Haaretz, July 7, 2004). The SHABAC Director, Avi Dichter, warned against growing extremism among militant opponents of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's disengagement plan to withdraw from the Gaza Strip (the so-called "Gaza First Plan"). Spurred by Dichter's comments, Attorney General Menachem Mazuz plans to convene the SHABAC chief, the IDF Judge Advocate General, and senior police and Justice Ministry officials to discuss policies regarding bringing suspects to trial over incitement to violence.
Those familiar with my The Boundaries of Liberty and Tolerance know that it ends with an alarm that the radical right might assassinate an Israeli political leader. The book was published in 1994. A year later Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated. I raise the same cautionary alarm today. There are enough people in Israel who conceive Yigal Amir as a hero and who think that his terrible deed helped to avert the "disastrous" Oslo Accords. Some may try the same method to forestall Sharon's "catastrophic" Gaza disengagement plan. After all, if murder was successful once, why not giving it a second shot? The Israeli authorities are not complacent regarding the instigating calls for murder, and rightly so. Incitement does not enjoy the protection of the Free Speech Principle. The book I am completing now, The Scope of Tolerance, addresses and elaborates on this issue.
My Newest Book Euthanasia in the Netherlands
R. Cohen-Almagor, Euthanasia in the Netherlands: The Policy and Practice of Mercy Killing (Dordrecht: Kluwer, July 2004), ISBN 1-4020-2250-6, Hard cover
I started working on this book in 1994 when I was a Fellow at the Hastings Center in New York. The data was available but I could not figure out what to make of it as the interpretations are so contradictory: some said that the Dutch serve as a model for the world; other said that we should deduce from the Dutch way all the reasons why euthanasia should never become legal. Baffled and confused I did not write a word about the issue and delayed publication of my previous book, The Right to Die with Dignity until having the opportunity to visit Holland and have a more confirmed opinion. In 1999 I went to the Netherlands for the first time for research purposes, visited hospitals and research centers across the country, and interviewed some 30 people, the cream de la cream of the policy makers, the movers and shakers of Dutch euthanasia. I repeated this research trip twice, in 2000 and 2002. The book is largely based on the interviews.
This is my tenth book and it is special to me for several reasons: It is the first book I write that is based largely on interviews; like all my books it is based on some ten years of thinking and research, but unlike my other books the actual writing of the book was like an eruption: the first draft was written in less than 4 months; the book was attacked and criticized even before it was published: it thought me great and painful lesson about academic freedom (before I retire I will probably write a book on this intriguing subject); I changed my mind as a result of my research: from pro-euthanasia advocate I became an anti-euthanasia campaigner, although I still support physician-assisted suicide.
Infra please find two assessments of the book by two learned authorities, Professors Winslade and van Leeuwen:
Professor William R. Winslade, Institute for the Medical Humanities, University of Texas:
Euthanasia in the Netherlands is an excellent book on an important topic. It succeeds in giving an even-handed appraisal of Dutch euthanasia practices, providing a better understanding and valuable insights of the Dutch experience with euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. Cohen-Almagor analyses clearly and accurately the weaknesses of the policy and offers recommendations for correcting the deficiencies and developing a sounder policy. He combines an overview of the literature with analyses and interpretations of the intriguing interviews he conducted with key people in the Netherlands.
Cohen-Almagor’s book is critical but judicious. He gives a balanced account of the views with which he disagrees and he carefully explains the basis for his disagreement. His style of writing is straightforward, clear, easy to follow, logical, and coherent. Bioethicists and other scholars in medicine, public health, and law will be interested in this book. College teachers of medical ethics will also find it valuable, and educated general readers with a special interest in euthanasia will find it helpful.
Prof. Evert van Leeuwen, Faculteit der Geneeskunde, Section Philosophy and Medical Ethics, Free University of Amsterdam.
Writing a book on the Dutch experience with euthanasia is not an easy matter. Several reasons can explain the difficulty. First of all the ethics of the present palliative and terminal care has not been spelled out in detail until recent years. The difficulties every physician meets more than once in his career when confronted with a sincere wish of the patient to die in a humane way in a situation of unbearable suffering, are still puzzling for moral and legal thinking. Secondly, our ways of legal and public thinking are still not adapted to the situation in which death is a part of life, not so much as a natural fact but as a process that can be controlled. The goals of medicine to uphold human dignity and to alleviate suffering are at stake in this process. The Dutch policy to aim at a system of both legal clarity and control is perhaps at this moment the most articulated answer to the difficulties, but will almost certainly not be the last word in the issues of death and dying.
Rafi Cohen-Almagor has contributed much to the ongoing discussions by interviewing all the prominent legal, moral, political and medical people involved in the development of the Dutch legal ruling. His analysis of the interviews is based on clear, lucid thinking and argument. Unlike some others he tries to stay with the facts without entangling them with moral or political prejudice. Instead he tries to develop a view according to best standards of academic thinking. In the end he gives his own conclusion based on his experiences. One does not need to subscribe them in order to appreciate the work Prof. Cohen-Almagor has done. This book will certainly be helpful in every discussion on the legal and moral principles of assistance in dying, in traditions of legal philosophy such as the schools of Dworkin, Rawls and Kelsen. It can help physicians, nurses and others engaged in palliative care to sharpen their views in the ethics of palliative care as well in the forms of public and legal control that are needed in the burdensome but rewarding work of assistance in dying.
I'd be much obliged if you order the book to your respective libraries. Further information is available at http://www.wkap.nl/prod/b/1-4020-2250-6
The European Football Championship
For three weeks most of the world followed the Championship. United States was not interested. If the US does not participate, who cares? Two continents, world apart. So much so that the cable company that has a monopoly in Maryland offered to watch the game only by pay-per-view: $20 at the beginning; $26 at the end, PER GAME.
Not many places in Baltimore broadcast the event that happens once every four years, to my mind the third most important world event in sports, after the Olympic Games and The Mondeal; this with much respect to the Winter Olympics, NBA, NFL, and American and Japanese Baseball. Luckily, the student union at Hopkins did. The medium-size room was packed with people from different nationalities, and only few Americans. Between 80 to 150 people filled the room, hungry for good football. Well, we did not see much of this precious merchandise during this tournament, and the best team that produced the most exciting games (Czech Republic) was able to reach only the semis. It was a championship of the small teams. All the semi-finalists represented relatively small countries in Europe: Greece, Portugal, Czech and the Netherlands). The big nations, with 60 million people and more, went out quite early in the games: Russia, Germany, England, France, Italy and Spain. Only England and France were able to advance to the quarter finals. They were ousted by the two finalists, Portugal and Greece.
Kudos to Greece for a wonderful achievement. Their defence is remarkable, flawless. Greece has been a power house in European basketball, and now will make a difference in football.
Here is my tournament team:
Goalkeeper
Antonios Nikopolidis (Greece) / Gianluigi Buffon (Italy)
Defenders
Christian Panucci (Italy) / Giorkas Seitaridis (Greece)
Traianos Dellas (Greece)
Sol Campbell (England) / Angelos Basinas (Greece)
Marek Jankulovski (Czech Republic)
Midfield
Louis Figo (Portugal)
Karel Poborsky (Czech Republic) / Edgar Davids (The Netherlands)
Michael Balak (Germany) / Nuno Maniche (Portugal)
Pavel Nedved (Czech Republic)
Strikers
Wayne Rooney (England)
Milan Baros (Czech Republic)
Film Recommendation
Terminal By Steven Spielberg: Innovative, engaging, interesting. Based on a true story. With one of the best actors ever in the industry, Tom Hanks. Always a joy to watch him, and with Catherine Zeta-Jones who has magnetic and charming presence. Beautiful soundtrack by John Williams. Williams' elegant, light, capturing music is a constant reminder that we should see this drama with a wink in the eye.
Beautiful Photos
I wish to share with you some of the most beautiful photos of 2003. Take a few minutes, enjoy and circulate to your beloved people.
With my very best wishes, as ever,
Rafi
My last communications are available on http://almagor.blogspot.comEarlier posts at my home page: http://lib-stu.haifa.ac.il/staff/rcohen-Almagor
Friday, June 25, 2004
June 2004
On Gaza, Sharon, The Fence, Israeli Democracy Index, Euthanasia in the Netherlands, Book recommendation
Dear friends and colleagues,
Gaza
I was asked by The Advocacy & Public Policy Committee of Brit Tzedek v'Shalom: The Jewish Alliance for Justice and Peace app@btvshalom.org to circulate the following. I urge each and every one of you to give this your utmost consideration, and to sign.
_____________________
Subject: Join me in signing the Call to Bring the Settlers Home to Israel
Dear friend,
I hope you’ll join me in signing the Call to Bring the Settlers Home to Israel found at http://bringthemhome.btvshalom.org/. The Call is the creation of Brit Tzedek v’Shalom, the Jewish Alliance for Justice and Peace, a national group of Jewish Americans committed to ending the violence between Israelis and Palestinians. It is the centerpiece of a campaign to tackle one of the toughest obstacles to Middle East peace: the presence of over 200,000 Israeli settlers living throughout the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
In its Call to Bring the Settlers Home to Israel, Brit Tzedek is introducing a nationwide campaign in Jewish communities to:
* Urge the United States government to provide generous foreign assistance and solicit contributions from the European Union, other major industrial democracies and the United Nations for this massive relocation effort;
* Call on the United States to pressure Israel to reverse its longstanding financial inducements to Israeli settlers and to redirect those funds to assist settlers who are willing to return to Israel proper.
Signing the Call will only take a minute of your time, and will add your voice to thousands of other American Jews who want the U.S. Government to embrace this important initiative for peace. You can sign the Call and read its full text at http://bringthemhome.btvshalom.org/
Thank you.
Meanwhile, Sharon's new plan is to withdraw from Gaza in stages, rather than all at once. Sharon met with Egypt's intelligence chief, Omar Suleiman, to discuss his plan. Israel is urging Egypt to take a stepped-up role in assuring security there after an Israeli departure.
On June 6, 2004, after overcoming several setbacks, the cabinet approved Sharon's revised disengagement plan by a 14-7 majority. The result, however, that Sharon lost the majority in the Knesset, left with 59 MK out of 120. Labour assured that it will back him as long as he pursues the Gaza First Plan.
Voting in favor of the disengagement plan were Sharon, Netanyahu, Livnat, Shalom, Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz, Deputy Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Immigrant Absorption Minister Tzipi Livni, Minister in the Finance Ministry Meir Sheetrit, and Minister without portfolio Gideon Ezra, Justice Minister Yosef Lapid, Interior Minister Avraham Poraz, National Infrastructures Minister Yosef Paritzky, Environment Minister Yehudit Naot, Science Minister Modi Zandberg.
Minister without portfolio Uzi Landau, Health Minister Danny Naveh, Public Security Minister Tzachi Hanegbi, Agriculture Minister Yisrael Katz, Diaspora Affairs Minister Natan Sharansky, Housing and Construction Minister Effi Eitam, and Welfare Minister Zevulun Orlev voted against the plan. Eitam resigned from the coalition together with his colleague Yitzhak Levy, both from the Mafdal (National Religious Party). Orlev, also from the Mafdal, contested their decision and may decide to compete against Eitam for the Mafdal's leadership.
National Religious Party Chairman Effi Eitam said that the plan's approval would lead to the expulsion of thousands of Jews from the Gaza Strip and the creation of a Hamas state on platter of Jewish blood.
Zevulun Orlev said that there was a basis for NRP to remain in the coalition, as there is no mention of settlement evacuations in plan.
The key principles of the four-stage disengagement plan are:
A. The stalemate embodied in the current situation is damaging; in order to break the stalemate, the State of Israel must initiate a process that is not dependent on cooperation with the Palestinians.
B. The aim of the plan is to bring about a better security, diplomatic economic and demographic reality.
C. In any future permanent arrangement, there will be no Israeli presence in the Gaza Strip. [Sharon said there will be no Jews in Gaza by the end of 2005.] On the other hand, Sharon says "it is clear that some parts of Judea and Samaria (including key concentrations of Jewish settlements, civilian communities, security zones and areas in which Israel has a vested interest) will remain part of the State of Israel."
D. The State of Israel supports the efforts of the United States, which is working along with the international community, to promote the process of reform, the establishment of institutions and improving the economic and welfare conditions of the Palestinian people, so that a new Palestinian leadership can arise, capable of proving it can fulfill its obligations under the road map. [Israel still pays a lip-service to the failed road map.]
E. The withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and from the northern part of Samaria will reduce interaction with the Palestinian population.
F. Completion of the four-stage disengagement plan will negate any claims on Israel regarding its responsibility for the Palestinian population of the Gaza Strip.
G. The process of graduated disengagement does not detract from existing agreements between Israel and the Palestinians. The relevant security arrangements will remain in force.
H. International support for the four-stage disengagement plan is widespread and important. This support is vital in ensuring that the Palestinians fulfill their obligations in terms of fighting terror and implementing reforms, in accordance with the road map. Only then will the sides be able to resume negotiations.
II. Key points of the plan
A. The Gaza Strip
1. The State of Israel will withdraw from the Gaza Strip, including all Israeli settlements, and will redeploy outside the area of the Strip. The method of the withdrawal, with the exception of a military presence in the area adjacent to the border between Gaza and Egypt (the Philadelphi route), will be detailed below.
2. Once the move has been completed, there will be no permanent Israeli military presence in the evacuated territorial area of the Gaza Strip.
3. As a result of this, there will be no basis to the claim that the Strip is occupied land.
B. Judea and Samaria
1. The State of Israel will withdraw from northern Samaria (four settlements: Ganim, Kadim, Sa-Nur and Homesh) as well as all permanent military installations in the area, and will redeploy outside the evacuated area. [I expect that there will be clashes between settlers and the army when this will take place.]
2. Once the move has been completed, there will be no permanent Israeli military presence in the area.
3. The move will provide Palestinian territorial contiguity in the northern parts of Samaria.
4. The State of Israel, along with the international community, will help improve the transportation infrastructure in Judea and Samaria, with the goal of providing continuous transport for Palestinians in Judea and Samaria.
5. The move will make it easier for Palestinians to live a normal life in Judea and Samaria, and will facilitate economic and commercial activity.
C. The Process
The withdrawal process is slated to end by the end of 2005.
The settlements will be split into the following four groups:
1. Group A - Morag, Netzarim, Kfar Darom
2. Group B - The four settlements in northern Samaria (Ganim, Kadim, Sa-Nur and Homesh).
3. Group C - The Gush Katif bloc of settlements.
4. Group D - The settlements in the northern Gaza Strip (Alei Sinai, Dugit and Nissanit)
The necessary preparations will be undertaken in order to implement the four-stage disengagement plan (including administrative work to set relevant criteria, definitions and preparation of the necessary legislation.)
The government will discuss and decide separately on the evacuation of each of the above-mentioned groups.
D. The security fence
The State of Israel will continue to construct the security fence, in accordance with the relevant cabinet decisions. In deciding on the route of the fence, humanitarian considerations will be taken into account. [I also hope that prudence will prevail, leaving Palestinian land in future Palestine. No one disputes the necessity of the Fence given the significant reduction in the number of murderous attacks on Israel since its construction. Our generals were right in their forecast.]
III. The security reality after the evacuation
A. The Gaza Strip
1. The State of Israel will monitor and supervise the outer envelope on land, will have exclusive control of the Gaza airspace, and will continue its military activity along the Gaza Strip's coastline.
2. The Gaza Strip will be completely demilitarized of arms banned by current agreements between the sides.
3. The State of Israel reserves the basic right to self-defense, which includes taking preventive measures as well as the use of force against threats originating in the Gaza Strip. [I hope the "right to self-defense" will not be stretched beyond absolutely necessary measures, and that extra cautionary steps will be made to secure the safety of civilians.]
B. The West Bank
1. After the evacuation of the northern Samaria settlements, there will be no permanent military presence in that area. [This, of course, is not enough. The Plan is Gaza First, not Gaza Last. Having said that, I am of the view that it is prudent to carry this initiative in steps, while examining the reaction and counter-measures of the Palestinians.]
2. The State of Israel reserves the basic right to self defense, which includes taking preventive measures as well as the use of force against threats originating in the area. [Same caveat as above.]
3. Military activity will remain in its current framework in the rest of the West Bank. The State of Israel will, if circumstances allow, consider reducing its activity in Palestinian cities.
4. The State of Israel will work to reduce the number of checkpoints throughout the West Bank. [They should be significantly reduced. Some of them serve little or no purpose beyond making Palestinian daily life difficult.]
IV. Military infrastructure and installations in the Gaza Strip and the northern Samaria region. All will be dismantled and evacuated, except for those that the State of Israel decides to transfer to an authorized body.
V. The nature of the security assistance to the Palestinians
The State of Israel agrees that in coordination with it, consulting, assistance and training will be provided to Palestinian security forces for the purpose of fighting terror and maintaining the public order. The assistance will be provided by American, British, Egyptian, Jordanian or other experts, as will be agreed upon with Israel. [Good faith needs to prevail on both sides, and Israel welcomes outside assistance.]
The State of Israel stresses that it will not agree to any foreign security presence in Gaza or the West Bank without its consent. [Absolutely essential point, given the rough history we had with previous such attempts, none of them successful or objective.]
VI. The border area between the Strip and Egypt (the Philadelphi route)
The State of Israel will continue to maintain military presence along the border between the Gaza Strip and Egypt (the Philadelphi route.) This presence is an essential security requirement. The physical widening of the route where the military activity will take place, may be necessary in certain areas. [I hope the "physical widening of the route" does not entail the destruction of more houses on the Palestinian side and transforming poor civilians into desperate refugees and potential ticking bombs.]
The possibility of evacuating the area will be considered later on. This evacuation would be conditioned, among other factors, on the security reality and on the level of cooperation by Egypt in creating an alternative credible arrangement.
If and when the conditions are met enabling the evacuation of the area, the State of Israel will be willing to consider the possibility of setting up an airport and a seaport in the Gaza Strip, subject to arrangements agreed upon with the State of Israel. [Halleluiah. I hope to live to see this happening.]
VII. Real estate
In general, houses belonging to the settlers, and other sensitive structures such as synagogues will not be left behind. The State of Israel will aspire to transfer other structures, such as industrial and agricultural facilities, to an international third party that will use them for the benefit of the Palestinian population. [Pity Egypt and/or the European Community do not play a more constructive role, seeing that these houses be transferred to Palestinian civilians. They certainly need them, and Israel could use the money selling them.]
The Erez industrial zone will be transferred to an agreed-upon Palestinian or international body. [This is a starting point for them to develop viable economy. Of course, much more need to be done. The precondition is quiet borders.]
The State of Israel along with Egypt will examine the possibility of setting up a joint industrial zone on the border between Israel, Egypt and the Gaza Strip.
VIII. Infrastructure and civilian arrangements
The water, electricity, sewage and communications infrastructures will be left in place.
As a rule, Israel will enable the continued supply of electricity, water, gas and fuel to the Palestinians, under the existing arrangements and full compensation.
The existing arrangements, including the arrangements with regard to water and the electromagnetic area, will remain valid.
IX. The activity of the international civilian organizations
The State of Israel views very favorably continued activity of the international humanitarian organizations and those that deal will civil development, which aid the Palestinian population.
The State of Israel will coordinate with the international organizations the arrangements that will make this activity easier.
The State of Israel suggests that an international mechanism (such as the AHLC) be set up, in coordination with Israel and international bodies, that will work to develop the Palestinian economy.
X. Economic arrangements
In general, the economic arrangements that are currently in effect between Israel and the Palestinians will remain valid. These arrangements include, among other things:
A. The movement of goods between the Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria, Israel and foreign countries.
B. The monetary regime.
C. The taxation arrangements and the customs envelope.
D. Postal and communications arrangements.
H. The entry of workers into Israel in accordance with the existing criteria. [Hopefully more workers, as was the case before. Again, the key precondition is quiet borders.]
In the long run, and in accordance with the Israeli interest in encouraging Palestinian economic independence, The State of Israel aspires to reduce the number of Palestinian workers entering Israel, and eventually to completely stop their entrance. The State of Israel will support the development of employment sources in the Gaza Strip and in the Palestinian areas in the West Bank, by international bodies. [This is part of the "divorce mood" prevailing in Israel. I hope the mood will change, and it will if terror stops. In the short run, Palestine will find it very difficult to develop independent economy in the limited area of the Gaza Strip. Israel pushes away responsibility to "international bodies". This is the easy solution. Easy solutions are not always the most prudent ones.]
XI. The international crossing points
A. The international crossing point between the Gaza Strip and Egypt
1. The existing arrangements will remain in force.
2. Israel is interested in transferring the crossing point to the "border triangle," south of its current location. This will be done in coordination with the Egyptian government. This will allow the expansion of the hours of activity at the crossing point.
B. The international crossing points between Judea and Samaria, and Jordan.
The existing arrangements will remain in force.
XII. The Erez crossing point
The Erez crossing point will be moved into the territory of the State of Israel according to a timetable that will be determined separately.
XIII. Summary
The implementation of the four-stage disengagement plan will bring about an improvement in the situation and a break from the current stagnation. If and when the Palestinian side shows a willingness, an ability and an implementation of actions to fight terrorism, a full cessation of terror and violence and the carrying out of reforms according to the roadmap, it will be possible to return to the track of discussions and negotiations.
Sharon
On June 15, 2004, Israel's attorney general Meni Mazuz had decided against indicting Prime Minister Ariel Sharon on charges of accepting bribes from the real estate developer, Dudi Appel. Rejecting Edna Arbel's (the state prosecutor) recommended of late March to indict Sharon, Mazuz had decided there was not enough evidence to support an indictment. As you recall, in January, Appel was indicted on charges of trying to bribe Sharon with about $700,000, most of it paid to Gilad Sharon, his son. Appel had been seeking Sharon's help with real estate deals, including building a resort and casino on a Greek island, beginning in the late 1990's when Sharon was foreign minister in a previous government. The resort was never built. The case is known in Israel as the Greek Island Affair. For proposed payments of $3 million, Appel hired Gilad to promote the development on the Greek island, though, the indictment said, he "did not have the relevant professional skills." After hiring Gilad, Appel made monthly payments to an account of the Sharon ranch, which is in Gilad's name. It listed 15 separate payments, some in dollars and some in shekels, totaling about $700,000.
Appel's indictment charged that he had told Sharon that Gilad would make a lot of money, but it did not lay out evidence that Sharon had knowingly taken a bribe. Legal experts say it would be possible to prosecute one man for giving bribes, without prosecuting the target of the bribe, if he was believed to be unaware of the intent.
MK Yossi Sarid (Yahad, formerly Meretz) and Eitan Cabel (Labor) announced they would petition the High Court.
Sharon is also facing the possibility of eventual charges in another investigation, into a loan from a South African businessman to cover the refund of illegal campaign contributions in his election race in 1999.
Peres
The Labour's legendary leader would love to join Sharon's collapsing coalition. It is difficult for him to be away from the real action, and he loves meeting leaders of the world to push the peace-of-sorts forward. Sharon and Peres just had "a routine meeting". Sharon wants to continue in office. Peres wishes to return to the Foreign Office. As you know, I am against coalition governments in principle, thinking it ill-serves democracy. It does serve the interests of leaders of both parties.
The Fence
Israel is preparing to build new segments of its separation barrier around Jewish settlements that would mark the deepest penetration yet into the West Bank. According to the NY Times (June 14, 2004), President Bush has called the fence's route a "problem." Indeed it is a major problem. American officials have raised objections in continuing talks with the Israelis. But Israel has insisted that Washington has not opposed the first phase of construction around Ariel and nearby settlements that are more than 10 miles inside the West Bank. This is true. Does it mean that mistakes should be reiterated?
The Israeli plan, approved by the government last fall, calls for building a barrier around three sides of Ariel, which is about 20 miles north of Jerusalem and is one of the largest Jewish settlements, with close to 20,000 residents. This same building pattern would be carried out around several other settlements in the same area.
After this work is completed, Israel would consult with the United States about joining these sections together and linking them with the main barrier, which runs closer to the West Bank boundary.
Paul Patin, a spokesperson for the American Embassy commented: "We accept Israel's right to build a fence for security, but when the route goes deep into the West Bank, it has political dimensions, and we have concerns about that." The Bush administration has said that it does not object to the barrier in principle, but believes that it should be on, or very close to, the borders Israel had before the 1967 war in which Israel captured the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
The Israeli plan to include Ariel inside the barrier is one of the most controversial aspects of the entire project because it would be the most far-reaching intrusion into the West Bank. Until now, Israel has built about a quarter of the planned barrier, which would eventually put about 15 percent of the West Bank on the western or Israeli side, according to United Nations calculations. The barrier's planned route would put most of the West Bank settlers on the Israeli side of the fence.
The initial phase of the building is to be completed by May 2005. Construction on the parts that would connect the fence to the main West Bank barrier is tentatively planned to begin next year. In most areas, the barrier consists of an electronic fence accompanied by razor wire, trenches and guard towers. Some sections include concrete walls more than 20 feet high.
In another development on June 14, 2004, the Israeli military said it had removed 42 of 150 roadblocks and other obstacles in the West Bank. The move would ease Palestinian movements, though Israel still has checkpoints throughout the West Bank. This development should be congratulated. I hope this trend will continue.
Israeli Democracy Index
The Israel Democracy Institute publishes every year a report about the state of democracy in Israel. A complete English text of the 2004 Israeli Democracy Index will be available soon at: http://www.idi.org.il/english/article.php?id=205bf79ab2a9fdbc8aa2b819f733b9da.
Euthanasia in the Netherlands
This month I was invited to deliver two lectures, both on Euthanasia in the Netherlands, the subject matter of my forthcoming book, both at Hopkins. I think these were the last two public lectures for this academic year. I would like to take this opportunity to thank all colleagues who have graciously invited me to address audiences in their respective universities, speaking on diverse topics. I cherish such meetings and encounters.
Book recommendation
I recently read Patricia Campbell Hearst with Alvin Moscow, Patty Hearst: Her Own Story (New York: Avon, 1982). Hearst tells the story of her kidnapping by the SLA. It is most horrifying story, a real life drama, written in an engaging and interesting style. I found it difficult to let the book out of my hands.
With my very best wishes, as ever,
Rafi
My last communications are available on http://almagor.blogspot.com
Earlier posts at my home page: http://lib-stu.haifa.ac.il/staff/rcohen-Almagor
On Gaza, Sharon, The Fence, Israeli Democracy Index, Euthanasia in the Netherlands, Book recommendation
Dear friends and colleagues,
Gaza
I was asked by The Advocacy & Public Policy Committee of Brit Tzedek v'Shalom: The Jewish Alliance for Justice and Peace app@btvshalom.org to circulate the following. I urge each and every one of you to give this your utmost consideration, and to sign.
_____________________
Subject: Join me in signing the Call to Bring the Settlers Home to Israel
Dear friend,
I hope you’ll join me in signing the Call to Bring the Settlers Home to Israel found at http://bringthemhome.btvshalom.org/. The Call is the creation of Brit Tzedek v’Shalom, the Jewish Alliance for Justice and Peace, a national group of Jewish Americans committed to ending the violence between Israelis and Palestinians. It is the centerpiece of a campaign to tackle one of the toughest obstacles to Middle East peace: the presence of over 200,000 Israeli settlers living throughout the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
In its Call to Bring the Settlers Home to Israel, Brit Tzedek is introducing a nationwide campaign in Jewish communities to:
* Urge the United States government to provide generous foreign assistance and solicit contributions from the European Union, other major industrial democracies and the United Nations for this massive relocation effort;
* Call on the United States to pressure Israel to reverse its longstanding financial inducements to Israeli settlers and to redirect those funds to assist settlers who are willing to return to Israel proper.
Signing the Call will only take a minute of your time, and will add your voice to thousands of other American Jews who want the U.S. Government to embrace this important initiative for peace. You can sign the Call and read its full text at http://bringthemhome.btvshalom.org/
Thank you.
Meanwhile, Sharon's new plan is to withdraw from Gaza in stages, rather than all at once. Sharon met with Egypt's intelligence chief, Omar Suleiman, to discuss his plan. Israel is urging Egypt to take a stepped-up role in assuring security there after an Israeli departure.
On June 6, 2004, after overcoming several setbacks, the cabinet approved Sharon's revised disengagement plan by a 14-7 majority. The result, however, that Sharon lost the majority in the Knesset, left with 59 MK out of 120. Labour assured that it will back him as long as he pursues the Gaza First Plan.
Voting in favor of the disengagement plan were Sharon, Netanyahu, Livnat, Shalom, Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz, Deputy Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Immigrant Absorption Minister Tzipi Livni, Minister in the Finance Ministry Meir Sheetrit, and Minister without portfolio Gideon Ezra, Justice Minister Yosef Lapid, Interior Minister Avraham Poraz, National Infrastructures Minister Yosef Paritzky, Environment Minister Yehudit Naot, Science Minister Modi Zandberg.
Minister without portfolio Uzi Landau, Health Minister Danny Naveh, Public Security Minister Tzachi Hanegbi, Agriculture Minister Yisrael Katz, Diaspora Affairs Minister Natan Sharansky, Housing and Construction Minister Effi Eitam, and Welfare Minister Zevulun Orlev voted against the plan. Eitam resigned from the coalition together with his colleague Yitzhak Levy, both from the Mafdal (National Religious Party). Orlev, also from the Mafdal, contested their decision and may decide to compete against Eitam for the Mafdal's leadership.
National Religious Party Chairman Effi Eitam said that the plan's approval would lead to the expulsion of thousands of Jews from the Gaza Strip and the creation of a Hamas state on platter of Jewish blood.
Zevulun Orlev said that there was a basis for NRP to remain in the coalition, as there is no mention of settlement evacuations in plan.
The key principles of the four-stage disengagement plan are:
A. The stalemate embodied in the current situation is damaging; in order to break the stalemate, the State of Israel must initiate a process that is not dependent on cooperation with the Palestinians.
B. The aim of the plan is to bring about a better security, diplomatic economic and demographic reality.
C. In any future permanent arrangement, there will be no Israeli presence in the Gaza Strip. [Sharon said there will be no Jews in Gaza by the end of 2005.] On the other hand, Sharon says "it is clear that some parts of Judea and Samaria (including key concentrations of Jewish settlements, civilian communities, security zones and areas in which Israel has a vested interest) will remain part of the State of Israel."
D. The State of Israel supports the efforts of the United States, which is working along with the international community, to promote the process of reform, the establishment of institutions and improving the economic and welfare conditions of the Palestinian people, so that a new Palestinian leadership can arise, capable of proving it can fulfill its obligations under the road map. [Israel still pays a lip-service to the failed road map.]
E. The withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and from the northern part of Samaria will reduce interaction with the Palestinian population.
F. Completion of the four-stage disengagement plan will negate any claims on Israel regarding its responsibility for the Palestinian population of the Gaza Strip.
G. The process of graduated disengagement does not detract from existing agreements between Israel and the Palestinians. The relevant security arrangements will remain in force.
H. International support for the four-stage disengagement plan is widespread and important. This support is vital in ensuring that the Palestinians fulfill their obligations in terms of fighting terror and implementing reforms, in accordance with the road map. Only then will the sides be able to resume negotiations.
II. Key points of the plan
A. The Gaza Strip
1. The State of Israel will withdraw from the Gaza Strip, including all Israeli settlements, and will redeploy outside the area of the Strip. The method of the withdrawal, with the exception of a military presence in the area adjacent to the border between Gaza and Egypt (the Philadelphi route), will be detailed below.
2. Once the move has been completed, there will be no permanent Israeli military presence in the evacuated territorial area of the Gaza Strip.
3. As a result of this, there will be no basis to the claim that the Strip is occupied land.
B. Judea and Samaria
1. The State of Israel will withdraw from northern Samaria (four settlements: Ganim, Kadim, Sa-Nur and Homesh) as well as all permanent military installations in the area, and will redeploy outside the evacuated area. [I expect that there will be clashes between settlers and the army when this will take place.]
2. Once the move has been completed, there will be no permanent Israeli military presence in the area.
3. The move will provide Palestinian territorial contiguity in the northern parts of Samaria.
4. The State of Israel, along with the international community, will help improve the transportation infrastructure in Judea and Samaria, with the goal of providing continuous transport for Palestinians in Judea and Samaria.
5. The move will make it easier for Palestinians to live a normal life in Judea and Samaria, and will facilitate economic and commercial activity.
C. The Process
The withdrawal process is slated to end by the end of 2005.
The settlements will be split into the following four groups:
1. Group A - Morag, Netzarim, Kfar Darom
2. Group B - The four settlements in northern Samaria (Ganim, Kadim, Sa-Nur and Homesh).
3. Group C - The Gush Katif bloc of settlements.
4. Group D - The settlements in the northern Gaza Strip (Alei Sinai, Dugit and Nissanit)
The necessary preparations will be undertaken in order to implement the four-stage disengagement plan (including administrative work to set relevant criteria, definitions and preparation of the necessary legislation.)
The government will discuss and decide separately on the evacuation of each of the above-mentioned groups.
D. The security fence
The State of Israel will continue to construct the security fence, in accordance with the relevant cabinet decisions. In deciding on the route of the fence, humanitarian considerations will be taken into account. [I also hope that prudence will prevail, leaving Palestinian land in future Palestine. No one disputes the necessity of the Fence given the significant reduction in the number of murderous attacks on Israel since its construction. Our generals were right in their forecast.]
III. The security reality after the evacuation
A. The Gaza Strip
1. The State of Israel will monitor and supervise the outer envelope on land, will have exclusive control of the Gaza airspace, and will continue its military activity along the Gaza Strip's coastline.
2. The Gaza Strip will be completely demilitarized of arms banned by current agreements between the sides.
3. The State of Israel reserves the basic right to self-defense, which includes taking preventive measures as well as the use of force against threats originating in the Gaza Strip. [I hope the "right to self-defense" will not be stretched beyond absolutely necessary measures, and that extra cautionary steps will be made to secure the safety of civilians.]
B. The West Bank
1. After the evacuation of the northern Samaria settlements, there will be no permanent military presence in that area. [This, of course, is not enough. The Plan is Gaza First, not Gaza Last. Having said that, I am of the view that it is prudent to carry this initiative in steps, while examining the reaction and counter-measures of the Palestinians.]
2. The State of Israel reserves the basic right to self defense, which includes taking preventive measures as well as the use of force against threats originating in the area. [Same caveat as above.]
3. Military activity will remain in its current framework in the rest of the West Bank. The State of Israel will, if circumstances allow, consider reducing its activity in Palestinian cities.
4. The State of Israel will work to reduce the number of checkpoints throughout the West Bank. [They should be significantly reduced. Some of them serve little or no purpose beyond making Palestinian daily life difficult.]
IV. Military infrastructure and installations in the Gaza Strip and the northern Samaria region. All will be dismantled and evacuated, except for those that the State of Israel decides to transfer to an authorized body.
V. The nature of the security assistance to the Palestinians
The State of Israel agrees that in coordination with it, consulting, assistance and training will be provided to Palestinian security forces for the purpose of fighting terror and maintaining the public order. The assistance will be provided by American, British, Egyptian, Jordanian or other experts, as will be agreed upon with Israel. [Good faith needs to prevail on both sides, and Israel welcomes outside assistance.]
The State of Israel stresses that it will not agree to any foreign security presence in Gaza or the West Bank without its consent. [Absolutely essential point, given the rough history we had with previous such attempts, none of them successful or objective.]
VI. The border area between the Strip and Egypt (the Philadelphi route)
The State of Israel will continue to maintain military presence along the border between the Gaza Strip and Egypt (the Philadelphi route.) This presence is an essential security requirement. The physical widening of the route where the military activity will take place, may be necessary in certain areas. [I hope the "physical widening of the route" does not entail the destruction of more houses on the Palestinian side and transforming poor civilians into desperate refugees and potential ticking bombs.]
The possibility of evacuating the area will be considered later on. This evacuation would be conditioned, among other factors, on the security reality and on the level of cooperation by Egypt in creating an alternative credible arrangement.
If and when the conditions are met enabling the evacuation of the area, the State of Israel will be willing to consider the possibility of setting up an airport and a seaport in the Gaza Strip, subject to arrangements agreed upon with the State of Israel. [Halleluiah. I hope to live to see this happening.]
VII. Real estate
In general, houses belonging to the settlers, and other sensitive structures such as synagogues will not be left behind. The State of Israel will aspire to transfer other structures, such as industrial and agricultural facilities, to an international third party that will use them for the benefit of the Palestinian population. [Pity Egypt and/or the European Community do not play a more constructive role, seeing that these houses be transferred to Palestinian civilians. They certainly need them, and Israel could use the money selling them.]
The Erez industrial zone will be transferred to an agreed-upon Palestinian or international body. [This is a starting point for them to develop viable economy. Of course, much more need to be done. The precondition is quiet borders.]
The State of Israel along with Egypt will examine the possibility of setting up a joint industrial zone on the border between Israel, Egypt and the Gaza Strip.
VIII. Infrastructure and civilian arrangements
The water, electricity, sewage and communications infrastructures will be left in place.
As a rule, Israel will enable the continued supply of electricity, water, gas and fuel to the Palestinians, under the existing arrangements and full compensation.
The existing arrangements, including the arrangements with regard to water and the electromagnetic area, will remain valid.
IX. The activity of the international civilian organizations
The State of Israel views very favorably continued activity of the international humanitarian organizations and those that deal will civil development, which aid the Palestinian population.
The State of Israel will coordinate with the international organizations the arrangements that will make this activity easier.
The State of Israel suggests that an international mechanism (such as the AHLC) be set up, in coordination with Israel and international bodies, that will work to develop the Palestinian economy.
X. Economic arrangements
In general, the economic arrangements that are currently in effect between Israel and the Palestinians will remain valid. These arrangements include, among other things:
A. The movement of goods between the Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria, Israel and foreign countries.
B. The monetary regime.
C. The taxation arrangements and the customs envelope.
D. Postal and communications arrangements.
H. The entry of workers into Israel in accordance with the existing criteria. [Hopefully more workers, as was the case before. Again, the key precondition is quiet borders.]
In the long run, and in accordance with the Israeli interest in encouraging Palestinian economic independence, The State of Israel aspires to reduce the number of Palestinian workers entering Israel, and eventually to completely stop their entrance. The State of Israel will support the development of employment sources in the Gaza Strip and in the Palestinian areas in the West Bank, by international bodies. [This is part of the "divorce mood" prevailing in Israel. I hope the mood will change, and it will if terror stops. In the short run, Palestine will find it very difficult to develop independent economy in the limited area of the Gaza Strip. Israel pushes away responsibility to "international bodies". This is the easy solution. Easy solutions are not always the most prudent ones.]
XI. The international crossing points
A. The international crossing point between the Gaza Strip and Egypt
1. The existing arrangements will remain in force.
2. Israel is interested in transferring the crossing point to the "border triangle," south of its current location. This will be done in coordination with the Egyptian government. This will allow the expansion of the hours of activity at the crossing point.
B. The international crossing points between Judea and Samaria, and Jordan.
The existing arrangements will remain in force.
XII. The Erez crossing point
The Erez crossing point will be moved into the territory of the State of Israel according to a timetable that will be determined separately.
XIII. Summary
The implementation of the four-stage disengagement plan will bring about an improvement in the situation and a break from the current stagnation. If and when the Palestinian side shows a willingness, an ability and an implementation of actions to fight terrorism, a full cessation of terror and violence and the carrying out of reforms according to the roadmap, it will be possible to return to the track of discussions and negotiations.
Sharon
On June 15, 2004, Israel's attorney general Meni Mazuz had decided against indicting Prime Minister Ariel Sharon on charges of accepting bribes from the real estate developer, Dudi Appel. Rejecting Edna Arbel's (the state prosecutor) recommended of late March to indict Sharon, Mazuz had decided there was not enough evidence to support an indictment. As you recall, in January, Appel was indicted on charges of trying to bribe Sharon with about $700,000, most of it paid to Gilad Sharon, his son. Appel had been seeking Sharon's help with real estate deals, including building a resort and casino on a Greek island, beginning in the late 1990's when Sharon was foreign minister in a previous government. The resort was never built. The case is known in Israel as the Greek Island Affair. For proposed payments of $3 million, Appel hired Gilad to promote the development on the Greek island, though, the indictment said, he "did not have the relevant professional skills." After hiring Gilad, Appel made monthly payments to an account of the Sharon ranch, which is in Gilad's name. It listed 15 separate payments, some in dollars and some in shekels, totaling about $700,000.
Appel's indictment charged that he had told Sharon that Gilad would make a lot of money, but it did not lay out evidence that Sharon had knowingly taken a bribe. Legal experts say it would be possible to prosecute one man for giving bribes, without prosecuting the target of the bribe, if he was believed to be unaware of the intent.
MK Yossi Sarid (Yahad, formerly Meretz) and Eitan Cabel (Labor) announced they would petition the High Court.
Sharon is also facing the possibility of eventual charges in another investigation, into a loan from a South African businessman to cover the refund of illegal campaign contributions in his election race in 1999.
Peres
The Labour's legendary leader would love to join Sharon's collapsing coalition. It is difficult for him to be away from the real action, and he loves meeting leaders of the world to push the peace-of-sorts forward. Sharon and Peres just had "a routine meeting". Sharon wants to continue in office. Peres wishes to return to the Foreign Office. As you know, I am against coalition governments in principle, thinking it ill-serves democracy. It does serve the interests of leaders of both parties.
The Fence
Israel is preparing to build new segments of its separation barrier around Jewish settlements that would mark the deepest penetration yet into the West Bank. According to the NY Times (June 14, 2004), President Bush has called the fence's route a "problem." Indeed it is a major problem. American officials have raised objections in continuing talks with the Israelis. But Israel has insisted that Washington has not opposed the first phase of construction around Ariel and nearby settlements that are more than 10 miles inside the West Bank. This is true. Does it mean that mistakes should be reiterated?
The Israeli plan, approved by the government last fall, calls for building a barrier around three sides of Ariel, which is about 20 miles north of Jerusalem and is one of the largest Jewish settlements, with close to 20,000 residents. This same building pattern would be carried out around several other settlements in the same area.
After this work is completed, Israel would consult with the United States about joining these sections together and linking them with the main barrier, which runs closer to the West Bank boundary.
Paul Patin, a spokesperson for the American Embassy commented: "We accept Israel's right to build a fence for security, but when the route goes deep into the West Bank, it has political dimensions, and we have concerns about that." The Bush administration has said that it does not object to the barrier in principle, but believes that it should be on, or very close to, the borders Israel had before the 1967 war in which Israel captured the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
The Israeli plan to include Ariel inside the barrier is one of the most controversial aspects of the entire project because it would be the most far-reaching intrusion into the West Bank. Until now, Israel has built about a quarter of the planned barrier, which would eventually put about 15 percent of the West Bank on the western or Israeli side, according to United Nations calculations. The barrier's planned route would put most of the West Bank settlers on the Israeli side of the fence.
The initial phase of the building is to be completed by May 2005. Construction on the parts that would connect the fence to the main West Bank barrier is tentatively planned to begin next year. In most areas, the barrier consists of an electronic fence accompanied by razor wire, trenches and guard towers. Some sections include concrete walls more than 20 feet high.
In another development on June 14, 2004, the Israeli military said it had removed 42 of 150 roadblocks and other obstacles in the West Bank. The move would ease Palestinian movements, though Israel still has checkpoints throughout the West Bank. This development should be congratulated. I hope this trend will continue.
Israeli Democracy Index
The Israel Democracy Institute publishes every year a report about the state of democracy in Israel. A complete English text of the 2004 Israeli Democracy Index will be available soon at: http://www.idi.org.il/english/article.php?id=205bf79ab2a9fdbc8aa2b819f733b9da.
Euthanasia in the Netherlands
This month I was invited to deliver two lectures, both on Euthanasia in the Netherlands, the subject matter of my forthcoming book, both at Hopkins. I think these were the last two public lectures for this academic year. I would like to take this opportunity to thank all colleagues who have graciously invited me to address audiences in their respective universities, speaking on diverse topics. I cherish such meetings and encounters.
Book recommendation
I recently read Patricia Campbell Hearst with Alvin Moscow, Patty Hearst: Her Own Story (New York: Avon, 1982). Hearst tells the story of her kidnapping by the SLA. It is most horrifying story, a real life drama, written in an engaging and interesting style. I found it difficult to let the book out of my hands.
With my very best wishes, as ever,
Rafi
My last communications are available on http://almagor.blogspot.com
Earlier posts at my home page: http://lib-stu.haifa.ac.il/staff/rcohen-Almagor
Friday, May 21, 2004
May 2004
Dear friends and colleagues,
On Gaza, Sharon's Setback, Targeted Assassinations, Sponsoring Settlements, Ford Foundation, Independence Day Parties, Interview to the Jewish Times, First Arab Team to Win the Israel Football Cup, and New Books
On Gaza
I was asked what I think of Sharon's Plan. I have to say that when I first heard of Sharon's plan I was quite skeptic. Now that is published in some more details, it is very much the way I wanted it to be implemented. If you look at what I wrote back in 2000 you will find many resemblances between my suggestion and Sharon's. The only places where we differ concern my suggestions to invite Arafat to declare his statehood in Gaza. Sharon is still reluctant to officially acknowledge and welcome a Palestinian State; and secondly, my idea of coordination with the PA. Actually, on this issue I think Israel did not reveal all pertinent information. I would not be surprised if Israel coordinates to one extent or another its maneuvers with Dachlan.
Meanwhile, more blood has been shed in Gaza. Killings on both sides. Israel carried out a wide scale operation after 13 soldiers were killed. At least 20 Palestinians were killed on May 18, 2004 as the Israel Defense Forces launched its operation in Rafah, on the Gaza-Egypt border, aimed at halting weapons smuggling, and arresting or killing militants. Three children, including a 13-year-old boy and his 16-year-old sister, were reportedly among the dead. On May 20, the IDF killed at least ten more Palestinians who were marching in protest against the Israeli curfew. Four of them children: Walid Abu Kamar, 10 y-o; Mubarac Al-Hashash, 11 y-o; Machmud Mansur, 13 y-o; Ahmed Abu-Said, 14 y-o. More than sisty people were injured, including 16 children. Hundreds of Palestinians were reported fleeing from Rafah as the IDF went in. How the Israeli prudent government thinks those measures are going to solve our problems is a great wonder to me.
Amnesty international has published a very critical report of Israeli conduct, arguing that in recent years the Israeli army has demolished thousands of homes and properties as well as vast areas of agricultural land in Israel and in the Occupied Territories. Tens of thousands of men, women and children have been made homeless or have lost their source of livelihood. Many more live in fear that they will be next.
The report maintained that although Israel has for decades been pursuing a policy of demolishing the homes of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories and the homes of Israeli Arabs in Israel, in the past three and a half years the scale of the destruction has reached an unprecedented level.
House demolitions are usually carried out without warning, often at night, and the occupants are given little or no time to leave their homes and salvage their belongings. The victims are often amongst the poorest and most disadvantaged in society. In the wake of the demolitions, families return to the ruins of their homes searching for whatever can be salvaged from under the rubble – including passports or other documents.
Further information is available at http://web.amnesty.org/pages/isr-index-eng
On Sharon's Setback
On Sunday, May 2, Sharon had received a blow from his own party which rejected his disengagement plan from Gaza. Sharon, a lifelong hawk who has been a leading advocate of settlement-building for decades, was unable to persuade the Likud to back the plan. The party rejected the Gaza pullout proposal 60 percent to 40 percent. This casts doubts on the plan's future as well as on the stability of the government. It is a major blow to Israel. A day after his failure Sharon said that he would modify his plan for an Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and would continue pressing for its approval. Most vocal in the coalition in support of Sharon, voicing disappointment of the referendum was Shinuy, the liberal-center-right party, the shining star in Israeli politics. Tomy Lapid, the Shinuy leader, proves himself as one who has a very sharp eye in mapping popular tendencies and putting his weight in the right directions.
The referendum results deserve some analysis. Speaking from my limited experience, prior to starting promoting the Gaza First Plan in 2000 I did a little survey. It was not an extensive methodological survey, but it did manifest some patterns. Most significant one was that the Plan appealed to people of different ideologies: left, middle and right. I spoke to many Likud supporters, more or less proportionally represented in my pool to their number in society. Most of them accepted the reasoning for a unilateral pullout from Gaza. Bearing this in mind, and the fact that Sharon does enjoy a strong hold over many Likud branches in the country suggests that there was a major effort to sabotage Sharon's disengagement plan.
Openly, Bibi Netanyahu, Silvan Shalom and Limor Livnat declared their support of the Plan, which makes things rather confusing. If Sharon and those three powerful figures all support the disengagement plan, how come it failed so miserably? Two explanations may be offered: (1) the four are loosing their grip over the Likud and other people are rising in influence: Uzi Landau, Israel Katz and Gila Gamliel. (2) at least some of the four (most likely Netanyahu) are playing double language: in public they support the Plan and privately they instruct their followers to vote against it. Cynics may even suggest that Sharon himself had masterminded the results. Personally I would rule out this possibility but I would not rule out stabbing his back, Brutus style.
I was asked: Why did Sharon consult his party in the first place? The answer, simply put, is that he is obliged to do so by party statutes and regulations. For once he feels like the opponents he sabotaged so many times during his tenure in politics. Sharon now finds himself in a difficult situation. Polls show that some two thirds of the Israeli public support his plan but his own party does not. He would not like to alienate them but he would not like to give up his disengagement plan. He will seek ways to pursue the disengagement plan, maybe with some moderate revisions so as to shut up critique stemming from his own party. Maybe the Attorney General will help to further resolve the problem…
On Targeted Assassinations
The discussion continues. This time people think that I am too restrictive in my approach. Thus, for instance, Jonathan Zasloff wrote on 18 April:
Hi Rafi--
Good to hear from you. One note, just to get this off of my chest: I think that you let your interlocutors on targeted killings off way too easily, by conceding to them that the Yassin (and now presumably the Rantisi) killing was not justified. I think that this is quite wrong, for reasons that you yourself suggest.
Let's start with M's argument that it would have been impermissible to kill Al Capone, so why Yassin or anyone else? The answer, as you suggest, is that the political and military context is completely different. M's and Steve's argument contain a critical assumption: behavior under world politics is equivalent to that under domestic politics. I believe M said something to the effect that if it would be illegitimate under domestic law, then it should be under international law. This is inaccurate.
The reason why something would be illegitimate under domestic law is the assumption that the state has the adequate power to use a law enforcement approach and engage in due process: if it isn't, then it really isn't a domestic situation at all. We can put it another way: any attempt to use force against a criminal, or a terrorist, must be done without excessive force. This is hornbook international law. But excessive force varies greatly according to the circumstances. Again, as you point out, the IDF could not simply enter Gaza and arrest Yassin and/or Rantisi: if it could have, it would have done so already. Had it tried, not only would dozens of IDF soldiers have been killed, but dozens of Palestinian civilians would have as well. The reason why it would have been illegitimate to do the same to Capone is that law enforcement in the United States could have accomplished this--thus any attempt at a targeted killing would have been excessive. Al Capone was in 1920's Chicago, and actually submitted to federal jurisdiction; had he been an outlaw in the 19th Century west, the situation would have been completely different.
The touchstone, then, is excessive force, NOT whether the killing was "extrajudicial" or not. And this goes to the nature of the conflict. Virtually every international conflict yields extrajudicial killings. There is word for that: war. I continue to be amazed at the assertion that somehow it is okay to shoot at the grunts and the corporals, but if you target the generals, then you are somehow engaging in a war crime. Somehow it is "progressive" to protect the elite. It won't work.
It is no answer to say that one doesn't trust the executive to carry out these attacks, and that is why there must be due process. That, again, is the standard situation in war.
The REAL reason why M and Steve believe the attacks to be illegitimate, then, has nothing to do with whether they are extrajudicial. I'm not accusing them of bad faith, but rather of not thinking through their assumptions. At the bottom, they do not regard the current conflict as a war: they see it as a struggle for independence and self determination. If it illegitimate to use targeted killings on Hamas because Hamas is engaged in a legitimate struggle. This is their second critical assumption.
And this, of course, is patently false, as you point out by referencing Camp David 2000 (you could have also referenced the Clinton Plan of 2000, Taba of 2001, and the Palestinian reaction to the Nusseibeh/Ayalon Declaration of Principles, which has been complete rejection). This is NOT a war to determine whether there will be a Palestinian state: it is a war to determine whether there will be a Jewish state. Those who oppose targeted killings by Israel, and have thought through their assumptions, simply respond: "yes, that is what this war is about, and I would like the Palestinians to win it." But again, that has nothing to do with whether "extrajudicial" targeted killings are legitimate: it is about whether Israel is. It is about ends, not means.
Thus, I remain mystified as to your view of the Yassin killing. He was the political head of Hamas (at least in the territories); he was a key link in their strategic and operational command. He was able to unite and coordinate their various military commanders, and provided critical political unity to their operations in the territories. He was thus was a perfectly legitimate target. Killing him (and before him Shanab, and after him Rantisi) drove other leaders underground, made their communications more difficult, made their political activities more dangerous. (See Greg Myre's piece in the NYT today for some evidence regarding this) I simply fail to see why this was illegitimate. If during World War II we had been able to use the threat of an Apache strike against Hitler, we certainly would have done it, because it would have made it much more difficult for him and the Nazi Party to control military operations and the state apparatus. And we would have been perfectly justified in doing so. If we would have been able to do the same thing to Ho Chi Minh in the 50's and 60's, we would have tried to do so for the same reasons. Now, maybe that would have been less justified--but that is because of the justness of the war itself, not the technique.
Keep in mind as well that neither the killing of Yassin nor of Rantisi resulted in a single civilian casualty: the only people killed were their bodyguards and their adult families, who were themselves intimately involved in Hamas operations. And even if family members NOT involved in operations were killed, keep in mind again that this was Yassin's and Rantisi's choice: why is it that Israel should be condemned when Hamas leaders choose to turn their families into human shields just eludes me. Those who say that it does are in effect saying: Hamas should be given a free pass to commit terrorist acts, and Israel should not be able to respond. That makes no sense on an argument about means; it makes perfect sense if you want Israel to lose the war.
I do not want Israel to lose this war, despite my contempt for the Sharon government. I thus conclude that targeted killings that do not cause substantial civilian casualties are essentially justified and in fact the most moral form of warfare for Israel to wage. If they caused substantial casualties, then they MIGHT be another story, but neither the Yassin, Rantisi, nor Shanab operations caused such casualties. This is, so far, a very easy call.
My response:
Thanks for your comments. Yassin was not the political head of the Hamas. He was their spiritual leader. I don't think he was a key link in their strategic and operational command. The appropriate comparison therefore would be to Alfred Rosenberg rather than to Hitler. Rantisi is a different matter. His official title was not spiritual leader, like Yassin's, but the Head of the Hamas in the region. He was involved in the planning and operation of terror attacks on Israel. His past is saturated with blood. Hence I am more inclined to justify his assassination. I remain opposed to the Yassin assassination.
Yael Paz-Melamed, a leading columnist for Maariv, not only pondered the assassination of Yassir Arafat but recommended it. After Yassin's assassination, this is the natural, unavoidable next step. After all, Arafat's hands are not cleaner than the hands of Yassin. Quite the contrary. I wonder whether people on this list who condone Yassin's killing are also in favour of killing Arafat.
Sponsoring Settlements
The State Comptroller, Eliezer Goldberg, issued a new report that relates to funding settlements. His hardly surprising report found that the Housing and Construction Ministry inappropriately funneled $6.5 million to construction projects in the West Bank. Between January 2000 and June 2003, the Housing Ministry approved 77 contracts for projects in 33 West Bank areas without receiving the required approvals from the cabinet and the Defense Ministry. The report found that 18 of the contracts, worth about $4 million, were for outposts that the government had never approved, so-called "illegal settlements". In two cases the ministry paid for roads and building foundations at outposts that had already been slated for demolition. Credibility is a precious thing.
Ford Foundation
Ford money is still being used for anti-Israel activities, a recent NGO Monitor advises, drawing particular attention to the NGOs funded by Ford that engage in blatantly political anti-Israel activities. On 15 March 2004, NGO Monitor published an update (http://www.ngo-monitor.org/editions/v2n07/v2n07-3.htm) to ongoing investigations of Ford’s activities. Following publicity generated by NGO Monitor and the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Ford Foundation President Susan V. Berresford initiated a review and declared that it would act to ensure that funds no longer went to "groups that promote or condone bigotry or violence, or that challenged the very existence of legitimate, sovereign states like Israel." (http://ngo-monitor.org/editions/v2n04/v2n04-2.htm)
Some progress was noted, as Ford ceased funding for the Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights (LAW) and initiated a review of funding for the anti-Israel Habitat International Coalition (HIC) (http://www.ngo-monitor.org/editions/specialannouncement.htm). However, a number of recipients of Ford funding have continued to take part in anti-Israel activities that warrant a close review in the framework of the Ford Foundation’s funding policy.
Ford is listed as a donor (http://www.pchrgaza.org/about/funding.htm) to the Palestinian Center for Human Rights (PCHR), an organization analyzed by NGO Monitor that played a major role in the 2001 Durban conference and has demonstrated that its primary objective is the political and ideological demonization of Israel, in sharp contrast to its claims to promote universal human rights. (http://www.ngo-monitor.org/editions/v2n08/v2n08-4.htm)
Following the initial responses to the revelations of Ford’s role in funding anti-Israel NGOs, the Foundation has not moved quickly to fulfill the pledge to halt funding to groups that promote or condone bigotry or violence, or that challenge "the very existence of legitimate, sovereign states like Israel." However, Ford’s general guidelines have been incorporated in contracts for grants provided to universities. The Wall Street Journal of 6 May reported that this has led to some protests, based on the charge that these requirements could threaten academic freedom by inhibiting campus presentations of partisan lectures or films. However, according to press reports, two dozen universities have signed the new grant agreements without comment, and the Rockefeller Foundation has adopted similar guidelines. Alex Wilde, a spokesman for the Ford Foundation, said his organization is committed to academic freedom and plans to discuss the concerns with the schools. (Associated Press – 6 May 2004 http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/news/nation/8600831.htm?1c)
Independence Day
The main speaker at the Independence Day party in Washington was Collin Powell. It was heartening to listen to his speech which was warm and friendly to Israel, expressing deep support for our nation, appreciation to Israel's constant pursuit of peace; describing Israel as a democracy that seeks to promote justice and works to improve the well-being of our region. Powell reiterated American support of Israel, viewing Israel as a close and reliable ally. The speech included some words in Yiddish and some knowledge of Kabalah. Powell received loud applause for his efforts in those spheres and overall for his remarkable friendly tone and substance.
My family and I organized an Independence Day party at our home. People of different religions and nationalities gathered to celebrate the day. Our living room was coloured with white-and-blue ribbons and balloons. Aviva Raz-Shechter and Guy Shadmy from the Embassy had graciously sent us some material about Israel that received attention. Most of it was gone by the end of the party. Israeli music was playing at the background; Israeli dishes were served, and at the end of the party a video on Israel was played. It was a lively and enjoyable evening. Gilad, Dana, Roei and mostly Zehavit shared the organization efforts without which the party would never have materialized.
Interview to the Jewish Times
What follows is an interview I gave to the Jewish Times: first excerpts of the interview, and then the profile as published by the Senior Editor, Neil Rubin.
At Hopkins, completed a 10-year project, the book, “Euthanasia in the Netherlands.” Also working on another long term project, a book titled “The Scope of Tolerance,” which deals with media ethics and free speech issues. This is his third authored book on the topic.
Also working on two edited volumes on Israeli democracy/ started three years ago/ titled “Israeli Democracy at the Crossroads”
Also writing two academic journal articles/ media ownership in Israel, Canada and Germany and an article on “objectivity in the media,” something that fascinates him.
(Tell me about your work here.)
Taught 2 courses at Hopkins since arriving at the US in August 2003, one per term/ "Media, Violence and Pornography"/ this term “The Theatre of Terror,” about the triangle between government, media and terrorists. Will teach this course also in the summer term.
One may think that the media would side with the government vis-à-vis the terrorists. I show that was not always the case. During the course we develop some guidelines for responsible behavior by the media.
Last two courses were taught in D.C. at the School for Advanced Studies. The summer course will be taught in Baltimore.
In addition, I’m trying to raise money for the Center for Democratic Studies of which I am the director. The Center is designated to promote liberty, tolerance, equality and multiculturalism in Israel (look at material on website and provided. Please mention in article.)
The teaching and research have been productive and fruitful. The fund raising for the Center not so much. Unfortunately, without money the Center won’t move anywhere.
(You did your dissertation on Kahane. What was his impact on Israel?)
It was the first time in Israeli history that almost all of the house (Knesset) from left to right, were united to fight one member of the Knesset. It was unprecedented. The main issue is that Likud was part of the fight against Kahanism. The Knesset tried to deny Kahane of basic MK rights and Kahane appealed to the Supreme Court in protest. Kahane was a very isolated, marginal member of the Knesset and very frustrated. Then he was banned as a result of a law passed precisely in order to stop him.
In 1985 the Knesset amended 7-A to the effect that a racist and anti-democratic party could not compete in the elections. Then, when the legislator said its word, there was no way for Kahane to appeal successfully to the Supreme Court.
Kahane was conceived as racist and as a person working against Israeli democracy. So his representation in the Knesset was a short lived experiment. In the next election Kach was banned as was a splinter group, Kahane Chai. They tried to disguise themselves as other groups carrying different names, but it didn’t matter. All of those groups were not successful. They remained marginal. Their hardcore are among the settlers. If you would like those people resemble the militias in the United States – people (many of them American) who are against the government and the establishment. In this country they are Christian. In Israel they are Jewish. They collect arms. They are racists. They hate others. They are very similar.
I once talked to the Attorney General in Israel whom I won’t name. I asked him how you can allow Izhar, Kfar Tapuach and other settlements like this who have settlers who explicitly break the law, who enter Arab villages with the manifest intention to maim and inflict harm. He said, “I can’t stop them. It’s almost impossible to infiltrate those organizations.” The same thing is happening in the U.S.
(But going back to Kahane, does he have a legacy?)
He has followers. Whether he has a legacy, I don’t know. There are people who believe Kahane was right. Especially after the collapse of the Oslo Accords there were many signs saying “Kahane was right.” It was the first time in Israel’s short modern history that we had in our midst a Jewish Fascist, the first time we had a Jew living among us who was speaking of the Arabs as Nazis spoke of Jews. Some of us found it incomprehensible and disgusting.
Kahane was never mainstream, but his ideas are still appealing to some peripheral groups in Israeli society.
The groups are now associated with Baruch Marzel and Itamar Ben-Gvir. Even among the settlers those extremist groups are secluded, described as zealots. The settlers are quite cautious of them and often do not wish to cooperate with them.
(Can you tell me more about your views on the American militias?)
I just spoke about this yesterday evening in my class. The militias were more visible after Oklahoma City, but you hear very little about them now.
I asked my students what they know about the militias. This is a well educated group. They said these groups operated outside the law, are in the Midwest, and that the police are reluctant to go inside their territory. They did not know more than this.
There are some 400 hate groups in the US. Researchers often lump them all together – racists, Aryan supremacists, cults and militias. They operate in the Midwest and in the south. The U.S. has to ask itself whether it can afford to have so many groups operating outside the law. The police need to have the support of the community in order to monitor those groups successfully. The militias claim: we have the right to hold weapons just as the police does and we dare you to come to our places without a warrant or justified reason, or we’ll shoot you. I’m quite certain the FBI is cautiously following these people now, after September 11. They can’t afford another Oklahoma City, but people are prone to err, as Sept. 11 proved.
We’re talking about a few thousand activists in those groups. Many of them are now diverting their attention to the Internet. Some of the most magnificent sites are associated with those groups. It is a way for them to spread their vicious ideology and to attract followers.
In recent years the security forces have collected more information about those groups, but humans are prone to err and we know how determined these people are.
One thing that Americans have to understand is that they are isolated. I am amazed watching your news. You are so ignorant about what’s happening in the world. There are significant things happening all over the world, in Europe, Asia and Africa and most of the media don’t care, couldn’t care less. The insularism of the Super Power.
(Should Israel move toward separation of religion and state?)
Formally Britain doesn’t have separation between state and religion. The Queen is the head of the Anglican Church. But the unity is symbolic. That’s what I wish for Israel. I want symbols and traditions to be in that way, but not religious involvement in everyday life, especially not in most private matters like marriage and death. I don’t see why the state should have a role in that. The result is resentment toward religion. Some people tell me, “I don’t go to synagogue” and when I ask “Why?” they say, “because of Ovadia Yosef.” What’s that? This is ridiculous. Because you don’t like one single individual and his religious outlook you don’t want to practice anything? You hear such resentful statements much too often. Ovadia Yosef should not involve himself in politics. He would be better off, as most rabbis are, staying away from politics. When rabbis do involved themselves, it is awful for the state.
It will change. It’s a process – but I don’t know in what direction (you said with a smile)
It might be the case that at some point Israel will return to the days of the Bible. In Jerusalem we see that already. There are not many secular people around. The establishment in Jerusalem is more and more religious. A religious community surrounded by non-Jews (the Palestinians are the new Amori, Chity and Yevusi). Policy is more centralized and conservative. The majority of schools in Jerusalem are religious. However, this is not the case in the rest of Israel. Tel Aviv is very different. A bastion of secularism. The tension builds. To change events for the better we need different leadership, someone who thinks not only in the most immediate terms, but as a visionary. I don’t know if and when that guy or lady will appear. Then you need the public support to do separate between state and religion. I don’t see it happening in the near future.
(Should Israel sponsor religion in any way?)
It’s part of the Jewish state’s responsibility to sponsor such Jewish institutions, as it is its responsibility to support institutions like Tel Aviv University, The Hebrew University and the University of Haifa. What troubles me is the gulf between the two parties. We secular believe in live and let live. The religious people, particularly those who are more extreme, say, `We can’t allow that. If we allow that, then you secular are going to put holes in the Jewish boat in which we all live and consequently all of us will sink. It’s our responsibility to show you the light, that God exists and the final authority is God.’ This is a clash between two very fundamentally different ideologies which are incompatible. One believes in live and let live. The other believes that belief is dangerous.
Religious people can’t have the cake and eat it too by saying `You leave us alone, but we are entitled to interfere in your lives.’ It’s not going to work in the long run.
(Can you share your views on the U.S. media and its role in reporting the Iraq War? There have been complaints by some that the media here is too pro-U.S. and not questioning the Bush administration.)
I’m not a big fan of the American electronic media. I watch CNN and as said they put much too emphasis on local issues and on fluffy news. I read the Baltimore Sun, The New York Times and The Washington Post. To say that they are soft on the administration is almost ridiculous. There’s constant criticism of the American administration. It’s true for all of three papers.
(Some people think CNN is biased against Israel. Do you see that?)
I watched the CNN coverage of one of the last suicide bombings. Four Israelis were killed and some were injured. CNN showed some pictures from the scene and the next item was about James Brown. There was no transition period. A second ago it was Israel, blood and terrorism and immediately afterwards we are back at the studio and the announcer, with the big smile on his face, speaks of “the new James Brown” and shows some ridicules photo of Brown. This lack of sensitivity to suffering does not happen in Israel. The geographic remoteness plays a role.
I think the electronic media, generally speaking, just don’t care much about what’s going on outside of the U.S. I have not conducted a detailed research, but it seems to me that 90 percent of the 7 to 8 a.m. news has to do with the U.S., and this is a very lenient estimation. The news are so secluded and insular. It’s the insularity of an empire.
Often times I confront my students with these questions. Many of my students work for the media or the government or P.R. I asked what do you have to say about the fact that the U.S. media are not interested in what’s going on in this world? Most of them say they understand this. The USA is a big country; there’s a lot going on, and it’s what people want to hear. Now I come from a very different culture, Israel, a very small country. Possibly you can make an argument that because we are so tiny and so vulnerable, and because we see ourselves as part of Europe that our media reflect that. We take care of what’s going on in Europe, the Middle East and America because they all affect us. Some people think it’s good that the American people and the American media (not the American government) are concerned mainly about the US, but I don’t think so. Anyway, when I discuss this with my students, I just want them to be aware of the peripheriality of their news.
The USA is a superpower, but very ignorant of other cultures and languages. Most Americans speak no languages other than American. There are consequences. An ignorant president is one of them. It’s not a very educated society about foreign issues.
(Can you share your views on the war in Iraq?)
I support the war in Iraq. I was one of the few people in my circle who supported it without any reservations. Having said that, when Bush declared war on terror I was puzzled because I didn’t know whether he knew what he was saying, what it meant, and I didn’t know if he was serious about it. I thought it was impossible. If you look at the webs of terror all over the world, you find dozens of organizations. It’s not only in the Middle East, but also in South America, the Philippines, Africa, Asia, there are so many of them. So what does it mean that he declares war on terror? Does he intend to wage war on terror in four corners of the world, on all countries that are involved? It is ambitious even for the only superpower of the world.
(How would you go about this?)
First you want to track down ways the money comes in. Terrorism is state-sponsored. We know what is the axis of evil of countries that support terror – Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Syria, North Korea, Sudan, Yemen, Lebanon. All but one are Arab and Muslim countries. Are you going to declare war on all of them, together or one after the other? It’s ridiculous. It is not prudent to do it. So When Bush went after Iraq he shifted the emphasis to weapons of mass destruction in order to get the Congress' support.
I didn’t have any problem with the war in Iraq because as an Israeli I have been suffering from its sponsorship of terrorism. I don’t forget the 1991 Gulf War, the Iraqi missal attack on Israel. I am aware that Saddam gave $25,000 to each suicide murder’s family and $5,000 to people who cooperated with terrorists.
(One of your specialties is the limits of democracy. What do you think of the Bush administration’s push for democracy in the Arab world?)
Democracy in the Arab world is a very tricky issue. The U.S. can be successful in this only if they have the ability to sustain casualties in the long run, to convince the American public it’s worthwhile. American people may say: look at our great empire. Public education here is not very good, to use a British understatement. Public health is one of the worse in the western world, arguably the worst. Public transportation is horrible – Baltimore is a testimony. Much of the cities infrastructure is underdeveloped. One can ask why should the USA invest so much money in Iraq when I don’t have adequate basic needs -- healthcare, education and public transportation, to name only three?
The process of building a democracy in Iraq will take years if not dozens of years.
The American public could probably live for a long period of time with five casualties per week. But if there will be 50 casualties per week, I’m not sure. If you have many incidents like Fallujah, I don’t think any administration could take such heat.
Of course, a lot depends on the coming elections. Things may change by the end of the year.
Mr. Rubin had to cut substantial parts for the Profile he wrote. I think he did quite a good job. I thank him for his professional conduct. Here is what he wrote.
Israel Scholar Reflects On Year At JHU
Neil Rubin Senior Editor
APRIL 30, 2004
Like the man himself, Dr. Raphael Cohen-Almagor's office at Johns Hopkins University is simultaneously peaceful and on the run.
Spring sunlight streams into the room as pleasant jazz music dances from two small computer speakers, which themselves adorn one of three tabletops strewn with research documents ranging from medical ethics to democracy's limits to media behavior. After stuffing thick large envelopes for a pending conference, Dr. Cohen-Almagor sits for an interview. Sort of. The telephone keeps ringing, and he keeps answering. When off the phone, he responds to questions by citing academic articles and saying, "Wait, I can print it."
At age 42, the University of Haifa professor, soon wrapping up a year as a visiting fellow at JHU's Institute for Policy Studies, has penned more than 70 academic essays in English, French, Romanian, Spanish and Hebrew. Two books are in print, one more was finished this year and another is being polished. Five others have been edited, with two more nearing completion. Periodically, colleagues receive and participate in his "blog" — ruminations on the day's issues. The banter over Israel's policy of targeted assassinations was excerpted in the Sunday, April 25 Washington Post.
Perhaps sitting on Israeli buses for countless hours — he does not have a driver's license — offers more time. Maybe that's how he finished two volumes of Hebrew poetry.
While in Baltimore with his wife, Zehavit, and their three children, he has taught a course on "media, violence and pornography" and another on the relationship between the government, media and terrorists.
"One may think that the media would side with the government vis-a-vis the terrorists. I show that's not always the case," he said. "During the course we develop some guidelines for responsible behavior by the media."
His only disappointment here is not raising funds for Haifa University's Center for Democratic Studies, which he heads. The institute arose after the Rabin assassination and focuses, he has written, on promoting "liberty, tolerance, equality, justice, peace and multi-culturalism in our troubled society."
Dr. Cohen-Almagor's doctoral thesis focused on the now late Knesset member Rabbi Meir Kahane, known for controversial hard-right views on the Israel-Arab conflict.
"It was the first time in Israeli history that almost all of the Knesset, from left to right, were united to fight one member," he said of Rabbi Kahane. "He was a very isolated, marginal member of the Knesset and very frustrated. Then he was banned as a result of a law passed precisely in order to stop him."
Today, a few radical groups praise Kahane and "Kahane was right" signs are seen throughout Israel. It is analogous, Dr. Cohen-Almagor said, to the militia movement here.
"In this country, they are Christian. In Israel, they are Jewish. They collect arms. They are racists. They hate others. They are very similar," he said.
The secularist believes Israel must promote Judaism, but symbolically — as in Great Britain. That includes promoting university study and Shabbat as an official day of rest, allowing Palestinians to do so on Friday. Coercion on issues of personal status or even shopping, however, should not be allowed.
Change, by the way, is likely on the country's religious/secular divide, but not to his liking, he said with a chuckle.
"It might be the case that at some point that Israel will return to the days of the Bible. In Jerusalem we see that already," he said, noting Tel Aviv is the inverse.
"We secular believe in live and let live," he said. "The religious, particularly those who are more extreme, say, `We can't allow that. If we allow that, then you secular are going to put holes in the Jewish boat in which we all live and consequently all of us will sink. It's our responsibility to show you the light, that God exists and the final authority is God.' This is a clash between two very fundamentally different ideologies which are incompatible."
While here, he has been disturbed by Americans' lack of connection to the global community.
"You are so ignorant about what's happening in the world," he said. "There are significant things happening in Europe, Asia and Africa and most of the media don't care, couldn't care less. The insularism of a super power ... Possibly you can make an argument that because we [in Israel] are so little and so vulnerable, and because we see ourselves as part of Europe, that our media reflects that. ... Some people think it's good that the American people and media — not the government — are mainly concerned about the U.S., but I don't think so.
"Most Americans speak no languages other than American," he continued. "There are consequences. An ignorant president is one of them. It's not a very educated society about foreign issues."
Yet, he favored the U.S.-led attack on Iraq as a citizen in a country that suffered from Iraq's sponsorship of terrorism. That said, the expert on democracy wonders about the patience needed for the long haul.
As he said, "Public education here is not very good, to use a British understatement. Public transportation is horrible; Baltimore is a testimony. One can ask, 'Why should we invest so much money in Iraq seeing as how I don't have adequate basic needs — health care, education and public education, to name only three?' The process of building a democracy in Iraq will take years, if not dozens of years."
First Arab Team to Win the Israel Football Cup
Bnei Sachnin football club on the Israel Cup after winning 4:1 v. Hapoeal Haifa. This is a truly historical event: first time in Israel's history for an Arab team to win the cup. Bnei Sachnin will represent Israel next year in the UEFA Cup, the third most important cup in Europe. Good luck!!
New Books
Hearty congratulations to Valerie Alia and Joseph Magnet on their new books:
V. Alia, Media Ethics and Social Change, Edinburgh University Press (published in US and Canada by Routledge, NY). Just released, April 2004.
J. Magnet, Modern Constitutionalism: Identity, Equality and Democracy (Butterworths, 2004).
I urge you to order the books for your respective libraries.
I read only the review of Ben Cramer, How Israel Lost: The Four Questions (NY: Simon and Schuster, 2004). Sounds like a good read.
With my very best wishes, as ever,
Rafi
My last communications are available on http://almagor.blogspot.com
Earlier posts at my home page: http://lib-stu.haifa.ac.il/staff/rcohen-Almagor
Dear friends and colleagues,
On Gaza, Sharon's Setback, Targeted Assassinations, Sponsoring Settlements, Ford Foundation, Independence Day Parties, Interview to the Jewish Times, First Arab Team to Win the Israel Football Cup, and New Books
On Gaza
I was asked what I think of Sharon's Plan. I have to say that when I first heard of Sharon's plan I was quite skeptic. Now that is published in some more details, it is very much the way I wanted it to be implemented. If you look at what I wrote back in 2000 you will find many resemblances between my suggestion and Sharon's. The only places where we differ concern my suggestions to invite Arafat to declare his statehood in Gaza. Sharon is still reluctant to officially acknowledge and welcome a Palestinian State; and secondly, my idea of coordination with the PA. Actually, on this issue I think Israel did not reveal all pertinent information. I would not be surprised if Israel coordinates to one extent or another its maneuvers with Dachlan.
Meanwhile, more blood has been shed in Gaza. Killings on both sides. Israel carried out a wide scale operation after 13 soldiers were killed. At least 20 Palestinians were killed on May 18, 2004 as the Israel Defense Forces launched its operation in Rafah, on the Gaza-Egypt border, aimed at halting weapons smuggling, and arresting or killing militants. Three children, including a 13-year-old boy and his 16-year-old sister, were reportedly among the dead. On May 20, the IDF killed at least ten more Palestinians who were marching in protest against the Israeli curfew. Four of them children: Walid Abu Kamar, 10 y-o; Mubarac Al-Hashash, 11 y-o; Machmud Mansur, 13 y-o; Ahmed Abu-Said, 14 y-o. More than sisty people were injured, including 16 children. Hundreds of Palestinians were reported fleeing from Rafah as the IDF went in. How the Israeli prudent government thinks those measures are going to solve our problems is a great wonder to me.
Amnesty international has published a very critical report of Israeli conduct, arguing that in recent years the Israeli army has demolished thousands of homes and properties as well as vast areas of agricultural land in Israel and in the Occupied Territories. Tens of thousands of men, women and children have been made homeless or have lost their source of livelihood. Many more live in fear that they will be next.
The report maintained that although Israel has for decades been pursuing a policy of demolishing the homes of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories and the homes of Israeli Arabs in Israel, in the past three and a half years the scale of the destruction has reached an unprecedented level.
House demolitions are usually carried out without warning, often at night, and the occupants are given little or no time to leave their homes and salvage their belongings. The victims are often amongst the poorest and most disadvantaged in society. In the wake of the demolitions, families return to the ruins of their homes searching for whatever can be salvaged from under the rubble – including passports or other documents.
Further information is available at http://web.amnesty.org/pages/isr-index-eng
On Sharon's Setback
On Sunday, May 2, Sharon had received a blow from his own party which rejected his disengagement plan from Gaza. Sharon, a lifelong hawk who has been a leading advocate of settlement-building for decades, was unable to persuade the Likud to back the plan. The party rejected the Gaza pullout proposal 60 percent to 40 percent. This casts doubts on the plan's future as well as on the stability of the government. It is a major blow to Israel. A day after his failure Sharon said that he would modify his plan for an Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and would continue pressing for its approval. Most vocal in the coalition in support of Sharon, voicing disappointment of the referendum was Shinuy, the liberal-center-right party, the shining star in Israeli politics. Tomy Lapid, the Shinuy leader, proves himself as one who has a very sharp eye in mapping popular tendencies and putting his weight in the right directions.
The referendum results deserve some analysis. Speaking from my limited experience, prior to starting promoting the Gaza First Plan in 2000 I did a little survey. It was not an extensive methodological survey, but it did manifest some patterns. Most significant one was that the Plan appealed to people of different ideologies: left, middle and right. I spoke to many Likud supporters, more or less proportionally represented in my pool to their number in society. Most of them accepted the reasoning for a unilateral pullout from Gaza. Bearing this in mind, and the fact that Sharon does enjoy a strong hold over many Likud branches in the country suggests that there was a major effort to sabotage Sharon's disengagement plan.
Openly, Bibi Netanyahu, Silvan Shalom and Limor Livnat declared their support of the Plan, which makes things rather confusing. If Sharon and those three powerful figures all support the disengagement plan, how come it failed so miserably? Two explanations may be offered: (1) the four are loosing their grip over the Likud and other people are rising in influence: Uzi Landau, Israel Katz and Gila Gamliel. (2) at least some of the four (most likely Netanyahu) are playing double language: in public they support the Plan and privately they instruct their followers to vote against it. Cynics may even suggest that Sharon himself had masterminded the results. Personally I would rule out this possibility but I would not rule out stabbing his back, Brutus style.
I was asked: Why did Sharon consult his party in the first place? The answer, simply put, is that he is obliged to do so by party statutes and regulations. For once he feels like the opponents he sabotaged so many times during his tenure in politics. Sharon now finds himself in a difficult situation. Polls show that some two thirds of the Israeli public support his plan but his own party does not. He would not like to alienate them but he would not like to give up his disengagement plan. He will seek ways to pursue the disengagement plan, maybe with some moderate revisions so as to shut up critique stemming from his own party. Maybe the Attorney General will help to further resolve the problem…
On Targeted Assassinations
The discussion continues. This time people think that I am too restrictive in my approach. Thus, for instance, Jonathan Zasloff wrote on 18 April:
Hi Rafi--
Good to hear from you. One note, just to get this off of my chest: I think that you let your interlocutors on targeted killings off way too easily, by conceding to them that the Yassin (and now presumably the Rantisi) killing was not justified. I think that this is quite wrong, for reasons that you yourself suggest.
Let's start with M's argument that it would have been impermissible to kill Al Capone, so why Yassin or anyone else? The answer, as you suggest, is that the political and military context is completely different. M's and Steve's argument contain a critical assumption: behavior under world politics is equivalent to that under domestic politics. I believe M said something to the effect that if it would be illegitimate under domestic law, then it should be under international law. This is inaccurate.
The reason why something would be illegitimate under domestic law is the assumption that the state has the adequate power to use a law enforcement approach and engage in due process: if it isn't, then it really isn't a domestic situation at all. We can put it another way: any attempt to use force against a criminal, or a terrorist, must be done without excessive force. This is hornbook international law. But excessive force varies greatly according to the circumstances. Again, as you point out, the IDF could not simply enter Gaza and arrest Yassin and/or Rantisi: if it could have, it would have done so already. Had it tried, not only would dozens of IDF soldiers have been killed, but dozens of Palestinian civilians would have as well. The reason why it would have been illegitimate to do the same to Capone is that law enforcement in the United States could have accomplished this--thus any attempt at a targeted killing would have been excessive. Al Capone was in 1920's Chicago, and actually submitted to federal jurisdiction; had he been an outlaw in the 19th Century west, the situation would have been completely different.
The touchstone, then, is excessive force, NOT whether the killing was "extrajudicial" or not. And this goes to the nature of the conflict. Virtually every international conflict yields extrajudicial killings. There is word for that: war. I continue to be amazed at the assertion that somehow it is okay to shoot at the grunts and the corporals, but if you target the generals, then you are somehow engaging in a war crime. Somehow it is "progressive" to protect the elite. It won't work.
It is no answer to say that one doesn't trust the executive to carry out these attacks, and that is why there must be due process. That, again, is the standard situation in war.
The REAL reason why M and Steve believe the attacks to be illegitimate, then, has nothing to do with whether they are extrajudicial. I'm not accusing them of bad faith, but rather of not thinking through their assumptions. At the bottom, they do not regard the current conflict as a war: they see it as a struggle for independence and self determination. If it illegitimate to use targeted killings on Hamas because Hamas is engaged in a legitimate struggle. This is their second critical assumption.
And this, of course, is patently false, as you point out by referencing Camp David 2000 (you could have also referenced the Clinton Plan of 2000, Taba of 2001, and the Palestinian reaction to the Nusseibeh/Ayalon Declaration of Principles, which has been complete rejection). This is NOT a war to determine whether there will be a Palestinian state: it is a war to determine whether there will be a Jewish state. Those who oppose targeted killings by Israel, and have thought through their assumptions, simply respond: "yes, that is what this war is about, and I would like the Palestinians to win it." But again, that has nothing to do with whether "extrajudicial" targeted killings are legitimate: it is about whether Israel is. It is about ends, not means.
Thus, I remain mystified as to your view of the Yassin killing. He was the political head of Hamas (at least in the territories); he was a key link in their strategic and operational command. He was able to unite and coordinate their various military commanders, and provided critical political unity to their operations in the territories. He was thus was a perfectly legitimate target. Killing him (and before him Shanab, and after him Rantisi) drove other leaders underground, made their communications more difficult, made their political activities more dangerous. (See Greg Myre's piece in the NYT today for some evidence regarding this) I simply fail to see why this was illegitimate. If during World War II we had been able to use the threat of an Apache strike against Hitler, we certainly would have done it, because it would have made it much more difficult for him and the Nazi Party to control military operations and the state apparatus. And we would have been perfectly justified in doing so. If we would have been able to do the same thing to Ho Chi Minh in the 50's and 60's, we would have tried to do so for the same reasons. Now, maybe that would have been less justified--but that is because of the justness of the war itself, not the technique.
Keep in mind as well that neither the killing of Yassin nor of Rantisi resulted in a single civilian casualty: the only people killed were their bodyguards and their adult families, who were themselves intimately involved in Hamas operations. And even if family members NOT involved in operations were killed, keep in mind again that this was Yassin's and Rantisi's choice: why is it that Israel should be condemned when Hamas leaders choose to turn their families into human shields just eludes me. Those who say that it does are in effect saying: Hamas should be given a free pass to commit terrorist acts, and Israel should not be able to respond. That makes no sense on an argument about means; it makes perfect sense if you want Israel to lose the war.
I do not want Israel to lose this war, despite my contempt for the Sharon government. I thus conclude that targeted killings that do not cause substantial civilian casualties are essentially justified and in fact the most moral form of warfare for Israel to wage. If they caused substantial casualties, then they MIGHT be another story, but neither the Yassin, Rantisi, nor Shanab operations caused such casualties. This is, so far, a very easy call.
My response:
Thanks for your comments. Yassin was not the political head of the Hamas. He was their spiritual leader. I don't think he was a key link in their strategic and operational command. The appropriate comparison therefore would be to Alfred Rosenberg rather than to Hitler. Rantisi is a different matter. His official title was not spiritual leader, like Yassin's, but the Head of the Hamas in the region. He was involved in the planning and operation of terror attacks on Israel. His past is saturated with blood. Hence I am more inclined to justify his assassination. I remain opposed to the Yassin assassination.
Yael Paz-Melamed, a leading columnist for Maariv, not only pondered the assassination of Yassir Arafat but recommended it. After Yassin's assassination, this is the natural, unavoidable next step. After all, Arafat's hands are not cleaner than the hands of Yassin. Quite the contrary. I wonder whether people on this list who condone Yassin's killing are also in favour of killing Arafat.
Sponsoring Settlements
The State Comptroller, Eliezer Goldberg, issued a new report that relates to funding settlements. His hardly surprising report found that the Housing and Construction Ministry inappropriately funneled $6.5 million to construction projects in the West Bank. Between January 2000 and June 2003, the Housing Ministry approved 77 contracts for projects in 33 West Bank areas without receiving the required approvals from the cabinet and the Defense Ministry. The report found that 18 of the contracts, worth about $4 million, were for outposts that the government had never approved, so-called "illegal settlements". In two cases the ministry paid for roads and building foundations at outposts that had already been slated for demolition. Credibility is a precious thing.
Ford Foundation
Ford money is still being used for anti-Israel activities, a recent NGO Monitor advises, drawing particular attention to the NGOs funded by Ford that engage in blatantly political anti-Israel activities. On 15 March 2004, NGO Monitor published an update (http://www.ngo-monitor.org/editions/v2n07/v2n07-3.htm) to ongoing investigations of Ford’s activities. Following publicity generated by NGO Monitor and the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Ford Foundation President Susan V. Berresford initiated a review and declared that it would act to ensure that funds no longer went to "groups that promote or condone bigotry or violence, or that challenged the very existence of legitimate, sovereign states like Israel." (http://ngo-monitor.org/editions/v2n04/v2n04-2.htm)
Some progress was noted, as Ford ceased funding for the Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights (LAW) and initiated a review of funding for the anti-Israel Habitat International Coalition (HIC) (http://www.ngo-monitor.org/editions/specialannouncement.htm). However, a number of recipients of Ford funding have continued to take part in anti-Israel activities that warrant a close review in the framework of the Ford Foundation’s funding policy.
Ford is listed as a donor (http://www.pchrgaza.org/about/funding.htm) to the Palestinian Center for Human Rights (PCHR), an organization analyzed by NGO Monitor that played a major role in the 2001 Durban conference and has demonstrated that its primary objective is the political and ideological demonization of Israel, in sharp contrast to its claims to promote universal human rights. (http://www.ngo-monitor.org/editions/v2n08/v2n08-4.htm)
Following the initial responses to the revelations of Ford’s role in funding anti-Israel NGOs, the Foundation has not moved quickly to fulfill the pledge to halt funding to groups that promote or condone bigotry or violence, or that challenge "the very existence of legitimate, sovereign states like Israel." However, Ford’s general guidelines have been incorporated in contracts for grants provided to universities. The Wall Street Journal of 6 May reported that this has led to some protests, based on the charge that these requirements could threaten academic freedom by inhibiting campus presentations of partisan lectures or films. However, according to press reports, two dozen universities have signed the new grant agreements without comment, and the Rockefeller Foundation has adopted similar guidelines. Alex Wilde, a spokesman for the Ford Foundation, said his organization is committed to academic freedom and plans to discuss the concerns with the schools. (Associated Press – 6 May 2004 http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/news/nation/8600831.htm?1c)
Independence Day
The main speaker at the Independence Day party in Washington was Collin Powell. It was heartening to listen to his speech which was warm and friendly to Israel, expressing deep support for our nation, appreciation to Israel's constant pursuit of peace; describing Israel as a democracy that seeks to promote justice and works to improve the well-being of our region. Powell reiterated American support of Israel, viewing Israel as a close and reliable ally. The speech included some words in Yiddish and some knowledge of Kabalah. Powell received loud applause for his efforts in those spheres and overall for his remarkable friendly tone and substance.
My family and I organized an Independence Day party at our home. People of different religions and nationalities gathered to celebrate the day. Our living room was coloured with white-and-blue ribbons and balloons. Aviva Raz-Shechter and Guy Shadmy from the Embassy had graciously sent us some material about Israel that received attention. Most of it was gone by the end of the party. Israeli music was playing at the background; Israeli dishes were served, and at the end of the party a video on Israel was played. It was a lively and enjoyable evening. Gilad, Dana, Roei and mostly Zehavit shared the organization efforts without which the party would never have materialized.
Interview to the Jewish Times
What follows is an interview I gave to the Jewish Times: first excerpts of the interview, and then the profile as published by the Senior Editor, Neil Rubin.
At Hopkins, completed a 10-year project, the book, “Euthanasia in the Netherlands.” Also working on another long term project, a book titled “The Scope of Tolerance,” which deals with media ethics and free speech issues. This is his third authored book on the topic.
Also working on two edited volumes on Israeli democracy/ started three years ago/ titled “Israeli Democracy at the Crossroads”
Also writing two academic journal articles/ media ownership in Israel, Canada and Germany and an article on “objectivity in the media,” something that fascinates him.
(Tell me about your work here.)
Taught 2 courses at Hopkins since arriving at the US in August 2003, one per term/ "Media, Violence and Pornography"/ this term “The Theatre of Terror,” about the triangle between government, media and terrorists. Will teach this course also in the summer term.
One may think that the media would side with the government vis-à-vis the terrorists. I show that was not always the case. During the course we develop some guidelines for responsible behavior by the media.
Last two courses were taught in D.C. at the School for Advanced Studies. The summer course will be taught in Baltimore.
In addition, I’m trying to raise money for the Center for Democratic Studies of which I am the director. The Center is designated to promote liberty, tolerance, equality and multiculturalism in Israel (look at material on website and provided. Please mention in article.)
The teaching and research have been productive and fruitful. The fund raising for the Center not so much. Unfortunately, without money the Center won’t move anywhere.
(You did your dissertation on Kahane. What was his impact on Israel?)
It was the first time in Israeli history that almost all of the house (Knesset) from left to right, were united to fight one member of the Knesset. It was unprecedented. The main issue is that Likud was part of the fight against Kahanism. The Knesset tried to deny Kahane of basic MK rights and Kahane appealed to the Supreme Court in protest. Kahane was a very isolated, marginal member of the Knesset and very frustrated. Then he was banned as a result of a law passed precisely in order to stop him.
In 1985 the Knesset amended 7-A to the effect that a racist and anti-democratic party could not compete in the elections. Then, when the legislator said its word, there was no way for Kahane to appeal successfully to the Supreme Court.
Kahane was conceived as racist and as a person working against Israeli democracy. So his representation in the Knesset was a short lived experiment. In the next election Kach was banned as was a splinter group, Kahane Chai. They tried to disguise themselves as other groups carrying different names, but it didn’t matter. All of those groups were not successful. They remained marginal. Their hardcore are among the settlers. If you would like those people resemble the militias in the United States – people (many of them American) who are against the government and the establishment. In this country they are Christian. In Israel they are Jewish. They collect arms. They are racists. They hate others. They are very similar.
I once talked to the Attorney General in Israel whom I won’t name. I asked him how you can allow Izhar, Kfar Tapuach and other settlements like this who have settlers who explicitly break the law, who enter Arab villages with the manifest intention to maim and inflict harm. He said, “I can’t stop them. It’s almost impossible to infiltrate those organizations.” The same thing is happening in the U.S.
(But going back to Kahane, does he have a legacy?)
He has followers. Whether he has a legacy, I don’t know. There are people who believe Kahane was right. Especially after the collapse of the Oslo Accords there were many signs saying “Kahane was right.” It was the first time in Israel’s short modern history that we had in our midst a Jewish Fascist, the first time we had a Jew living among us who was speaking of the Arabs as Nazis spoke of Jews. Some of us found it incomprehensible and disgusting.
Kahane was never mainstream, but his ideas are still appealing to some peripheral groups in Israeli society.
The groups are now associated with Baruch Marzel and Itamar Ben-Gvir. Even among the settlers those extremist groups are secluded, described as zealots. The settlers are quite cautious of them and often do not wish to cooperate with them.
(Can you tell me more about your views on the American militias?)
I just spoke about this yesterday evening in my class. The militias were more visible after Oklahoma City, but you hear very little about them now.
I asked my students what they know about the militias. This is a well educated group. They said these groups operated outside the law, are in the Midwest, and that the police are reluctant to go inside their territory. They did not know more than this.
There are some 400 hate groups in the US. Researchers often lump them all together – racists, Aryan supremacists, cults and militias. They operate in the Midwest and in the south. The U.S. has to ask itself whether it can afford to have so many groups operating outside the law. The police need to have the support of the community in order to monitor those groups successfully. The militias claim: we have the right to hold weapons just as the police does and we dare you to come to our places without a warrant or justified reason, or we’ll shoot you. I’m quite certain the FBI is cautiously following these people now, after September 11. They can’t afford another Oklahoma City, but people are prone to err, as Sept. 11 proved.
We’re talking about a few thousand activists in those groups. Many of them are now diverting their attention to the Internet. Some of the most magnificent sites are associated with those groups. It is a way for them to spread their vicious ideology and to attract followers.
In recent years the security forces have collected more information about those groups, but humans are prone to err and we know how determined these people are.
One thing that Americans have to understand is that they are isolated. I am amazed watching your news. You are so ignorant about what’s happening in the world. There are significant things happening all over the world, in Europe, Asia and Africa and most of the media don’t care, couldn’t care less. The insularism of the Super Power.
(Should Israel move toward separation of religion and state?)
Formally Britain doesn’t have separation between state and religion. The Queen is the head of the Anglican Church. But the unity is symbolic. That’s what I wish for Israel. I want symbols and traditions to be in that way, but not religious involvement in everyday life, especially not in most private matters like marriage and death. I don’t see why the state should have a role in that. The result is resentment toward religion. Some people tell me, “I don’t go to synagogue” and when I ask “Why?” they say, “because of Ovadia Yosef.” What’s that? This is ridiculous. Because you don’t like one single individual and his religious outlook you don’t want to practice anything? You hear such resentful statements much too often. Ovadia Yosef should not involve himself in politics. He would be better off, as most rabbis are, staying away from politics. When rabbis do involved themselves, it is awful for the state.
It will change. It’s a process – but I don’t know in what direction (you said with a smile)
It might be the case that at some point Israel will return to the days of the Bible. In Jerusalem we see that already. There are not many secular people around. The establishment in Jerusalem is more and more religious. A religious community surrounded by non-Jews (the Palestinians are the new Amori, Chity and Yevusi). Policy is more centralized and conservative. The majority of schools in Jerusalem are religious. However, this is not the case in the rest of Israel. Tel Aviv is very different. A bastion of secularism. The tension builds. To change events for the better we need different leadership, someone who thinks not only in the most immediate terms, but as a visionary. I don’t know if and when that guy or lady will appear. Then you need the public support to do separate between state and religion. I don’t see it happening in the near future.
(Should Israel sponsor religion in any way?)
It’s part of the Jewish state’s responsibility to sponsor such Jewish institutions, as it is its responsibility to support institutions like Tel Aviv University, The Hebrew University and the University of Haifa. What troubles me is the gulf between the two parties. We secular believe in live and let live. The religious people, particularly those who are more extreme, say, `We can’t allow that. If we allow that, then you secular are going to put holes in the Jewish boat in which we all live and consequently all of us will sink. It’s our responsibility to show you the light, that God exists and the final authority is God.’ This is a clash between two very fundamentally different ideologies which are incompatible. One believes in live and let live. The other believes that belief is dangerous.
Religious people can’t have the cake and eat it too by saying `You leave us alone, but we are entitled to interfere in your lives.’ It’s not going to work in the long run.
(Can you share your views on the U.S. media and its role in reporting the Iraq War? There have been complaints by some that the media here is too pro-U.S. and not questioning the Bush administration.)
I’m not a big fan of the American electronic media. I watch CNN and as said they put much too emphasis on local issues and on fluffy news. I read the Baltimore Sun, The New York Times and The Washington Post. To say that they are soft on the administration is almost ridiculous. There’s constant criticism of the American administration. It’s true for all of three papers.
(Some people think CNN is biased against Israel. Do you see that?)
I watched the CNN coverage of one of the last suicide bombings. Four Israelis were killed and some were injured. CNN showed some pictures from the scene and the next item was about James Brown. There was no transition period. A second ago it was Israel, blood and terrorism and immediately afterwards we are back at the studio and the announcer, with the big smile on his face, speaks of “the new James Brown” and shows some ridicules photo of Brown. This lack of sensitivity to suffering does not happen in Israel. The geographic remoteness plays a role.
I think the electronic media, generally speaking, just don’t care much about what’s going on outside of the U.S. I have not conducted a detailed research, but it seems to me that 90 percent of the 7 to 8 a.m. news has to do with the U.S., and this is a very lenient estimation. The news are so secluded and insular. It’s the insularity of an empire.
Often times I confront my students with these questions. Many of my students work for the media or the government or P.R. I asked what do you have to say about the fact that the U.S. media are not interested in what’s going on in this world? Most of them say they understand this. The USA is a big country; there’s a lot going on, and it’s what people want to hear. Now I come from a very different culture, Israel, a very small country. Possibly you can make an argument that because we are so tiny and so vulnerable, and because we see ourselves as part of Europe that our media reflect that. We take care of what’s going on in Europe, the Middle East and America because they all affect us. Some people think it’s good that the American people and the American media (not the American government) are concerned mainly about the US, but I don’t think so. Anyway, when I discuss this with my students, I just want them to be aware of the peripheriality of their news.
The USA is a superpower, but very ignorant of other cultures and languages. Most Americans speak no languages other than American. There are consequences. An ignorant president is one of them. It’s not a very educated society about foreign issues.
(Can you share your views on the war in Iraq?)
I support the war in Iraq. I was one of the few people in my circle who supported it without any reservations. Having said that, when Bush declared war on terror I was puzzled because I didn’t know whether he knew what he was saying, what it meant, and I didn’t know if he was serious about it. I thought it was impossible. If you look at the webs of terror all over the world, you find dozens of organizations. It’s not only in the Middle East, but also in South America, the Philippines, Africa, Asia, there are so many of them. So what does it mean that he declares war on terror? Does he intend to wage war on terror in four corners of the world, on all countries that are involved? It is ambitious even for the only superpower of the world.
(How would you go about this?)
First you want to track down ways the money comes in. Terrorism is state-sponsored. We know what is the axis of evil of countries that support terror – Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Syria, North Korea, Sudan, Yemen, Lebanon. All but one are Arab and Muslim countries. Are you going to declare war on all of them, together or one after the other? It’s ridiculous. It is not prudent to do it. So When Bush went after Iraq he shifted the emphasis to weapons of mass destruction in order to get the Congress' support.
I didn’t have any problem with the war in Iraq because as an Israeli I have been suffering from its sponsorship of terrorism. I don’t forget the 1991 Gulf War, the Iraqi missal attack on Israel. I am aware that Saddam gave $25,000 to each suicide murder’s family and $5,000 to people who cooperated with terrorists.
(One of your specialties is the limits of democracy. What do you think of the Bush administration’s push for democracy in the Arab world?)
Democracy in the Arab world is a very tricky issue. The U.S. can be successful in this only if they have the ability to sustain casualties in the long run, to convince the American public it’s worthwhile. American people may say: look at our great empire. Public education here is not very good, to use a British understatement. Public health is one of the worse in the western world, arguably the worst. Public transportation is horrible – Baltimore is a testimony. Much of the cities infrastructure is underdeveloped. One can ask why should the USA invest so much money in Iraq when I don’t have adequate basic needs -- healthcare, education and public transportation, to name only three?
The process of building a democracy in Iraq will take years if not dozens of years.
The American public could probably live for a long period of time with five casualties per week. But if there will be 50 casualties per week, I’m not sure. If you have many incidents like Fallujah, I don’t think any administration could take such heat.
Of course, a lot depends on the coming elections. Things may change by the end of the year.
Mr. Rubin had to cut substantial parts for the Profile he wrote. I think he did quite a good job. I thank him for his professional conduct. Here is what he wrote.
Israel Scholar Reflects On Year At JHU
Neil Rubin Senior Editor
APRIL 30, 2004
Like the man himself, Dr. Raphael Cohen-Almagor's office at Johns Hopkins University is simultaneously peaceful and on the run.
Spring sunlight streams into the room as pleasant jazz music dances from two small computer speakers, which themselves adorn one of three tabletops strewn with research documents ranging from medical ethics to democracy's limits to media behavior. After stuffing thick large envelopes for a pending conference, Dr. Cohen-Almagor sits for an interview. Sort of. The telephone keeps ringing, and he keeps answering. When off the phone, he responds to questions by citing academic articles and saying, "Wait, I can print it."
At age 42, the University of Haifa professor, soon wrapping up a year as a visiting fellow at JHU's Institute for Policy Studies, has penned more than 70 academic essays in English, French, Romanian, Spanish and Hebrew. Two books are in print, one more was finished this year and another is being polished. Five others have been edited, with two more nearing completion. Periodically, colleagues receive and participate in his "blog" — ruminations on the day's issues. The banter over Israel's policy of targeted assassinations was excerpted in the Sunday, April 25 Washington Post.
Perhaps sitting on Israeli buses for countless hours — he does not have a driver's license — offers more time. Maybe that's how he finished two volumes of Hebrew poetry.
While in Baltimore with his wife, Zehavit, and their three children, he has taught a course on "media, violence and pornography" and another on the relationship between the government, media and terrorists.
"One may think that the media would side with the government vis-a-vis the terrorists. I show that's not always the case," he said. "During the course we develop some guidelines for responsible behavior by the media."
His only disappointment here is not raising funds for Haifa University's Center for Democratic Studies, which he heads. The institute arose after the Rabin assassination and focuses, he has written, on promoting "liberty, tolerance, equality, justice, peace and multi-culturalism in our troubled society."
Dr. Cohen-Almagor's doctoral thesis focused on the now late Knesset member Rabbi Meir Kahane, known for controversial hard-right views on the Israel-Arab conflict.
"It was the first time in Israeli history that almost all of the Knesset, from left to right, were united to fight one member," he said of Rabbi Kahane. "He was a very isolated, marginal member of the Knesset and very frustrated. Then he was banned as a result of a law passed precisely in order to stop him."
Today, a few radical groups praise Kahane and "Kahane was right" signs are seen throughout Israel. It is analogous, Dr. Cohen-Almagor said, to the militia movement here.
"In this country, they are Christian. In Israel, they are Jewish. They collect arms. They are racists. They hate others. They are very similar," he said.
The secularist believes Israel must promote Judaism, but symbolically — as in Great Britain. That includes promoting university study and Shabbat as an official day of rest, allowing Palestinians to do so on Friday. Coercion on issues of personal status or even shopping, however, should not be allowed.
Change, by the way, is likely on the country's religious/secular divide, but not to his liking, he said with a chuckle.
"It might be the case that at some point that Israel will return to the days of the Bible. In Jerusalem we see that already," he said, noting Tel Aviv is the inverse.
"We secular believe in live and let live," he said. "The religious, particularly those who are more extreme, say, `We can't allow that. If we allow that, then you secular are going to put holes in the Jewish boat in which we all live and consequently all of us will sink. It's our responsibility to show you the light, that God exists and the final authority is God.' This is a clash between two very fundamentally different ideologies which are incompatible."
While here, he has been disturbed by Americans' lack of connection to the global community.
"You are so ignorant about what's happening in the world," he said. "There are significant things happening in Europe, Asia and Africa and most of the media don't care, couldn't care less. The insularism of a super power ... Possibly you can make an argument that because we [in Israel] are so little and so vulnerable, and because we see ourselves as part of Europe, that our media reflects that. ... Some people think it's good that the American people and media — not the government — are mainly concerned about the U.S., but I don't think so.
"Most Americans speak no languages other than American," he continued. "There are consequences. An ignorant president is one of them. It's not a very educated society about foreign issues."
Yet, he favored the U.S.-led attack on Iraq as a citizen in a country that suffered from Iraq's sponsorship of terrorism. That said, the expert on democracy wonders about the patience needed for the long haul.
As he said, "Public education here is not very good, to use a British understatement. Public transportation is horrible; Baltimore is a testimony. One can ask, 'Why should we invest so much money in Iraq seeing as how I don't have adequate basic needs — health care, education and public education, to name only three?' The process of building a democracy in Iraq will take years, if not dozens of years."
First Arab Team to Win the Israel Football Cup
Bnei Sachnin football club on the Israel Cup after winning 4:1 v. Hapoeal Haifa. This is a truly historical event: first time in Israel's history for an Arab team to win the cup. Bnei Sachnin will represent Israel next year in the UEFA Cup, the third most important cup in Europe. Good luck!!
New Books
Hearty congratulations to Valerie Alia and Joseph Magnet on their new books:
V. Alia, Media Ethics and Social Change, Edinburgh University Press (published in US and Canada by Routledge, NY). Just released, April 2004.
J. Magnet, Modern Constitutionalism: Identity, Equality and Democracy (Butterworths, 2004).
I urge you to order the books for your respective libraries.
I read only the review of Ben Cramer, How Israel Lost: The Four Questions (NY: Simon and Schuster, 2004). Sounds like a good read.
With my very best wishes, as ever,
Rafi
My last communications are available on http://almagor.blogspot.com
Earlier posts at my home page: http://lib-stu.haifa.ac.il/staff/rcohen-Almagor